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Foreword
	 In	 light	 of	 the	 recent	 global	 financial	 turmoil,	 the	 crisis	 in	
liquidity has received much attention because of its potential effect on 
various markets. Financial innovation and market developments have also 
changed the nature of liquidity crisis in recent years as the funding of some 
banks has shifted towards a greater dependence on the capital markets. A 
bank	may	be	solvent,	but	if	lenders	lose	confidence	in	the	bank’s	ability	to	
provide funds upon request, this can result in a liquidity crisis which can 
bring down an otherwise healthy institution in a short period of time. Once 
started, a liquidity crisis can be very hard to stop, as adverse dynamics 
may	feed	back	on	themselves.	Compared	to	other	financial	risks,	therefore,	
liquidity risk may be the most challenging, both in terms of measurement 
and management. 
  Recent  events  have  clearly  demonstrated  that  strengthened 
liquidity management practices are desirable to prepare banks for a period 
of	severe	liquidity	stress.	From	the	perspective	of	financial	institutions,	
sound liquidity management is crucial for reducing funding and market 
liquidity	 stresses.	 It	 also	 enables	 them	 to	 meet	 cash	 flow	 obligations	
without	affecting	daily	operations	or	financial	conditions	once	the	banking	
system comes under severe pressure. From the stance of central bankers, 
the recent episodes of liquidity support have prompted central banks to 
review an increasingly important liquidity management policy on how to 
strike	a	balance	between	preserving	financial	stability	and	avoiding	moral	
hazard	amid	financial	turmoil.	
  This  research  highlights  the  importance  of  understanding  and 
building  good  defences  against  liquidity  stress,  particularly  as  the 
macroeconomic	and	financial	market	developments	of	the	past	few	years	
have	 led	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 many	 banks’	 overall	 exposure	 to	 liquidity	
risk. This study explores various practices in liquidity measurement and 
management in SEACEN countries as well as the linkages and factors that 
affect different types of liquidity in the banking sector in the region. The 
study reveals that measuring and managing liquidity are non-trivial issues 
and proposes that differences in national liquidity regimes should be taken 
into account when designing liquidity management strategy for regulatory 
purposes.	We	hope	that	the	findings	and	suggestions	of	this	study	will	be	
valuable references to central bankers and other policy makers in their 
design of future liquidity supervision. iv
This collaborative research was led by Dr. Tientip Subhanij, Chief 
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A well known reason for the severity of such crisis lies in the propagation 
of original shock that is compounded by extreme bank funding fragility, 
forcing	fire	sales	across	all	markets.	The	funding	of	some	banks	has	shifted	
towards a greater dependence on the capital markets. These wholesale 
funding sources such as commercial papers, repurchase agreements, and 
other	commercial	money	market	instruments,	as	the	recent	financial	crisis	
illustrates, tend to be more volatile than traditional retail deposits and may 
pose additional challenges to liquidity risk management which is important 
for the long-run viability of a bank. 
	 In	the	US,	the	loss	of	investor	confidence	in	a	wide	range	of	
structured	 securities	 markets	 led	 to	 risks	 flowing	 onto	 banks’	 balance	
sheets. The initial shock in credit markets was transmitted through a fall 
in asset market liquidity, which led to an increase in funding risk. Money 
markets  tightened  internationally  as  banks  built  up  liquidity  to  meet 
contingent claims. Banks in SEACEN countries, on the contrary, remain 
resilient	to	the	global	financial	crisis	as	a	result	of	ample	liquidity	and	
traditional banking businesses pursued prior to the crisis. Banks in this 
region are mostly dependent on deposit and loan businesses, and hence 
have a range of defenses against a sudden decline in the availability of 
wholesale	funds.	In	this	context,	the	first	lesson	learned	is	that	a	market-
based	financial	system	relies	more,	and	not	less,	on	funding	liquidity.  
  In terms of counter-measures to liquidity pressures, banks usually 
have several strategies, i.e. transforming illiquid assets into cash, bidding 
for higher retail deposits and slowing or even reducing their lending to 
households  and  corporate  customers.  These  defenses,  however,  suffer 
from a common shortcoming. While they may work well when one bank 
is facing funding pressure on its own, every bank will attempt to use them 
at the same time when liquidity pressures are widespread. Therefore, there 
is one last line of defense left, which is what banks in SEACEN countries 
have executed, i.e., to hold a buffer of reliable high-quality liquid assets, 
such as Treasury bills or other government securities, which can be drawn 
on immediately and directly in the event of a sudden withdrawal of market 
liquidity or  an unexpected increase in funding requirement. Based on 
this experience, the second lesson, therefore, is that consideration should 
clearly be given to maintaining the holdings of very high-quality liquid vi




  Another lesson drawn from the recent episode is the disclosure 
practices in relation to liquidity risk management objectives. Strict and 
relatively comprehensive liquidity report submissions required by central 
banks in the region has enabled them to be proactive on liquidity risk 
management. These practices have also made it easier for central banks in 
the region to distinguish between solvent and illiquid banks and therefore 
impose liquidity cushions to the ones most in need.  
  In  terms  of  the  liquidity  environment,  the  SEACEN  country 
experiences  have  highlighted  the  important  role  played  by  deposit 
insurance  in  containing  runs  on  banks.  Although  deposit  insurance 
schemes,	narrowly	defined	as	those	designed	to	protect	retail	depositors,	
can perform a variety of roles, the one they are considered most relevant 




  For  central  banks,  the  opening  of  the  lending  window  more 
broadly, and ensuring the smooth functioning of the short-term money 
market as well as government bond market are also important in effective 
liquidity management. Although the existence of central bank lending 
facilities  can  be  viewed  as  a  double-edged  sword  as  it  could  cause 
“moral hazard” problems, experiences in this region indicate that banks 
usually use central bank liquidity only as the last resort to avoid negative 
interpretation	regarding	their	financial	health.	It	is	also	crucial	for	central	
banks to acknowledge systemic risk due to liquidity spirals and consider 
the system as a whole, as opposed to each institution in isolation.
  Going forward, there is little doubt that regulators will pay far 
more attention to liquidity management than they have in the past. In 
this environment, diversity in the national liquidity regimes should be vii
considered	and	the	heterogeneity	in	financial	market	conditions	should	be	
taken into account when designing liquidity management strategies. Factors 
such as deposit insurance arrangements, central bank lending policies and 
banks’	own	balance	sheet	choices	are	also	crucial	in	determining	banks’	
vulnerability to liquidity risk. Therefore, to build strong defenses against 
future	liquidity	crisis,	there	requires	a	good	understanding	of	a	country’s	
specific	regulatory	policies,	the	nature	of	banks’	assets	and	liabilities	as	
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LIQUIDITY MEASUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT
IN THE SEACEN ECONOMIES
by Tientip Subhanij1
1.   Introduction
Many past financial crises have highlighted the importance of 
liquidity for the well-functioning of the financial system. The recent global 
financial crisis which was unprecedented in scale and scope is no different. 
A well known reason for the severity of such crises lies in the propagation 
of the original shock that was compounded by extreme bank funding 
fragility, forcing fire sales across all markets (Brunnermeier, 2009). At the 
centre of this is the role played by banks which normally match savers 
who generally want to be able to withdraw their money at short notice with 
borrowers who often want to repay their loans over a longer period of time. 
This ‘maturity transformation’ function of banks which is necessary to 
allow money to be invested in a productive way by offering such maturity 
transformation, are inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk — the risk that 
a bank is unable to meet its commitments should depositors attempt to 
withdraw their funds ahead of the bank’s ability to repay them.2
Financial  innovation  and  market  developments  have  changed 
the nature of liquidity risk in recent years. The funding of some banks 
has shifted towards a greater dependence on the capital markets. These 
wholesale  funding  sources  such  as  commercial  papers,  repurchase 
agreements, and other commercial money market instruments, as the recent 
financial crisis illustrates, tend to be more volatile than traditional retail
1.   Chief Researcher, Economic Research Department, Bank of Thailand and concurrently 
Visiting Research Economist, The SEACEN Centre (OY2009/10). The author would 
like to thank Charles Adams, Reza Siregar and participants at workshops hosted by 
The SEACEN Centre for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are 
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The SEACEN Centre or 
Bank of Thailand. E-mail address: TientipS@bot.or.th 
2.    BCBS (2008b) distinguishes liquidity risk into two types: Funding liquidity risk and 
market liquidity risk. Funding liquidity risk is the risk that firm will not be able to meet 
efficiently both expected and unexpected current and future cash flow and collateral 
needs without affecting either daily operations or the financial condition of the firm. 
Market liquidity is the risk that a firm cannot easily offset or eliminate a position at the 
market price because of inadequate market depth or market disruption. 2
deposits and may pose additional challenges to liquidity risk management, 
which is important for the long-run viability of a bank. Compared to other 
financial risks, liquidity risk may be the most challenging, both in terms of 
measurement and management. 
As  many  bankers  have  found  to  their  detriment,  a  bank  may 
be well capitalised and profitable, but if lenders lose confidence in the 
bank’s ability to provide funds upon request, this may result in a liquidity 
crisis which can bring down an otherwise solvent institution in a short 
period of time. Once started, a liquidity crisis can be very hard to stop, as 
adverse dynamics may feed back on themselves. Liquidity risk can also be 
triggered through the realisation of other risks, such as the disclosure of 
large and unexpected trading losses, or the discovery of fraudulent activity 
within the bank. 
These issues illustrate why it is of paramount importance to form 
good defences against liquidity risk, particularly as the macroeconomic 
and financial market developments of the past few years have led to a rise 
in many banks’ overall exposure to liquidity risk. Although this changing 
financial environment has led to marked improvements in banks’ efficiency 
and management of other risks, liquidity risk management and supervision 
have not always kept pace. Recent events have clearly demonstrated that 
future strong defences are desirable to prepare banks for periods of severe 
liquidity stress. 
2.   Objectives of the Study
The objectives of this research are to create an understanding of 
practices in liquidity measurement and management in SEACEN countries 
as well as the linkages and factors that affect different types of liquidity in 
the banking sector in the region. The study aims to measure various kinds 
of liquidity, review management of liquidity risks including supervision 
practices and assess the central bank’s role in providing liquidity support. 
Lastly, the study provides lessons from liquidity management practices in 
the SEACEN countries and discusses policy recommendations to enhance 
sound practices to strengthen banks’ liquidity management and improve 
future supervisory processes. 3
3.   Conceptual Framework
3.1   The Notion of Liquidity 
 
It is important to distinguish solvency from liquidity. Solvency 
refers to a bank having more assets than liabilities so that the equity value is 
positive. Liquidity refers to the ability to fund increases in assets and meet 
obligations as they come due. Central to this definition is an assumption 
that obligations will be met “at reasonable cost”. This involves meeting 
uncertain cash flow obligations, which depend on development of external 
factors and behaviour of other market participants.  As discussed earlier, 
the fundamental role of banks in facilitating the maturity transformation 
of  short-term  deposits  into  long-term  loans,  makes  banks  inherently 
vulnerable to liquidity risk. 
It is important to note that “liquidity” is different from “capital”. 
Any understanding of liquidity risk should begin with an understanding 
of its key characteristics. Liquidity risk is different from other risks in 
many ways. First, liquidity risk is secondary risk in the sense that the rise 
in liquidity risk usually follows the increase in other financial risks. It is 
often called a “consequential risk.” Second, the coverage of liquidity risk 
is different from the coverage of other financial risks and so capital is only 
of limited usage here. Cash inflows need to be generated instead. This can 
be achieved, among other ways, by selling liquid, high-quality assets. The 
ability to sell assets, however, depends on bank’s balance sheet position, 
bank’s role in the market and the ability of the market to absorb additional 
assets sold by banks. 
This paper distinguishes three broad types of liquidity: central 
bank liquidity, funding liquidity and market liquidity. The first relates to 
the liquidity provided by the central bank, the second to the ability of 
banks to fund their positions, and the third to the ability of trading in the 
markets (Nikolaou, 2009). 
Central bank liquidity refers to the ability of the central bank to 
supply the liquidity to the financial system when needed. This is the flow 
of monetary base provided to the system by central banks via central bank 
operations either for routine or emergency liquidity facilities. 
Funding  liquidity  refers  to  the  ability  of  banks  to  meet  their 
liabilities,  unwind  or  settle  their  positions  as  they  come  due  (BCBS, 4
2008b). The IMF provides a definition of funding liquidity as the ability of 
solvent institutions to make agreed upon payments in a timely fashion. A 
bank is liquid as long as inflows are larger or at least equal to outflows. 
Market liquidity refers to the ability to trade an asset at short 
notice, at low cost and with little impact on its price (Sarr and Lybek, 
2002). Market liquidity, therefore, may be defined by three dimensions 
to  capture  these  characteristics:  depth,  tightness  and  resiliency.  These 
dimensions ensure that any amount of assets can be sold quickly at anytime 
within trading hours with minimum loss of value. For the purpose of this 
project, we will focus on liquidity in the government bond market, where 
bonds are being traded among financial institutions. The government bond 
market is considered to be the most liquid and provides the main sources 
of market liquidity for banks in most SEACEN countries.3
3.2   Liquidity Linkages
As discussed earlier, a security has good market liquidity if it is 
easy to trade, that is, has a low bid-ask spread, small price impact, and 
high resilience. A bank has good funding liquidity if it has ample funding 
from its own capital or from wholesale or retail deposits. There is an 
inverse relationship between liquidity and liquidity risk, that is the higher 
the liquidity risk, the higher the probability of becoming illiquid, and 
hence, the lower the liquidity. With these concepts in mind, the meaning 
of liquidity risk is straightforward. 
Market liquidity risk is the risk that the market liquidity worsens 
when a bank needs to buy or sell a security. Funding liquidity risk is the risk 
that a bank cannot fund its position and is forced to unwind. For example, 
depositors may withdraw their funds, and the bank may lose its ability to 
borrow from other banks or raise funds via securities issuances. 
In terms of central bank liquidity risk, it is not possible to come up 
with a definition in the literature. This is mainly because of the common 
view that central bank liquidity risk does not exist. The central bank is 
usually able to supply base money when needed (unless constrained by
3.   The other main source of market liquidity for banks includes the interbank market 
which is not covered in this study.5
law) and, therefore, cannot be illiquid. However, a central bank can incur 
costs in its role as a liquidity provider (such as cost incurred from credit 




In general, the linkages among the three various liquidity types 
are found to be strong. In normal times (times of low liquidity risk), such 
linkages produce a virtuous circle in the liquidity of the financial system, 
guaranteeing its smooth functioning and stability. The central bank which 
has the responsibility to supply liquidity, would provide the normal quantity 
of liquidity to the financial system via routine liquidity facilities. A bank 
would remain liquid as long as it can get sufficient liquidity to meet its 
funding requirement from the markets or the central bank.
Figure 1 illustrates the interconnectedness among various types of 
liquidity. Each type of liquidity is important for the well-functioning of the 
system and each liquidity type is dependent on the efficient functioning of 
the other two for the overall system to be liquid. In particular, the neutral 
amount of liquidity supplied by the central bank should flow among the 
market  participants  as  long  as  market  liquidity  effectively  recycles  it 
and funding liquidity allocates it within the system in an efficient way. 
Markets should be liquid provided that there is no shortage of liquidity 
in the financial system on aggregate, and that each counterparty demands 
liquidity according to their funding needs. Last, funding liquidity in turn 
depends on the availability of liquidity from the market and central bank. 6
In periods of stress (period of high liquidity risk), the linkages 
among the three types of liquidity are also strong. The difference is that 
such strong links become propagation channels of liquidity risk in the 
financial system, leading to a vicious circle which may end up destabilising 
the  financial  system.  The  role  of  central  bank  liquidity  together  with 
supervision  and  regulation  are  of  paramount  importance  in  restoring 
stability to the system. 
In general, banks are considered by their construction, fragile to 
funding liquidity risk due to the maturity transformations they undertake 
(e.g. liquid short-term deposits to illiquid long-term loans). Given this 
inherent fragility, incomplete markets and asymmetric information could 
prompt coordination failures among depositors demanding liquidity from 
the bank, resulting in bank runs, the worst form of funding liquidity risk
Funding liquidity risk in a single bank is usually not a cause 
of much concern for policy makers. The problem arises when funding 
liquidity risk is transmitted to more than one bank, that is when liquidity 
risk  becomes  systemic.  Funding  liquidity  risk  can  arise  directly  from 
interbank market liquidity risk. Banks are linked by a common market 
for liquidity (Diamond and Rajan 2001 and 2005). Therefore, one bank 
failure  may  reduce  the  common  pool  of  liquidity  that  links  all  banks 
together, resulting in the transmission of liquidity shortage to other banks. 
The remaining surplus banks may take advantage of this liquidity shortage 
situation and under-provide liquidity, thereby worsening the illiquidity 
in the interbank market. With the interbank market severely impaired, 
liquidity risk could be transmitted to the asset markets as banks may 
seek liquidity through fire-sales, thereby impacting asset prices and asset 
market liquidity. As asset price changes, this begins to show up in changes 
in net worth of the bank, leading to balance sheet adjustment on the bank’s 
part. This process results in further asset sales and distress pricing. In this 
scenario, the interaction between funding and market liquidity can lead to 
a downward liquidity spiral in the markets. With increased popularity of   
securitization, the linkages between market and funding liquidity has been 
further reinforced, leading to faster transmission between asset markets to 
funding liquidity and vice versa. 
To sum up, market liquidity risk is an important driver of security 
prices. The funding liquidity of banks is an important driver of market 
liquidity risk. Liquidity crisis are triggered via liquidity spirals in which 
losses,  increasing  margins,  tightened  risk  management,  and  increased 
volatility  feed  on  one  another.  When  this  occurs,  traditional  liquidity 7
providers become demanders of liquidity with new capital coming too 
slowly and prices dropping. Most SEACEN countries, however, did not 
experience negative interactions between funding and market liquidity 
during  the  recent  global  financial  crisis.  Despite  some  deposit  drains 
during this time, banks did not have to liquidate their financial assets to 
fund cash outflows, partly as a result of the deposit insurance scheme.4 
 
3.3   Liquidity Sources
It is useful to consider the liquidity sources for banks. In general, 
banks have several liquidity sources such as the depositors who deposit 
their money at the bank, the asset market in which a bank can sell its 
assets, the interbank market from which a bank can obtain liquidity and 
the central bank from which a bank can also acquire funding liquidity 
during normal and crisis times.  Typically, the main sources of liquidity for 
financial institutions, as illustrated in Figure 2, are as follows:
3.3.1 Wholesale and Retail Deposits
Wholesale  deposits  are  a  shorter  and  more  volatile  source 
of  funding  than  retail  deposits.  When  markets  are  unstressed,  a 
creditworthy  bank  usually  has  no  problem  in  borrowing  money  in 
wholesale  markets.  However,  in  stressed  market  conditions,  there  is 
a heightened  aversion  to  risk. This leads  to  higher interest  rates, 
shorter maturities for loans in the wholesale market, and in some cases, 
a refusal to provide funds at all. Deposits from retail clients are, on the 
other hand, a longer and less volatile source of funding than borrowings 
in  the  wholesale  market.  Unfortunately,  liquidity  problems  tend  to 
be market-wide rather than something that affects one or two banks.5 
When  one  bank  wants  to  increase  its  retail  deposit  base  for  liquidity 
reasons, others usually do the same and so the desired increase is likely to 
be hard to achieve. 
4.   Surveyed  countries  in  this  study  that  already  have  deposit  insurance  are  Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam. Others, with the 
exception of Cambodia, have plans to implement this by 2010 (See Table A4).
5.  Liquidity problem discussed in this paper focuses on systemic liquidity crisis, and not 
on liquidity problems that only affect a single institution. 8
Figure 2
Liquidity Sources
Fortunately, the balance sheet structure of banks in all SEACEN 
countries  is  associated  with  stable  retail  deposits  as  their  major 
source  of  funds,  accounting  for  around  60-80%  in  most  countries.6 
Deposits in the region have also experienced healthy growth. Despite 
deposit  drains  in  some  countries  following  the  global  financial  crisis, 
the introduction of deposit guarantee had a stabilising effect, alleviating 
liquidity tension in the financial system.  
3.3.2 Liquid Assets
Cash and very liquid marketable securities are relatively expensive 
types of liquidity insurance. The interest received on securities that can 
be easily converted into cash is less than the interest earned on other less 
liquid assets. Assessing which assets in the trading book are liquid and 
which are not, is a key consideration for banks. It is important to base 
this assessment on stressed market conditions, and not just normal market 
conditions. This is because when one bank is short of liquidity, other 
banks are likely to be in the same situation. Assets that are highly liquid in 
normal market conditions may become hard to sell during stressed market 
conditions. One result of the global financial crisis was that the trading
6.   Banks in Korea, however, rely less on retail deposits than other banks in the region. 
The ratio is around 50% on average. This, to some extent, led to difficulties in issuing 
bank bonds during the global financial crisis as investors’ risk aversion amplified.9
books of all financial institutions suddenly became much less liquid. The 
inability to value and trade complex structured products caused investors 
to run which in turn created problems which spread to the inter-bank 
market (Borio, 2008 and Brunnemeier, 2009).  
In SEACEN countries, banks hold large amounts of liquid assets 
which are well above the minimal target in their respective countries. 
Definition of liquid assets, however, varies among the SEACEN countries, 
depending on the financial market structure and development. For example, 
in Cambodia, liquid asset includes only cash and placements with other 
banks. In Malaysia, apart from securities issued by the government and 
Bank Negara Malaysia, other securities such as those issued by recognised 
government linked institutions, banker’s acceptance, negotiable certificate 
of  deposits,  residential  mortgage  backed  securities,  equities,  among 
others, are also considered as liquid assets. In Thailand, liquid asset refers 
to cash on hand, current account at the BOT, deposit at other commercial 
banks and government and BOT bonds (See Table A1). The difference in 
coverage of liquid asset implies that minimum holding of liquid assets can 
not and should not be standardized across countries. 
3.3.3 Reserve Requirement
Reserve requirements require banks to keep a certain percentage 
of deposits as cash in the bank’s vault or as deposits with the central bank. 
The reserve requirement usually applies only to transaction deposits (i.e., 
those made to a checking account). All banks in SEACEN countries have 
minimum  holding  of  reserves  as  their  primary  liquidity  management 
tools. Some countries have higher required reserve than the others. In 
the Philippines, for example, the required reserve is the highest in the 
region at 19%, reflecting in part, the authorities’ concern about the health 
of the banking sector (Table 1). In general, despite its existence, reserve 
requirement is not a significant part of banks’ liquidity sources. This is 
mainly because banks in SEACEN countries obtain most of their liquidity 
from retail deposits and liquid asset, and exposure to the wholesale market 
is, therefore, quite minimal. 
3.3.4 Central Bank Borrowing
Central banks are often referred to as “lenders of last resort”. 
When solvent banks are experiencing financial difficulties, central banks 
are generally prepared to supply liquidity to maintain the stability of the 
financial system. Collateral has to be posted by the banks and the central 10
bank usually applies a haircut and may charge a high interest rate. Different 
central banks apply different rules. In general, banks try to keep their 
emergency borrowings from a central bank a secret because there is a risk 
that the borrowings will be interpreted by the market as a sign that the bank 
is experiencing financial difficulties, while  other sources of liquidity may 
also dry up. The central banks in the SEACEN countries have provided 
both routine and emergency facilities to banks. Central banks in the region 
also  stand  ready  to  help  banks  during  crisis  time.  Eligible  collaterals 
are often government or central bank bonds but there is allowance  to 
expand  the  coverage  of  eligible  securities  in  emergency  situations.  In 
some countries, bank loans, commercial papers and corporate bonds are 
included as acceptable collateral (See Table 8 and 9 for more details).
4.   Liquidity Dynamics and Management
4.1   Liquidity Profile and Indicators Across Countries
SEACEN  countries  entered  the  global  financial  crisis  in  good 
shape.  The  banking  system  was  sound  with  abundant  liquidity.  The 
business models of most Asian banks were originally, and continue to be, 
based on retail deposits and are thus safer than wholesale funded banks 
due to a more stable source of funds. Another unique characteristic of 
Asian banks is the role played by specialised financial institutions. In most 
countries, specialised banks help provide funds to sectors where access to 
commercial bank funding is limited. 
Regardless  of  the  level  of  financial  market  development, 
the main uses and sources of funds for banks in the region are from 
deposits and loans (Figure 3 and 4). Even in Korea, where reliance on 
wholesale funding has played a significant role, commercial banks are 
still the most important players in the financial system and are involved 
mostly  in  deposit-taking  and  lending  activities.  In  Korea,  the  share 
of retail deposits in total source of fund has been approximately 50%7 
and the share of lending in total uses of funds has been around 70% in 
recent years. 
 
7.  The retail seposits here exclude CD which in Korea is considered to be as stable as 
retail deposits. Korea banks usually use CD to mobilise funds from households.11
Figure 3
Share of Deposit and Loan in Total Uses and Source of Funds of 
Commercial Banks (Dec 2006)
Figure 4
Share of Deposit and Loan in Total Uses and Source of Funds of 
Commercial Banks (Dec 2009)
  In general, liquidity appears to be abundant in most of the region. 
Banks have healthy deposit growth, with the ratio of loan to deposit at 
around 70-80 % on average. Banks in the region also hold a large amount 
of excess reserves and liquid assets are usually large enough to cover 
short-term liabilities. The ratio of excess to required reserve ratio was in 
the range of 20-2,000% in most countries while the ratio of liquid asset to 
short-term liabilities was in the range of 25-120%, well above the minimal 
target in all countries (Table 1).8
 




  In Cambodia, like other countries in the region, the banking sector 
was flushed with liquidity. Financial intermediation was relatively low due 
mostly to the credit worthiness of borrowers, credit information system 
as well as relatively high cost of borrowings. In Malaysia, liquidity in the 
financial system was also ample, with banks holding a large amount of 
excess liquidity. Liquidity surplus was in the range of 1.55 times of deposits 
maturing within 1 month and around 24% of total bank deposits. The  loan 
to deposit ratio which stood at 81% means that banks did not have to rely 
on interbank borrowing to fund their loans.  Funding liquidity risk was at 
its highest during 2006-2007, when banks experienced negative mismatch 
mainly coming from core banking of the shortest maturity bucket. Despite 
this, the negative mismatch was sufficiently met by the amount of liquid 
assets, which was also the highest during the same period. 
For Myanmar since 2005, liquidity has been moderately abundant 
with the loan to deposit ratio in the range of 60-70% while the banking 
system has healthy deposit growth. Liquid asset to short-term liabilities 
was relatively high, reflecting in part the high minimum requirement on 
reserve and liquid asset holding. In Nepal, although there has been rapid 
loan growth in recent years, a moderate level of excess liquidity remains 
in the banking system. The loan to deposit ratio was at a comfortable 71% 13
at the end of June 2009, compared to 60.7% in 2006. The same situation 
applies to the Philippines where the loan to deposit ratio stood at 69.1%, 
with  liquid  asset  to  short-term  liabilities  as  high  as  51.8%,  reflecting 
adequate liquidity conditions in the financial system.   
In  Sri  Lanka,  the  financial  system  was  flooded  with  liquidity 
for most of the period, with the exception of 2008Q4-2009Q2, due to 
significant  outflows  of  foreign  exchange  and  government’s  difficulties 
in obtaining foreign funding. Overall, banks in Sri Lanka had a loan to 
deposit ratio around 78.5% and this is further augmented by high liquid 
assets to deposit ratio of more than 30%. Foreign banks in Sri Lanka 
appeared  to  be  more  liquid  than  their  domestic  counterparts  as  they 
had greater opportunity to find low cost funds and better investments in 
international markets.  In Taiwan, all domestic banks have comfortably 
met the regulatory liquidity ratio requirement of 7%. The average liquidity 
ratio was as high as 28.31% and most banks held large amounts of excess 
reserves of around 304% of required reserve. The loan to deposit ratio was 
76.8%, mainly driven by banks’ conservative attitude towards lending.9 
 
For other countries, such as Korea and Thailand, where the loan 
to deposit ratio was about 108.12% and 102.80%, respectively, the ratio is 
not a good measure of liquidity. This reflects the fact that a relatively larger 
amount of bank funding in Korea and Thailand comes from non-retail 
deposits. In the case of Thailand, banks also issue the bill of exchange 
(B/E) as an alternative source of funds. In Korea, a large part of funding 
comes from certificates of deposit (CD), covered bills and RPs.  Although 
there  were  pressures  in  terms  of  funding  and  market  liquidity  risks 
after the global financial crisis in Korea, the banking system remained 
very liquid. The share of wholesale funding to total funding peaked at 
24.9% at the end of June 2008 before declining sharply afterwards.10 
 
9.  High excess liquidity in most SEACEN countries is also associated with weak loan 
demand in the region. However, banks in this region have largely learned their lessons 
from  the  1997-1998 Asian  financial  crisis  and,  therefore,  been  well-prepared  to 
withstand the recent global financial crisis with more robust regulatory environment.
10.  Some pressures in Korea during the global crisis arose from the high loan to deposit 
ratio which caused some concerns for foreign investors. During this time, banks had 
difficulties issuing bonds in the domestic and international markets. Subsequently, 
however, Korean banks still enjoyed abundant liquidity as their deposits increased 
rapidly.14
Looking at incidences of banking panics across the region, there 
were no such problems in recent years because banks usually held enough 
liquid assets to cover short-term obligations while most countries also 
implemented the deposit insurance scheme, had better risk management 
system and improved asset quality. In addition, since most banks have 
not had much exposure to the capital market, there has been little concern 
about  market  liquidity  risk.  Banks  still  maintain  their  traditional  role 
as  intermediaries  between  short-term  deposit  and  long-term  funding. 
Most occasional stresses in the financial market, if they occurred at all, 
were  usually  associated  with  tightened  liquidity  in  the  interbank  and 
bond markets. Meanwhile, although some banks were downgraded and 
confidence  declined,  these  incidences  have  created  neither  significant 
funding problems nor deposit outflows.
Table 2
Liquidity Environment after Global Crisis
In  terms  of  qualitative  measures,  there  were  no  incidents  of 
positions approaching or breaching limits most of the time and banks’ 
financial  conditions  remained  strong  (Table  2).    Negative  publicity  in 
SEACEN countries was not much present and external events did not 
appear to be a significant factor triggering liquidity risk. In Malaysia, there 
were panic withdrawals at some banks, but with the Malaysian government 
announcing a blanket guarantee in October 2008 until end 2010, the panic 
quickly subsided.  15
4.2   Bank’s Liquidity Management 
Measuring and managing liquidity can be challenging, primarily 
because the underlying factors that drive exposures can be dynamic and 
unpredictable. Attempts have been made to capture the relative magnitude 
of liquidity. Regardless of the methods used, liquidity should be measured 
at a granular level, e.g. by business units, regions (Figure 5).  
Figure 5
Liquidity Management
Although measurement techniques vary from bank to bank, there 
are some common liquidity measures, including liquidity ratios, cash flow 
gaps and market liquidity measures such as bid and ask spread and turnover 
ratio. Liquidity ratios convey a picture of a bank’s liquidity position by 
measuring  items  from  the  bank  balance  sheet,  income  statement,  and 
statement of cash flows to determine the sufficiency of resources. Cash 
flow gaps, on the contrary, focus on known or estimated cash inflows and 
outflows over various time horizons to determine possible surpluses or 
deficits. 
4.2.1 Liquidity Ratios
Dissecting a bank’s financial position is a necessary starting point 
in measuring liquidity risk. By understanding the composition of a bank’s 16
assets,  liabilities,  and  off-balance  sheet  cash  flows,  we  can  develop  a 
useful view of liquidity. In fact, the best approach is holistic - measures 
that provide information on assets, liabilities, and associated contingencies 
jointly provide a more accurate picture than a simple examination of each 
category on its own. For example, a bank may have a great deal of short-
term liabilities coming due that might appear to be a concern, but if they 
are properly matched by an equally large amount of short-term assets, the 
concern is mitigated. 
Since significant liquidity problems arise from a short-term lack 
of funds, metrics that reflect short-term asset and liability positions are 
an essential dimension of the measurement process. The state of a bank’s 
liquidity position can be determined by examining a number of measures 
from the balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows. 
While these are generally static estimates of liquidity that soon become 
outdated, they can still be useful because when historical information 
is accumulated, trends can be developed to determine whether a bank 
is becoming more or less liquid over time. As seen in Table 3, banks in 




4.2.2 Cash Flow Gaps
Asset-liability gaps are important in the effective management 
of liquidity risk. A bank may have stable funding and/or market liquidity 
sources, but it must still manage the gap between the two if it is to create 
a  robust  liquidity  plan.  Banks  often  measure  cash  flow  mismatches 
because any gap that leads to a funding deficit will place demands on 
the bank’s liquidity programme. Therefore, it is important to consider 
how severe such deficits can become and whether cash cushions should 
be accumulated in advance. Equally, any mismatch that creates a surplus 
can serve to reinforce the liquidity buffer in anticipation of future deficits 
or emergencies. Banks in SEACEN countries typically compute liquidity 
ratios to provide a picture of the total liquidity position and supplement 
this with cash flow gap by maturity/duration. In some countries, financial 
institutions are required by central banks to produce specific liquidity 
measures as evidence of their financial strength. These may be the same 
as  those  already  produced  internally,  or  they  may  be  complementary. 
Like liquidity ratios, cash flow gap methods vary widely across countries, 
depending on what is deemed most appropriate for their banking structure 
(See Table 4).  
Table 4 
Cash Flow Gaps18
4.2.3 Market Liquidity Measures
It is crucial for banks that deal actively in financial instruments, 
including marketable securities and derivatives, to measure the amount of 
liquidity inherent in such contracts. Research has focused on three different 
dimensions of market liquidity measurement, including depth, tightness, 
and resiliency (Kyle, 1985). Tightness is how far transaction prices (i.e. 
bid or ask prices) diverge from the mid-market price - in other words -  the 
general costs incurred irrespective of the level of market prices. Depth 
denotes either the volume of trades possible without affecting prevailing 
market prices or the amount of orders on the order books of market-
makers at a given time. Finally, resiliency refers to either the speed with 
which price fluctuations resulting from trades are dissipated or the speed 
with which imbalances in order flows are adjusted. No single measure, 
however, unequivocally measures tightness, depth and resiliency. Some 
common measures to capture market liquidity include bid-ask spread and 
turnover ratio (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). Table 5 shows market liquidity 
measures, where available, in Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan and Thailand. 
Table 5 
Market Liquidity
All these three classes of measures can be strengthened through 
the use of stress testing and other quantitative limits. Table 6 summarises 19
liquidity management techniques used by banks in the SEACEN countries. 
Liquidity ratio, cash flow gaps and some minimum quantitative limits 
such as liquid asset and reserve holdings are commonly used tools. Stress 
testing is also implemented in many of the countries. Looking back, most 
SEACEN countries have taken the lead in implementing liquidity risk 
management based on the lessons of the Asian financial crisis. In Korea, 
after the 1997 crisis, the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), required 
banks to maintain both the won and foreign liquidity ratio. In addition, 
banks are also required to maintain foreign currency asset and liability 
gap ratio above certain levels for residual maturity period no longer than 
7 days and one month respectively. The long-term borrowing ratio for 
foreign currency  loans was  also established. Overall, banks  in Korea, 
Malaysia,  Thailand  and  Taiwan  appear  to  have  quite  comprehensive 
liquidity management techniques. 
Table 6 
Banks’ Liquidity Management
4.3   Factors Affecting Liquidity Risk
Liquidity risk can occur on both sides of the balance sheet. This 
can  be  either  from  inadequate  liquidity  generated  from  selling  assets 
or insufficient liquidity available from various funding sources to meet 
financial obligations when needed. In most cases, the trigger of an external 
event, combined with an already weak bank’s balance sheet, can cause an 
adverse liquidity outcome. 20
The most common sources of bank vulnerability include liquidity 
mismatches between assets and liabilities (assets being less liquid than 
liabilities), the right of depositors to withdraw funds at any time and the 
right of providers of short-term money market financing not to roll over 
funds. 
Unexpected  demand  for  liquidity  is  at  the  centre  of  funding 
liquidity risk, while anticipated obligations can normally be accommodated 
without much difficulty. Unexpected demand for liquidity can arise from 
various factors such as unpredictable cash flows, unfavourable legal or 
regulatory judgments, mismanagement and negative publicity or market 
over reactions. 
Each of these factors can propagate into market liquidity risk. 
Unexpected  demand  for  liquidity  that  exceeds  the  unsecured  funding 
capacity to cover obligations requires action on the asset side of the balance 
sheet. If a bank must post assets as collateral at very large discounts or can 
only sell its asset portfolio at very low prices in order to supplement the 
cash position, then the sources that affect the funding risk are translated 
directly into market liquidity problems. For market liquidity, as immediate 
access to cash is also a key factor, the time dimension is as important as 




Joint  market  and  funding  problems  can  occur  as  a  result  of 
endogenous factors. A poorly planned or executed contingency funding 
programme can worsen the problems. If banks do not have the proper 
tools to control problems as they propagate, the results may be financial 
distress.21
It should be noted that under stress scenarios, assets may not 
be worth the normal value especially for assets that are complex. At the 
same time, liabilities may not always behave as anticipated. There may be 
divergence between contractual and behavioural maturities and sources 
of  funding  can  be  unexpectedly  withdrawn,  recalled,  or  cancelled.  If 
depositors are nervous, they may not be willing to deposit at reasonable 
rates, forcing banks to fund their operations at a higher cost, sell assets at 
a loss to carrying value, or pledge assets at unfavourable terms in which 
case a systemic crisis can ensue (Figure 6).  
In the SEACEN countries, the most common factors affecting 
funding liquidity are asset-liability mismatch and contagion effect (Table 
7). In terms of market liquidity, the most important drivers are the lack 
of liquidity in the interbank and bond markets, the global financial crisis 
as well as the loss of confidence. In some countries such as Malaysia and 
Korea, monetary policy changes and worsening conditions for the issuance 
of bank bonds also play a significant role in funding liquidity risk. 
In  Cambodia,  changes  in  regulations  have  proved  to  have  a 
significant impact on liquidity in the banking sector. The changes include 
the increase in reserve requirement and minimum capital requirement, 
leading to severe liquidity tightening. In Korea, the main factor affecting 
liquidity problems is a sudden rise in uncertainty. Following the global 
financial  crisis,  the  impact  was  felt  in  the  bond  markets  where  the 
outflow of foreign investors led to a shortage of liquidity in the bond 
market. Korean banks’ high loan to deposit ratios and their reliance on 
bond issuance, have provided further reasons for foreign investors’ loss 
of confidence. The loss of confidence as a result of the sudden rise in 
uncertainty is also an important factor affecting liquidity in Malaysia, 
causing deposit withdrawals from banks in both the 1997 Asian and the 
recent  subprime  crisis.  The  blanket  deposit  guarantee  announcement, 
however, have brought back financial stability. In the case of Sri Lanka, 
there was a collapse of some unauthorised financial firms in the mid 2008, 
causing public confidence to deteriorate and a resultant deposit drain of 
some financial firms.
Overall,  however,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  SEACEN 
countries, market and funding problems did not materialise in the most 
recent crisis episodes, including the subprime crisis. Liquidity risk mainly 
arose from the liability side of the banks’ balance sheet, e.g. deposits drain 
and shortage of wholesale funding. Although there were some pressures 
from liquidity problems, a number of policy choices which included those 22
on reserve requirement, extensive report submissions, banks’ own balance 
sheet decisions as well as deposit insurance have helped cushion the effect 




5.   The Role of Central Bank and Liquidity Risk Management
5.1   Why Should Central Banks Be Concerned About Market    
  Liquidity?
Financial  market  participants  are  usually  quite  capable  of 
developing  institutional  arrangements  to  generate  liquid  conditions  in 
their  respective  markets.  However,  the  benefits  that  deep  and  liquid 
markets offer to the broader economy are regarded as public goods. It is 
possible that even if all financial market participants prefer to have liquid 
market, individually they may sometimes lack the appropriate incentives 
for behaviour that would maintain adequate liquidity especially in stressed 
periods. This situation gives rise to the role of central banks in providing 
liquidity to the market for maintaining financial stability.
Central banks usually have an interest in the liquidity of government 
securities markets for a variety of reasons. First, outright purchases and 23
repos of government securities are important instruments of monetary 
policy. If market liquidity is not adequate, central banks may not be able 
to provide or absorb the necessary amount of liquidity smoothly via their 
open market operations. Second, extracting appropriate information, such 
as the term structure of yields and implied inflation expectations, from 
prices in government securities markets is crucial for monetary policy 
conduct. Third, liquidity in asset markets improves the ability of financial 
institutions to adjust their balance sheet position quickly in response to 
shocks. A deeper and more liquid money market also strengthens the 
transmission effects of the central bank’s monetary policy operations on 
other financial markets. 
As  discussed  earlier,  funding  liquidity  risk  is  inherent  in  the 
banking  system  and  that  under  incomplete  markets  and  asymmetric 
information, a vicious cycle can develop, leading to a systemic crisis. 
The central bank’s main function is to alleviate systemic liquidity risks 
in its role as guarantor of the banking system. These mechanisms involve 
routine liquidity provision and emergency liquidity provision, apart from 
their role in supervision and regulation setting. 
Central bank interventions can provide temporary injections of 
liquidity aimed at breaking the link between market and funding liquidity 
risk, thwarting a downward liquidity spiral. This can be executed quickly, 
until other more time-demanding tools, i.e. supervision and regulation 
can be adjusted to prevent future risk.  However, there is no tailor-made 
standardised intervention and policy for countries. In providing liquidity 
to  the  system,  a  central  bank  can  increase  credit  risk  in  its  portfolio, 
depending on types of the collateral accepted, and increase the risk of 
compromising its monetary policy objectives. 
 
  In the SEACEN countries, central banks provide both routine and 
emergency liquidity facilities to banks. The tools used by these central 
banks  for  liquidity  provision  include  end-of-day  facilities,  discount 
window operations, payment system facilities, repo facilities and swap 
facilities (Table 8). The most commonly used tools are discount windows 
and repo facilities while the most common types of eligible collateral are 
government bonds, followed by central bank bonds and bank loans. In the 
case of Korea and Taiwan, there is scope for other assets to be accepted 
as collaterals pending the allowance of the Monetary Policy Committee 
in emergency situations. Most of the central banks do not have plans to 
expand eligible securities, reflecting in part the relative less exposure to 
the global financial crisis (Table 9). 24
Table 8 
Tools of Central Banks’ Liquidity Provision
Table 9 
Type of Collaterals Accepted25
5.2   Liquidity Supervisory Practices 
The global financial crisis was preceded by an extended period 
of abundant liquidity in the financial system and therefore liquidity risk 
and its management did not receive the same attention as other types of 
risks. However, one important feature of the crisis was the weakness in 
managing liquidity risk. To strengthen risk management in this area, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has issued a report 
highlighting inadequacies in market practices in February 2008 (BCBS, 
2008a).  These  weaknesses  include,  for  example,  underestimation  of 
the funding requirements of contingent obligations, failure to consider 
potential systemic liquidity strains in stress tests and insufficient treatment 
of individual products.
Later in September 2008, bank regulators issued another revised 
set of principles on how banks should manage liquidity (BCBS, 2008b). 
These  sound  principles  provide  supervisory  expectations  on  the  key 
elements of a framework for liquidity risk management of banks.11 The 
principles consist of the following elements -board and senior management 
oversight;  the  establishment  of  policies  and  risk  tolerance;  the  use 
of  liquidity  risk  management  tools  such  as  comprehensive  cash  flow 
forecasting, limits and liquidity scenario stress testing; the development of 
contingency funding plans; and the buffer of high quality liquid assets to 
meet contingent liquidity needs. Supervisors are expected to evaluate both 
the sufficiency of bank’s liquidity risk management and liquidity exposure. 
Moreover, supervisors are expected to take action in addressing the bank’s 
risk management inadequacies or excess exposure to protect depositors 
and ensure financial stability (See Appendix B).
In  December  2009,  the  BCBS  issued  a  consultative 
document  on  international  framework  for  liquidity  risk  measurement, 
standard  and  monitoring,    in  response    to    recommendations   
of    the    G20    that    would    like    to  have  a  global  framework 
for  promoting  stronger  liquidity  buffers  of  banks  by  2010.12 
Banks are expected to meet these standards and adhere to all the principles 
set out in the September 2008 Sound Principles. Essentially, there are 
11.  For further detail, please see BCBS (2008b), Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision, September.  
12.  Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, London Summit, 2 April 2009.26
two standards for liquidity risk, namely the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and 
the Net Stable Funding Ratio (See Appendix B for details). The liquidity 
coverage ratio identifies the amount of high quality liquid assets a bank 
can use to offset the net cash outflows it would encounter under severe 
short-term stress scenarios. The objective is to promote the short-term 
resiliency of banks by ensuring that they have adequate high quality liquid 
resources to survive extreme stress scenario lasting for one month.13 
The net stable funding (NSF) ratio sets a minimum acceptable amount 
of  stable  funding  based  on  the  liquidity  characteristics  of  a  bank’s 
assets and activities over a one year period. The objective is to promote 
resiliency  over  longer-term  time  horizons  by  creating  incentives  for 
banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding.14 
 
To further strengthen and promote consistency in international 
liquidity risk supervision, the Committee has also developed a minimum 
set of monitoring tools to be used by supervisors. This is hoped to improve 
the heterogeneity in quantitative measures to monitor the liquidity risk 
profiles of banks globally. The proposed set of monitoring tools includes 
the following - contractual maturity mismatch (provides an initial, simple 
baseline of contractual commitments), concentration of funding (involves 
analysing concentrations of wholesale funding), available unencumbered 
assets (measures the amount of unencumbered assets a bank has which 
could potentially be used as collateral for secured funding), market-related 
monitoring tools (includes monitoring market-wide data on asset prices 
and liquidity, credit default swap (CDS) spreads and equity prices, etc.). 
For the  SEACEN countries, the objectives for liquidity supervision 
are similar across countries, although there are differences in how these 
objectives translate into rules and guidelines. Broadly speaking, high-level 
approaches to supervising liquidity risk are common across countries - 
banks are expected to have specific policies to address liquidity risk; the 
use of contingency funding plans (CFP) is commonplace; all countries 
recognise the importance of stress testing; and all countries require banks 
to report information regularly to supervisors. Countries differ in the extent 
to which requirements are prescribed and standardised. The differences 
are highlighted below through a review of the individual components of 
national liquidity regimes.
13.  Liquidity coverage ratio = Stock of high quality liquid assets/Net cash outflows over 
a 30-day time period ≥ 100%.
14.  Net stable funding = Available amount of stable funding/Required amount of stable 
funding > 100%27
5.2.1 Liquidity Policies
Almost all countries expect banks to document liquidity policies 
in order to set up the internal strategy for managing liquidity risk. Broadly 
speaking, banks’ liquidity policies are expected to put in place the internal 
processes to measure, monitor and control liquidity risk. Various countries 
require some combination of the following items to be included in their 
policies:  the  requirement  for  adequate  information  systems;  required 
processes  to  assess  future  cash  flows  and  net  funding  requirements; 
stress tests and the setting of internal limits. In Malaysia, recent practice 
is associated with the New Liquidity Framework (NLF), which was first 
adopted in 1998. The NLF measures liquidity needs on a monthly basis and 
mismatch between assets and liabilities is evaluated. In addition, banks are 
expected to manage reliance on funding source and maintain contingency 
back-up lines.
5.2.2 Contingency Funding Plans
Contingency funding plans are used to establish banks’ strategies 
for dealing with stressed periods.  All countries expect banks to have 
pre-established  contingency  arrangements,  although  the  formality  of 
the requirement varies. Similar to overall liquidity policies, there do not 
appear  to  be  fundamental  differences  in  national  approaches.  Rather, 
diversity can be seen in the detail of the requirements. The CFP in all 
countries comprises details about sources of emergency liquidity and most 
have specified triggers for launching the plan (Table 10). Few, however, 
have specified persons in charge and public relation handling. In Korea, 
banks also have multi-stage contingency plans where banks undertake 
appropriate crisis response when liquidity indicators fall or rise above 
some threshold level. In Sri Lanka, although CFP is required, only a few 
banks have an effective contingency plan. Nepal is the only country where 




5.2.3   Stress Tests and Scenario Analyses
Stress  tests  and  scenario  analyses  aim  to  identify  potential 
weaknesses  or  vulnerabilities  in  a  bank’s  liquidity  position,  enabling 
changes to be put in place to counter those weaknesses. While all surveyed 
central banks, with the exception of Nepal, require or suggest banks to 
have liquidity contingency funding plan, this does not apply to stress 
testing (Table 11). A number of surveyed countries currently do not require 
banks to conduct stress tests as part of their liquidity risk management but 
will, however, soon do so. Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia and Vietnam have 
already implemented stress testing as part of mandatory requirement. In 
Korea and Thailand, while stress testing is not required, it forms part of 
prudential liquidity guidelines and banks should incorporate the results 
of the test in their liquidity risk management strategies and contingency 
funding plans. Countries where stress testing is neither mandatory nor 
suggested include Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Brunei. 
However, many have plans to implement stress testing in 2010. In most 
countries, specification of survival period under liquidity shortage situation 
is not required. The frequency of conducting stress tests in countries that 
have implemented them, varies widely from monthly to yearly. 29
Table 11
Stress Test in Banking Sector
5.2.4   The Setting of Limits
All  SEACEN  countries  require  banks  to  maintain  required 
reserves (Table 12). However, some countries have suggested for banks 
to set other internal limits or targets. These may include target holdings of 
liquid assets, limits on maturity mismatches or limits on the reliance on 
a particular funding source. Where targets are set for different purposes, 
their  structures  understandably  vary  considerably.  Several  SEACEN 
countries prescribe explicit limits or target ratios as part of the prudential 
guidelines and most countries have set liquidity ratio for banks. On the 
contrary, only a few countries have set limits on funding concentration 
or target positive gaps for some time buckets. These quantitative limits, 
although varying widely across countries, can help constrain the amount 
of liquidity risk that banks take. In particular, they can help ensure that 
banks are adequately prepared for stressed conditions or serve as early 
warning indicators of stress or vulnerability. 30
Table 12
The Setting of Limits
5.2.5   Reporting Requirements
SEACEN  supervisors  typically  require  banks  to  report 
information on their liquidity positions for a variety of reasons (Table 13). 
Most regulators use standardised forms, with prescribed definitions and 
behavioural assumptions. Liquidity disclosure to central banks normally 
include deposit concentration, loan to deposit ratio, short-term liabilities 
breakdown, maturity gap report, liquid assets breakdown, liquidity ratios, 
liquidity gap report and stress test. Most have to be submitted on a monthly 
basis, with the exception of Indonesia where most reports are submitted 
daily. 31
Table 13
Liquidity Disclosure to Central Banks
To conclude, there appears to be diversity in national liquidity 
regimes as well as implications to this diversity. In part, such differences 
result from heterogeneity in financial market conditions and differences 
in the national liquidity regimes. Diversity also arises from linkages to 
other factors which govern the resilience of the banking system to severe 
liquidity stress but may fall outside the legal mandate of supervisors. These 
factors include nationally determined factors such as deposit insurance 
arrangements, and central bank credit and collateral policies, including 
intraday, standing facility, or emergency liquidity assistance arrangements, 
as well as the structure of the banking sector. In addition, liquidity regimes 
are affected by policy choices made by national authorities about the 
desired resilience of banks to liquidity stress, which in turn affect banks’ 
decision regarding liquid assets that they should hold to attain the desired 
resilience. 32
6.   Conclusion and Policy Recommendation
The 2008 global financial crisis clearly demonstrates that banks 
funded primarily by retail deposits have faced less liquidity pressure than 
those more dependent on wholesale funds. In the US, the loss of investor 
confidence in a wide range of structured securities markets led to risks 
flowing to banks’ balance sheets. The initial shock in credit markets was 
transmitted through a fall in asset market liquidity, which led to an increase 
in funding risk. Money markets tightened internationally as banks built up 
liquidity to meet contingent claims. Banks in the SEACEN countries, on 
the contrary, remained resilient to the global financial crisis as a result 
of ample liquidity and traditional banking businesses pursued prior to 
the crisis. Banks in this region are mostly dependent on deposit and loan 
businesses, and hence have a range of defenses to a sudden decline in the 
availability of wholesale funds. In this context, the first lesson learned is 
that a market-based financial system relies more, and not less, on funding 
liquidity.  
In  general,  banks  have  several  counter-measures  to  liquidity 
pressures. One is to transform illiquid assets into cash. However, this 
approach could fail when the source of the change in market conditions 
is a lowering of demand for securities. Another approach is to bid for 
higher retail deposits. That is likely to take time as many individual retail 
savers react slowly to changes in relative interest rates. In addition, in an 
environment of general liquidity strain, competitors are likely to do the 
same to protect their market share. The impact on each bank in the medium 
term is likely to be limited. Therefore, faced with restrictions on raising 
liquidity, a bank must respond to a funding shortfall by slowing or even 
reducing its lending to households and corporate customers. Retrenchment 
in lending can have significant implications for the wider economy, as 
a reduced amount of funds are available to companies. These defences 
suffer from a common shortcoming. While they may work well when an 
individual bank is facing funding pressure, it can become challenging 
when every bank attempts to use them at the same time when liquidity 
pressures are widespread. 
Therefore, there is one last line of defence left, which is what 
banks in SEACEN countries have done - to hold a buffer of reliable high-
quality liquid assets such as Treasury bills or other government securities, 
which can be drawn on immediately and directly in the event of a sudden 
withdrawal  of  market  liquidity  or  an  unexpected  increase  in  funding 
requirement. Based on this experience, the second lesson, therefore, is 33
that consideration should be given to maintaining the holdings of very 
high-quality liquid assets that can provide enough reliable reserves in 
stressed period.15 It should be noted, however, that only amounts in excess 
of the minimum requirement can truly act as buffers. In times of liquidity 
stress, the minimum requirement could add to, rather than offset, liquidity 
imbalance. In addition, although liquidity buffers are generally beneficial, 
it can also act as a constraint on banks’ profitability and efficient risk 
management.
Another lesson drawn from the recent episode is the disclosure 
practices in relation to liquidity risk management objectives. Strict and 
relatively  comprehensive  liquidity  report  submissions  required  by  the 
central banks in the region has enabled them to be proactive on liquidity 
risk management. In times of heightened uncertainty, a lack of information 
can lead to defensive reactions by market counterparties. To eliminate 
systemic  liquidity  risk,  greater  transparency  of  liquidity  management 
practices is needed. Close supervision and regulation of banks are found 
to  be  the  fundamental  weapons  against  systemic  liquidity  crises  and 
have helped tackle the root of liquidity risks by minimising asymmetric 
information and moral hazard through effective monitoring mechanisms. 
These practices have also made it easier for central banks in the region 
to distinguish between solvent and illiquid banks and therefore impose 
liquidity cushions on the ones most in need.  
In addition, this study reveals that there are measurement and 
management challenges. There is no simple and representative summary 
measure of liquidity risks assumed by a given bank and any single definition 
of such a complex array of risks will necessarily be approximate. Banks 
use a variety of liquidity measurement and management techniques in 
attempts to monitor their liquidity positions. Although specific methods 
vary by banks, common liquidity measures used by banks in this region 
include liquidity ratio, cash flow gaps and some minimum limits on liquid 
asset and reserve holdings. It is also clear that banks in SEACEN countries 
15.  The threshold for this should be bank-specific as each bank is different in its customer, 
product and balance sheet structure. Good liquidity risk management should also 
include well-designed liquidity risk reporting, robust contingency funding plan and 
rigorous stress testing in order to control risk profile within acceptable limits and to 
prepare a bank for any liquidity crisis that might occur.34
have paid more attention to improving liquidity management over the 
past few years, especially after the global financial crisis. There has been 
a heightening of risk awareness and many banks have formalised their 
liquidity risk management processes. In terms of liquidity environment, 
the Asian experience has highlighted the important role played by deposit 
insurance  in  containing  runs  on  banks.  Although  deposit  insurance 
schemes, narrowly defined as those designed to protect retail depositors, 
can perform a variety of roles, the one they are considered most relevant 
for is that of preventing bank runs. An important lesson learned is that there 
should be improvements made in funding markets and public confidence 
by broadening the scope of bank guarantees to ensure future financial 
stability, especially during crisis time.16
For  central  banks,  the  opening  of  the  lending  window  more 
broadly, and ensuring the smooth functioning of the short-term money 
market as well as government bond market are important in effective 
liquidity management. Although the existence of central bank lending 
facilities can be viewed as a double-edged sword as it can cause a “moral 
hazard” problem, experiences in this region indicate that banks usually use 
central bank liquidity only as a last resort to avoid negative interpretation 
regarding  their  financial  health.  It  is  also  crucial  for  central  banks  to 
acknowledge systemic risk due to liquidity spirals and consider the system 
as a whole, as opposed to each institution in isolation. In terms of liquidity 
supervision, the objectives and high-level approach of central banks are 
similar across countries. Banks are expected to address liquidity risk by 
having liquidity policies, internal liquidity guidelines and contingency 
funding plans, as well as regular reporting to supervisors. All countries 
recognise the importance of stress testing. The main differences lie in the 
way the requirements are prescribed and standardised. 
In  concluding,  this  study  has  demonstrated  the  importance  of 
liquidity in financial system stability. Financial innovation and market 
development have highlighted the significance of ever present liquidity 
risks and should, therefore, be taken into consideration when relevant 
policy decisions are made. If the problem is a liquidity spiral, improvements 
should be made for the funding liquidity of banks, the main players in the 
market, in order to prevent a systemic crisis. Normalcy in the region is
16.  In normal time, the blanket guarantee scheme provided to banks may create moral 
hazard problems and hence it should be applied only in emergency situation when 
public confidence in the banking system significantly deteriorates. 35
also not a reason for complacency. Banks in SEACEN countries, having 
learned their lessons from the past Asian crisis, entered the global crisis 
in good shape with abundant liquidity. This, however, may not necessarily 
continue to be the case in the future. And as capital markets become more 
developed, banks may increasingly rely on wholesale funding, making the 
system more vulnerable to liquidity risk.  
Going forward, there can be little doubt that regulators will pay far 
more attention to liquidity management than they have in the past. More 
resources will likely be devoted to the monitoring and management of 
liquidity by banks. The diversity in national liquidity regimes, reflecting the 
heterogeneity in financial market conditions, should be taken into account 
when designing liquidity management strategy. Factors such as deposit 
insurance arrangements, central bank lending policies and banks’ own 
balance sheet choices are also crucial in determining banks’ vulnerability to 
liquidity risks. Therefore, to build strong defences against future liquidity 
crisis, there is a need for a good understanding of a country’s specific 
regulatory policies, the nature of banks’ assets and liabilities as well as the 
economic and liquidity environment in which they operate.  36
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Appendix B
Principles for the Management and Supervision of Liquidity Risk1
Fundamental  principle  for  the  management  and  supervision  of 
liquidity risk
Principle 1: A bank is responsible for the sound management of liquidity 
risk. A bank should establish a robust liquidity risk management framework 
that  ensures  it  maintains  sufficient  liquidity,  including  a  cushion  of 
unencumbered, high quality liquid assets, to withstand a range of stress 
events, including those involving the loss or impairment of both unsecured 
and  secured  funding  sources.  Supervisors  should  assess  the  adequacy 
of both a bank’s liquidity risk management framework and its liquidity 
position and should take prompt action if a bank is deficient in either area 
in order to protect depositors and to limit potential damage to the financial 
system.
Governance of liquidity risk management
Principle 2: A bank should clearly articulate a liquidity risk tolerance that 
is appropriate for its business strategy and its role in the financial system.
Principle 3: Senior management should develop a strategy, policies and 
practices to manage liquidity risk in accordance with the risk tolerance and 
to ensure that the bank maintains sufficient liquidity. Senior management 
should  continuously  review  information  on  the  bank’s  liquidity 
developments and report to the board of directors on a regular basis. A 
bank’s board of directors should review and approve the strategy, policies 
and practices related to the management of liquidity at least annually and 
ensure that senior management manages liquidity risk effectively.
Principle 4: A bank should incorporate liquidity costs, benefits and risks in 
the internal pricing, performance measurement and new product approval 
process for all significant business activities (both on- and off-balance 
sheet), thereby aligning the risk-taking incentives of individual business 
lines with the liquidity risk exposures their activities create for the bank 
as a whole.
1.  See  “Principles  for  Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and  Supervision”,  BCBS 
(2008b) for more details. 41
Measurement and management of liquidity risk
Principle 5: A bank should have a sound process for identifying, measuring, 
monitoring and controlling liquidity risk. This process should include a 
robust framework for comprehensively projecting cash flows arising from 
assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items over an appropriate set of 
time horizons.
Principle 6: A bank should actively monitor and control liquidity risk 
exposures and funding needs within and across legal entities, business 
lines and currencies, taking into account legal, regulatory and operational 
limitations to the transferability of liquidity.
Principle  7: A  bank  should  establish  a  funding  strategy  that  provides 
effective diversification in the sources and tenor of funding. It should 
maintain an ongoing presence in its chosen funding markets and strong 
relationships with funds providers to promote effective diversification of 
funding sources. A bank should regularly gauge its capacity to raise funds 
quickly from each source. It should identify the main factors that affect 
its ability to raise funds and monitor those factors closely to ensure that 
estimates of fund raising capacity remain valid.
Principle 8: A bank should actively manage its intraday liquidity positions 
and risks to meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis 
under  both  normal  and  stressed  conditions  and  thus  contribute  to  the 
smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems.
Principle  9:  A  bank  should  actively  manage  its  collateral  positions, 
differentiating between encumbered and unencumbered assets. A bank 
should monitor the legal entity and physical location where collateral is 
held and how it may be mobilised in a timely manner.
Principle 10: A bank should conduct stress tests on a regular basis for a 
variety of short-term and protracted institution-specific and market-wide 
stress scenarios (individually and in combination) to identify sources of 
potential liquidity strain and to ensure that current exposures remain in 
accordance with a bank’s established liquidity risk tolerance. A bank should 
use stress test outcomes to adjust its liquidity risk management strategies, 
policies, and positions and to develop effective contingency plans.
Principle 11: A bank should have a formal contingency funding plan (CFP) 
that clearly sets out the strategies for addressing liquidity shortfalls in 42
emergency situations. A CFP should outline policies to manage a range of 
stress environments, establish clear lines of responsibility, include clear 
invocation and escalation procedures and be regularly tested and updated 
to ensure that it is operationally robust.
Principle 12: A bank should maintain a cushion of unencumbered, high 
quality liquid assets to be held as insurance against a range of liquidity 
stress scenarios, including those that involve the loss or impairment of 
unsecured and typically available secured funding sources. There should 
be no legal, regulatory or operational impediment to using these assets to 
obtain funding.
Public disclosure
Principle 13: A bank should publicly disclose information on a regular 
basis that enables market participants to make an informed judgement 
about  the  soundness  of  its  liquidity  risk  management  framework  and 
liquidity position.
The role of supervisors
Principle  14:  Supervisors  should  regularly  perform  a  comprehensive 
assessment of a bank’s overall liquidity risk management framework and 
liquidity position to determine whether they deliver an adequate level of 
resilience to liquidity stress given the bank’s role in the financial system.
Principle 15: Supervisors should supplement their regular assessments 
of a bank’s liquidity risk management framework and liquidity position 
by monitoring a combination of internal reports, prudential reports and 
market information.
Principle 16: Supervisors should intervene to require effective and timely 
remedial  action  by  a  bank  to  address  deficiencies  in  its  liquidity  risk 
management processes or liquidity position.
Principle 17: Supervisors should communicate with other supervisors and 
public authorities, such as central banks, both within and across national 
borders, to facilitate effective cooperation regarding the supervision and 
oversight  of  liquidity  risk  management.  Communication  should  occur 
regularly  during  normal  times,  with  the  nature  and  frequency  of  the 
information sharing increasing as appropriate during times of stress.43
International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, 
Standards and Monitoring2
Regulatory standards 
Two regulatory standards for liquidity risk which have been eveloped to 
achieve two separate but complementary objectives. The first objective is to 
promote the short-term resiliency of the liquidity risk profile of institutions 
by  ensuring  that  they  have  sufficient  high  quality  liquid  resources  to 
survive an acute stress scenario lasting for one month. The Committee 
developed the Liquidity Coverage Ratio to achieve this objective. The 
second objective is to promote resiliency over longer-term time horizons 
by creating additional incentives for banks to fund their activities with 
more stable sources of funding on an ongoing structural basis. The Net 
Stable  Funding  Ratio  has  been  developed  to  capture  structural  issues 
related to funding choices.
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
The liquidity coverage ratio identifies the amount of unencumbered, high 
quality liquid assets an institution holds that can be used to offset the net 
cash outflows it would encounter under an acute short-term stress scenario 
specified by supervisors. The specified scenario entails both institution-
specific and systemic shocks built upon actual circumstances experienced 
in the global financial crisis. The scenario entails:
•  a significant downgrade of the institution’s public credit rating;
•  a partial loss of deposits;
•  a loss of unsecured wholesale funding;
•  a significant increase in secured funding haircuts; and
• increases in derivative collateral calls and substantial calls on contractual 
and  noncontractualoff-balance  sheet  exposures,  including  committed 
credit and liquidity
facilities. As part of this metric, banks are also required to provide a list 
of contingent liabilities (both contractual and non-contractual) and their 
related triggers.
Net Stable Funding Ratio
The net stable funding (NSF) ratio measures the amount of longer-term, 
stable  sources  of  funding  employed  by  an  institution  relative  to  the 
liquidity profiles of the assets funded and the potential for contingent 
2.  See “International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitor-
ing, BCBS (2009) Consultative document, for more details.44
calls on funding liquidity arising from off-balance sheet commitments and 
obligations. The standard requires a minimum amount of funding that is 
expected to be stable over a one year time horizon based on liquidity risk 
factors assigned to assets and off-balance sheet liquidity exposures. The 
NSF ratio is intended to promote longer-term structural funding of banks’ 
balance sheets, off-balance sheet exposures and capital markets activities.
Monitoring tools 
At  present,  supervisors  use  a  wide  range  of  quantitative  measures  to 
monitor the liquidity risk profiles of banking organisations. A survey of 
Basel Committee members
conducted in early 2009 identified that more than 25 different measures and 
concepts are used globally by supervisors. These include both contractual 
and bank-estimated cash flows and maturity gaps across different time 
horizons; granular assessments of the liquidity implications of specific 
balance sheet profiles; and the use of market data to monitor potential 
liquidity risks at banks. Such metrics enable monitoring of trends both 
within banking organisations as well as within financial systems, for a 
more macroprudential approach to supervision.
To introduce more consistency, the Committee has developed a set of 
common  metrics  that  should  be  considered  as  the  minimum  types  of 
information which supervisors should use in monitoring the liquidity risk 
profiles of supervised entities. In addition, supervisors may use additional 
metrics in order to capture specific risks in their jurisdictions.
The proposed set of monitoring metrics includes the following and may 
evolve  further  as  the  Committee  conducts  further  work.  One  area  in 
particular where more work on monitoring tools will be conducted relates 
to intraday liquidity risk.
a. Contractual maturity mismatch: As a baseline to gain an understanding 
of the basic, least complex aspects of a bank’s liquidity needs, banks should 
frequently  conduct  a  contractual  maturity  mismatch  assessment.  This 
metric provides an initial, simple baseline of contractual commitments 
and is useful in comparing liquidity risk profiles across institutions, and 
to highlight to both banks and supervisors when potential liquidity needs 
could arise.
b. Concentration of funding: This metric involves analysing concentrations 
of wholesale funding provided by specific counterparties, instruments and 45
currencies. A metric covering concentrations of wholesale funding assists 
supervisors in assessing the extent to which funding liquidity risks could 
occur in the event that one or more of the funding sources are withdrawn. 
The monitoring of this aspect of liquidity risk mirrors the monitoring of 
large exposures on the assets side of banks’ balance sheets.
c.  Available  unencumbered  assets:  This  metric  measures  the  amount 
of unencumbered assets a bank has which could potentially be used as 
collateral for secured funding either in the market or at standing central 
bank facilities. This should make banks (and supervisors) more aware of 
their potential capacity to raise additional secured funds, keeping in mind 
that in a stressed situation this ability may decrease.
d. Market-related monitoring tools: In order to have a source of instantaneous 
data on potential liquidity difficulties, the Committee suggests utilising 
market-based data as a valuable supplement to the metrics above. Useful 
data includes monitoring market-wide data on asset prices and liquidity, 
institution-related information such as credit default swap (CDS) spreads 
and equity prices, and additional institution specific information related 
to the ability of the institution to fund itself in various wholesale funding 
markets and the price at which it can do so.PART 2
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CHAPTER 2
LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT AND MEASUREMENT IN 
CAMBODIA
by Ouk Sarat1
Overview  of  Financial  System  and  Commercial  Banking  1. 
Industry in Cambodia
1.1   Structure of Financial System in Cambodia
The financial system in Cambodia is at a rudimentary stage of 
development.  Wrecked  by  almost  three  decades  of  domestic  conflict, 
the  basic  economic  and  social  infrastructure  of  Cambodia,  including 
its  financial  system,  were  completely  destroyed.  Cambodia  regressed 
to a barter economy and public knowledge about the role of financial 
institutions was almost erased. The economy went through a slow and 
painful process of rehabilitation. The intermediary role of the financial 
sector was progressively restored and the financial institutions regained 
public confidence. 
 Despite this progress, the structure of the financial system remains 
traditional. By and large, the banking sector is predominant in the financial 
system. The insurance industry plays a very small role in the financial 
sector while the money and capital markets are non-existent in Cambodia. 
The total assets of the banking system accounted for 49% of the GDP 
while the total assets of the insurance industry contributed less than 1% 
of the GDP.
1.  Author  is  Section  Chief,  Banking  Supervision  Department,  National  Bank  of 
Cambodia. The views express in this paper are of the author only and does not reflect 
the views of the NBC.50
Figure 1 
Total Assets of Banking and Insurance Sector Performance
Figure 1
Total Assets of Banking and Insurance Sector to GDP
Source: National Bank of Cambodia
1.2   Characteristics of Banking Sector
The banking sector in Cambodia consists of commercial banks, 
specialised banks, and micro-finance institutions. The Law on Banking 
and Financial Institution of the Kingdom of Cambodia defines banking 
operation as: (1) credit operations for valuable consideration, including 
leasing, guarantees and commitments under signature; (2) the collection 
of non-earmarked deposits from the public; and (3) provision of means of 
payment to customers and the processing of the said means of payment 
in national currency or foreign exchange. Any institution carrying out all 
these three activities are deemed to be engaged in banking activities and 
shall be called commercial banks. Any institution which carries out only 
one of these three basic activities shall be known as a specialised bank. In 
practice, specialised banks are only involved in lending activities. Micro-
finance institutions also engage in banking activities through the soliciting 
of deposits and the granting of credits, but their scope of operation is 
limited within certain thresholds to distinguish the markets of banking and 
micro-finance.
As  of  June  2009,  the  financial  system  comprises  32  banks, 
consisting of 26 commercial banks and 6 specialised banks, and with 
two representative offices of foreign banks. Apart from this, there are 18 
licensed micro-finance institutions and 25 rural credit institutions operating 
country-wide  in  providing  micro-financial  services  to  rural  and  urban 
households. For the purpose of this study, only the liquidity measurement 
and  management  of  commercial  banks  and  specialised  banks  will  be 
covered.51
According to the Law on Banking Financial Institutions, the legal 
form of banking institutions in Cambodia consists of locally incorporated 
banks and foreign bank branches. However, the locally incorporated banks 
could be wholly foreign-owned, major local interest, banks with major 
foreign interest, foreign bank subsidies, and foreign bank branches.  Figure 
2 below shows the ownership structure of banks in Cambodia.
Figure 2
Structure of the Banking Sector in Cambodia
As of June 2009 Commercial  Specialised Total % Total Assets
Major Local interest 6 4 10 47.50%
Major Foreign Interest 9 2 11 6.00%
Foreign Subsidies 6 - 6 38.30%
Foreign Branches 5 - 3 8.20%
Total 26 6 30 100.00%
% of Total Assets 98.60% 1.40%
Source: National Bank of Cambodia
Within the past few years, the number of banks in Cambodia 
almost doubled. It can be explained by the following factors: (1) The 
Cambodian economy recorded double-digit growth over the last five years 
and the momentum is expected to sustain for another decade or more. It 
means an opportunity promising a huge potential for investors to invest 
in Cambodia. The banking industry attracted foreign investors due to the 
large interest margin and high rate of return. (2) The minimum capital 
requirement  for  setting  up  a  bank  in  Cambodia  previously  was  only 
US$13 million, a figure which is significantly lower as compared to other 
countries in the region. Conglomerate investors in Cambodia viewed it 
affordable for them to establish their own banks to facilitate their business 
in Cambodia. As a result of this, the minimum capital requirement is now 
raised to US$38 million. 
Figure 2 above also shows that the proportion of market shares of 
local and foreign banks are roughly similar, though the number of local 
banks is only one-third that of the foreign banks. Foreign bank subsidiaries 
generally perform better than the foreign bank branches probably because 
the subsidiaries have more autonomy in their operation than the foreign 
bank branches. The subsidiaries adapt well to the market and have more 
freedom in targeting their customers, whereas the foreign bank branches 
generally focus on their existing Head Office customers which are operating 
in Cambodia. Other foreign banks exist to serve niche markets, particularly 
financing real estate projects in the country, and some are geared up for the 
opening of the stock exchange in the country.52
Despite a growing number of banks in the system, the banking 
business  remains  traditional  and  the  products  are  not  diversified. The 
major  sources  and  uses  of  funds  are  basically  customer  deposits  and 
credits. Figure 3 below shows the consolidated balance sheet structure of 
banks. Customer deposits accounted for 65% of the total sources of funds, 
followed by shareholders equity of 22%. Borrowing from banks consisted 
of 10% while borrowing from other creditors was relatively low at only 
1.52%. Generally, lending between banks was not possible so far as there 
was no arrangement in place and banks were reluctant to lend to their 
competitors. Most of the bank borrowings are from their head office. This 
has been done by the foreign bank subsidies and branches to expand their 
loan portfolios as deposit from customers could not accommodate the need 
for credit expansion. Borrowings from the central bank to commercial 
banks especially local banks were relatively small, almost 0% of the total 
assets. Such lending was provided to support clearing process and not for 
the purpose of liquidity support.
Credits to customers produced 53% of total assets, the largest 
application  of  funds.    Due  to  prudential  requirements,  the  funds 
maintained at the central bank amounted to 28% of the total assets. Such 
funds consisted of capital guarantee requirement, reserve requirement for 
customer deposits, and other correspondent accounts, which are barred 
of  interest  for  banks.  Placements  with  banks  both  local  and  overseas 
totaled 8% of total assets. These placements are generally maintained for 
settlement purpose and mostly with foreign counterparts. Lacking liquid 
financial instruments and considering Cambodia is a cash-based economy, 
banks hold cash reserves up to 6.84% of their total assets. 
Figure 3 
Consolidated Balance Sheet Structure
Assets Percentage Liabilities & Equity Percentage
Cash and Gold 6.84% Owe to NBC 0.5%
Deposits – NBC  28.20% Owe to Banks 9.95%
Placement with Banks 7.68% Borrowing Funds 1.52%
Loans to Customers 52.79% Customer Deposits 64.86%
Securities Investment 0.00% Other Liabilities 1.56%
Fixed Assets 3.58%
Other Assets 0.91% Equity 22.11%
Total Assets 100.00 Total Liabilities & Equity 100.00%
Source: National Bank of Cambodia53
Characteristics of Non-Bank Business      1.3 
The non-banking business in Cambodia consists of the insurance 
sector, money and interbank market, and capital market. The insurance 
sector is relatively small as compared to the banking sector. Six insurance 
companies, comprising a state-owned company, a joint venture between 
the state and foreign investor, and four foreign private-owned companies, 
make up the insurance industry. As of end-2008, the total assets of the 
insurance sector amounted to less than 2% of the total assets of the banking 
sector. 
Currently, the money and interbank market and the capital market 
are  non-existent  in  Cambodia.  Work  is  in  progress  to  establish  these 
markets. The National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) is spearheading efforts 
to establish the money and interbank market. Likewise, the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance is doing the same to establish the stock exchange.
Pending the establishment of the money and interbank market, 
the NBC took initiative to issue negotiable central bank security. The 
NBC also promoted repurchase transactions between banks using central 
bank  securities  as  collateral.  To  support  the  establishment  of  these 
arrangements, the NBC plans to introduce a regulation on the issuance of 
central bank security and to establish a security depository. At the same 
time, the NBC is set to introduce a regulation on repurchase transaction 
while related regulations are to be amended, especially regulations with 
regard to liquidity ratio, liquidity reporting process, and market liquidity 
management. 
The money and interbank market is expected to begin operation 
once the above arrangements are put in place, which will provide more 
tools for banks to better manage their liquidity. The availability of money 
and interbank market will provide additional sources of funds for banks 
that are more flexible than customer deposits and will provide liquid assets 
to facilitate bank treasury operations and assets and liabilities management. 
It will offer more options for banks in setting up their liquidity contingency 
plan. As medium- and long-term plan, the establishment of money and 
interbank  market  will  support  the  implementation  of  monetary  policy 
through the implementation of open market operation. However, this will 
need to be consistent with the issuing of government bond to diversify 
instruments in open market operation. 54
On the establishment of stock exchange, it involves the building 
of security infrastructure, investors of securities, issuers of securities, and 
intermediaries of securities. Most of the work in establishing the security 
infrastructure has been completed. The legal and regulatory framework 
relating to securities have been adopted, such as the Law on Government 
Security, Law on the Issuing and Trading of Non-government Security, 
Sub-degree on the Organisation and Conduct of the Security and Exchange 
Commission of Cambodia, and Sub-degree on the Implementation of the 
Law on Non-government Security. In addition, a series of regulations 
have been issued to facilitate the operations stock exchange operations 
and supervision of the stock exchange. The launch of the first ever stock 
exchange of Cambodia is targeted for end-2009. 
The  responsibility  for  propagating  the  stock  market  does  not 
rest on the government alone as the promotion of securities investment 
and trading require investor confidence and transparency of the market. 
However, with the lack of knowledge and risk in stock market dealing, 
securities investment is not expected to flourish rapidly. Securities issuers 
are faced with cumbersome requirements in the listing and issuing process. 
Not many companies will be listed in the early stage. The development 
of stock brokerage has made some ground. Many foreign securities firms 
have set up their base in Cambodia. These firms currently are involved in 
the education process to raise awareness of the stock market. 
The Role of Central Bank 2. 
2.1   Role and Function of the National Bank of Cambodia     
The Law on the Organisation and Conduct of the National Bank 
of  Cambodia  designates  the  NBC  as  the  central  bank  of  Cambodia. 
The principal mission of the NBC is to determine and direct monetary 
policy aimed at maintaining price stability in order to facilitate economic 
development  within  the  framework  of  the  Kingdom’s  economic  and 
financial policy. The Law defines the general role and functions of the 
NBC, which are to:
Determine monetary policy objectives in consultation with the  •	
Royal Government taking into consideration the framework of the 
economic and financial policy of the Kingdom;
Formulate,  implement  and  monitor  monetary  and  exchange  •	
policies aimed at   achievement of the determined objectives;55
Conduct regular economic and monetary analysis, make public  •	
the  results,  and  submit  proposals  and  measures  to  the  Royal 
Government;
License, de-license, regulate and supervise banks and financial  •	
institutions  and  other  relevant  entities,  such  as  auditors  and 
liquidators;
Oversee payment systems in the Kingdom and enhance interbank  •	
payment mechanisms;
Act as sole issuer of the national currency; •	
Undertake  and  perform  transactions  arising  from  Cambodia’s  •	
participation in international institutions in the banking, credit, 
and monetary spheres;
Establish the balance of payments; •	
Participate in the management of external debt and claims; •	
Participate in the formation and supervision of the money and  •	
financial markets;
License,  de-license,  regulate  and  supervise  all  those  operating  •	
in the securities and foreign exchange markets, and market for 
precious stones and precious metals; and
Set interest rate. •	
Apart from these fundamental role and functions, the Law also 
empowers the NBC to act as liquidity provider to banks and financial 
institutions.  Liquidity  provision  is  extended  through  banks’  accounts 
via NBC’s overdraft facility to help banks meet a temporary liquidity 
shortage. Even though the Law provides for this accommodation since its 
promulgation in 1995, in practice, only two banks had availed this facility 
in the third and fourth quarters of 2008 as the Cambodian economy came 
under the impact of the global financial crisis. Currently, there is no bank 
using the overdraft facility of the central bank. 
2.2   Central Bank’s Recommendation Regarding Liquidity    
  Management
The  maintenance  of  a  permanently  sound,  liquid  and  solvent 
condition is the prime responsibility of banks’ management. Liquidity 
is the ability to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they 
come due, without incurring unacceptable losses. Banks may default if 
they are not able to meet their obligations as they come due and liquidity 
management relies on assumptions of conditions that might not prove 
stable or reliable over time. Therefore, banks are required to establish 
prudent policies and assumptions, set a reasonable appetite for liquidity risk 56
and consider possible adverse market conditions that might impact their 
liquidity condition. Furthermore, banks are advised to foresee plausible 
stress scenarios and establish contingency funding plans aimed at coping 
with such adverse situations and preventing from any payment default 
situation from arising. Such a default situation might be devastating for 
banks’ reputation.
All these liquidity management principles and risk appetite should 
result in the holding of a commensurate liquidity buffer and establishment 
of  responsive  policies  and  procedures  aimed  at  rapid  deployment 
of  appropriate  contingency  measures,  such  as  the  reduction  of  loan 
extensions or utilisation of alternative funding sources, which will help 
the banks bridge the liquidity gaps. In spite of the safeguards provided, 
banks sometimes can still be caught in a liquidity crunch due to unforeseen 
or unprecedented adverse trends or market conditions. To cover this risk, 
the NBC provides overdraft facilities to these banks, which otherwise are 
fully solvent, to tide them through a temporary liquidity shortage.
Banks, however, are not allowed to rely on the use of such facilities 
as an excuse for not practicing prudent liquidity management. In addition, 
such facilities are not meant to assist banks that are in a state of insolvency 
or  otherwise  compromised  financial  situation.  Banks  applying  for  an 
overdraft facility must be profitable, solvent and fully compliant with 
the minimum capital requirements and solvency ratio. However, in the 
event that a bank faces a more severe problem than a temporary liquidity 
shortage, the NBC may prescribe the bank an appropriate resolution plan. 
Once a potential temporary liquidity shortage is identified due 
to unforeseen adverse trends or market conditions, banks are advised to 
apply for an overdraft facility from the central bank. When applying for 
an overdraft facility, banks are required to furnish some information to the 
central bank, such as liquidity forecasts and estimates of liquidity shortages, 
assumptions used for the formulation of its liquidity forecasts, discussion 
of the adverse trends and market conditions that lead to the foreseeable 
liquidity shortage, the action plan to address the liquidity shortages over 
the period to be temporarily covered by the overdraft facility applied for, 
prudent estimates of the timeline necessary to implement the action plan and 
to reimburse the overdraft facility, foreseeable impact and consequences 
of the implementation of the envisioned action plan on profitability and on 
solvency, and assessment on the bank’s overall condition. In addition, the 
banks must provide a list of collateral proposed to the central bank in order 
to secure the overdraft facility.57
The central bank will approve the facility within two working 
days  upon  completion  of  the  application.  The  overdraft  facilities  are 
granted either in US dollar or in riel, depending on the liquidity shortfalls 
forecasted by the applicant banks. The initial period of the facilities ranges 
from one week to one month, and is intended to help the institutions to 
overcome a short-term liquidity shortage. The facility may be extended for 
a new period not exceeding one month, and it cannot be rolled over more 
than two times. In the event the implementation of the proposed action plan 
does not result in a durable improvement of the bank’s liquidity condition 
after an extension period of the overdraft facility, the central bank will 
take appropriate action, as it deems fit, to deal with the problem bank and 
devise an appropriate resolution.
2.3   Collateral Criteria for Borrowing from Central Bank     
As defined in the Law on Organisation and Conduct of the National 
Bank of Cambodia, the central bank is empowered to grant overdraft 
facilities to banks against collateral of government securities or government 
guarantee securities.  Banks may also pledge loans as collateral in securing 
their overdraft facilities. Such loans shall not be adversely classified and 
meet all the criteria and requirements established in applicable regulations 
by the central bank. Banks are required to provide a detailed list of the 
eligible collateral and loans, such as initial amount, debtor, nature of the 
loan, classification in the bank’s books and records, tenor, amortisation 
schedule, transaction number, ultimate maturity, and collateral pledged to 
the bank to secure the loan.
Loans and facilities extended to related parties are not eligible as 
collateral. The central bank may refuse acceptance of collateral on ground 
of suspicion of close links of loan accounts with related parties as well as 
close economic or business relationships. The loans and facilities pledged 
as collateral must be sufficiently diversified. The loans or facilities maturing 
during the overdraft facility period are not acceptable as collateral. The 
proposed collateral is to be valued at book value as of the latest date 
prior to the establishment of the proposed collateral list. The central bank 
applies a haircut of 40% to the value of the total collateral pledged, which 
means that the overdraft facility could only be granted up to 60% of the 
collateral value.
Banks are required to earmark in their books any loans and any 
other eligible assets pledged as collateral to the central bank in order to 
secure an overdraft facility. The collateral pledged is to be documented 58
in  accordance  with  the  legal  forms  and  rules  applicable  in  order  to 
safeguard the central bank’s interests from any possible joint claim by 
any collateralised lending counterparty. The central bank has full rights to 
the collateral pledged and will institute legal action against any bank that 
knowingly omits disclosure of such restrictions or pre-existing pledges   
that  could  prejudice its rights to such collateral. 
The central bank will perform a review of the proposed collateral 
prior to making its final decision on the grant of the overdraft facilities. 
The central bank will carry out an on-site review of the collateral loan 
documentation aimed at verifying notably the effective possession of the 
proposed collateral documents, characteristics of such collateral, absence 
of adverse classification in the applicant bank’s books, account records on 
performance and delinquency over the past period of time, and conditions 
under which the loans and assets proposed under the collateral pledge are 
earmarked and secured to protect the central bank’s interests.
Banks are required to comply with the submission of regular report 
to the central bank on receipt of the overdraft facility until termination of 
the facility. The reporting requirements are determined taking into account 
the adverse circumstances affecting the bank’s liquidity condition and 
of the overall risk profile assessment made by the central bank on the 
bank’s overall condition. The frequency of requested reports should be 
commensurate with the risk assessment. Where necessary, in the event of 
a serious liquidity concern and a progressively deteriorating condition, the 
central bank may require a daily report of the day’s inflows and outflows 
as well as the liquidity gap forecasts for the following days.
Dynamics and Determinants of Liquidity in Cambodia 3. 
3.1   Liquidity Profile in the Financial System     
Liquidity in the financial system is generally characterised by the 
movement of liquidity in the banking sector. In the absence of a money 
and interbank market as well as a capital market, liquidity in the banking 
sector is mostly in the form of cash and placements with both local and 
overseas banks. Since the restructuring programme in 2000, when banks 
were required to increase their minimum capital base to US$13 million 
and operate in compliance with the prudential regulations enforced by the 
supervisory authority, until the onset of the impact of the global crisis 
on Cambodia in mid-2008, the banking sector was flushed with excess 
liquidity. As can be seen in Figure 4 below, during the period of 2000 to 59
2004, the liquidity ratio of banks was more than twice the prudential limit 
of 50% while the loan-to-deposit ratio averaged less than 55%. 
Figure 4
Loan-to-Deposit Ratio
Source: National Bank of Cambodia
Though intermediation in the banking sector was relatively low 
compared  to  GDP,  a  large  proportion  of  funds  accumulated  was  not 
channeled for investment. This may be explained by the following factors: 
(1) Banks were concerned about the moral hazard of firms and households 
not properly using the funds as proposed. Banks did not have complete 
information of the borrowers to assess their repayment capacity. With the 
lack of proper accounting practice, banks were not able to use financial 
statements of borrowers as a basis of assessing the primary source of 
income for repayment. (2) Bank loans and advances were mostly secured 
by collateral, which is the basis of credit approval. However, due to the 
bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of transparency of the property registry 
office, banks incurred extra overhead cost to verify the authenticity of the 
collateral. Given the constraints, banks were generally reluctant to lend. 
(3) The profile of borrowers was not publicly available. The lack of credit 
information made it impossible for banks to identify customers’ banking 
conduct and their record of borrowing. (4) The banking community, then, 
did not have in place an adequate risk management system to address and 
mitigate their credit risk. All these factors operated to restrict the supply of 
credit for investment. 
On the other hand, the demand for credit stagnated during the 
period possibly due to these reasons: (1) Socially in Cambodian society, 60
the practice of borrowing does not reflect positively on the borrower. 
Individual  and  firms  doing  business  avoid  debt  financing  as  much  as 
possible,  as  it  would  downgrade  their  social  standing.  People  prefer 
doing business with their own capital, minimising on borrowing. (2) The 
income level of Cambodia was low which did not provide entrepreneurs 
with much business opportunities. With few business partners, low skills 
and technology, and faced with the business risk and challenges, people 
preferred to seek employment in the public sector rather than engage in 
self-employment running their own businesses. (3) The cost of financing 
probably explained why demand for borrowing was scarce. The cost of 
borrowing averaged around 18% per annum, which was high compared 
to other countries in the region. The high cost of funds generally reflected 
the high risk characteristic of borrowers, and the returns to banks had to be 
high enough to compensate for the high cost of operating in the Cambodian 
environment.     
Figure 5
Liquidity Ratio and Loan-to-Deposit Ratio
Source: National Bank of Cambodia
The period from 2005 to mid-2008 was a period of high rapid 
growth. The loan-to-deposit ratio moved upwards while the liquidity ratio 
gradually declined. Businesses were flourishing throughout the country 
and income almost doubling. Funds were channeled into every sector of 
the economy, largely into the wholesale and retail trades. Cambodians 
imported  substantially  ranging  from  basic  to  high-end  consumption 
goods, and exported limited commodities, especially textile, agriculture 
and agro products, and natural resources. The service sector accumulated 
huge  amounts  of  funds,  followed  by  real  estate,  construction,  and 
manufacturing. The demand for credit increased as firms felt the need to 61
leverage and diversify their businesses, and households desired to borrow 
for consumption rather than save. The availability of funds in the market 
grew with the entry of new banks as well as through foreign capital inflows. 
Banks were constrained for the first time during this period in funding 
sources to accommodate credit expansion. Foreign bank subsidiaries and 
branches sought funding support from their head office to meet the demand 
for credit expansion. 
Cambodia faced a severe liquidity shortage in the banking sector 
by mid-2008.  Prudential measures were imposed by the central bank, such 
as the doubling of the reserve requirements to 16% and restriction of credit 
to high risk sectors especially real estate and construction. In an attempt 
to combat the growing inflation through reduction of credit expansion, 
Cambodia experienced a tightening of liquidity in the banking system as 
well as the entire economy. The reversal of capital flow as foreign investors 
faced  liquidity  shortage  in  their  home  countries  further  deepened  the 
problem. Under the impact of global financial crisis, the major sectors of 
the economy such as textile exports, tourism, construction, and agriculture, 
were severely affected, causing unemployment to rise and income levels 
of households to fall.    
At this critical juncture, the central bank acknowledged the need to 
ease liquidity in the market to stimulate investment and support economic 
growth  while  creating  jobs  and  income  for  households.    The  NBC 
lowered the reserve requirement and abolished the restriction of credit 
to the high risk sectors in early 2009. At the same time, it implemented 
an economic stimulus package along with tax reductions to support the 
business continuity of firms. Foreign capital returned to Cambodia with 
the  improvement  of  the  economic  situation  in  the  region.  Firms  and 
entrepreneurs could gradually access credit to normalise their business. 
Despite the progress achieved, if the global crisis persists for a longer 
period, the risk remains critical a liquidity shortage may translate into 
insolvency problem, and vice versus. 
3.2   Development of Liquidity Indicators         
As mentioned earlier, the money and interbank market as well as 
capital market are non-existent in Cambodia. This paper looks at funding 
liquidity risk. It does not cover market liquidity risk, which is beyond the 
scope of this study. 62
3.2.1 Funding Liquidity Indicators      
The liquidity ratio, which is generally expressed as the ratio of 
liquid assets in relation to weighted customer deposits, is a prominent 
indicator measuring the liquidity risk of banks in Cambodia. Only cash 
and placements with banks are qualified as liquid assets specified in the 
numerator of the ratio, while deposits weighted according to the type of 
account, i.e. 80% for time deposits, 60% for demand deposits, and 50% 
for saving deposits, are placed under the denominator. Banks and financial 
institutions are required to maintain a minimum liquidity ratio of 50%. The 
loan-to-deposit ratio is also important in measuring the liquidity position of 
banks. The larger the ratio, the more constrained is the liquidity condition, 
given that deposits and loans both are major sources and uses of funds in the 
banking system. There is no prudential requirement imposed with regard 
to the loan-to-deposit ratio. As can be seen in Figure 5 above, the liquidity 
ratio dropped from 118% in 2005 to its lowest at 81% by end-2008 and 
improved to 91% in mid-2009. Despite the decline in the liquidity ratio, 
it remained substantially above the prudential limit. Similarly, the loan-
to-deposit ratio reached its peak in end-2008 and contracted to 83% by 
mid-2009. These two ratios revealed a common finding that the liquidity 
condition in the banking system was at its worse in 2008. 
Besides these ratios, the breakdown of assets and liabilities also 
provides some clues on the liquidity condition of banks. The breakdown 
helps reveal where the assets and liabilities are concentrated. As can be seen 
in Figure 6, loans in proportion to total assets surged to 57% by end-2008 
and then declined to 53% in mid-2009. To support this credit expansion, 
banks reduced their placements causing pressure on liquid assets. Deposit 
with the central bank showed an upward trend in the first semester of 2009, 
particularly due to the rise of customer deposits while credit disbursement 
was slowing down. Banks, thus, opted for the most practical solution. They 
increased their placement of funds with the central bank to earn some risk-
free interest and maintain reserves for their liquidity need.      63
Figure 6
Major Uses of Funds in Proportion to Total Assets
Source: National Bank of Cambodia
On the other hand, it can be seen from Figure 7 that the proportion 
of deposits to total liabilities and equity declined to its lowest level at 
61%, while borrowing from banks rose upward to its highest at 14% by 
end-2008. This confirmed further that, to support credit expansion, banks 
not only reduced their placements but also engaged in borrowing from 
overseas banks, especially from their parent banks. Those borrowing were 
generally of a short-term nature ranging from three months to one year. 
Once  additional  deposits  were  accumulated,  banks  started  to  partially 
settle with their head office for the borrowed funds. The proportion of 
equity rose up gradually with the injection of additional capital and capital 
of new incoming banks. 64
Figure 7
Major Sources of Funds in Proportion to Total Liabilities and Equity
Source: National Bank of Cambodia
In addition, the maturity gap of assets and liabilities is also helpful 
in gauging the liquidity condition of banks. However, this indicator was 
only adopted recently to better assess the liquidity risk of banks in the 
sense that it provides information on the mismatch of assets and liabilities 
within a particular time horizon. The maturity of assets and liabilities are 
classified into eight time horizons ranging from less than one month, from 
one to three months, until more than ten years. According to the Figure 
8 below, the maturity gap with less than one month was largely negative 
in  June  2008,  the  time  when  Cambodia  hard  hit  by  the  global  crisis. 
The gap remained negative until the end of 2008. However, it improved 
substantially in March and June 2009.       
Figure 8
Maturity Gap of Assets and Liabilities (US$ million)
Maturity Gap 03/2008 06/2008 09/2008 12/2008 03/2009 06/2009
Up to 1 month 2.51% -6.59% -7.70% -4.10% 0.20% 6.01%
> 1 – 3 months -10.59% -2.83% -7.02% -6.84% 9.56% -9.52%
> 3 – 6 months -2.09% -3.93% -1.50% -2.14% 11.06% -1.09%
> 6 – 12 months -4.43% 6.09% 1.50% -0.30% 2.18% -0.84%
> 1 – 2 years 9.57% 1.14% 4.98% 6.73% 2.34% 1.54%
> 2 – 5 years 9.89% 10.02% 9.71% 8.90% 7.82% 9.77%
> 5 – 10 years 2.84% 3.07% 2.93% 3.12% 5.49% 2.84%
> 10 years -7.71% -6.97% -2.91% -5.36% -38.65% -8.72%
Source: National Bank of Cambodia65
Besides these indicators, the statistics on the number of depositors 
and the amount of classified deposits were also used to measure liquidity 
position of banks. These figures identified the likeliness that banks may 
face liquidity shortage if large deposits are drawn down. As can be seen 
in Figure 9 and Figure 10, more than 80% of depositors deposited less 
than US$500 while around 3% of depositors maintained more than 83% 
of total deposits in banks. This could simply mean that the banking system 
is highly susceptible to large deposit withdrawals. Any run on banks from 
these depositors will put severe pressure on liquidity and could bring 
banks to collapse. 
Figure 9
Values of Deposits According to Class of Deposits (US$ million)
Limit 01/2009 02/2009 03/2009 04/2009 05/2009 06/2009
> 
20,000
83.78% 80.80% 83.24% 83.12% 83.27% 83.07%
≤ 
20,000
5.60% 7.87% 5.57% 5.69% 5.71% 5.84%
≤ 
10,000
3.95% 4.38% 4.08% 4.07% 4.15% 4.16%
≤ 5,000 1.93% 2.03% 2.03% 2.02% 2.00% 1.98%
≤ 3,000 2.71% 2.75% 2.75% 2.69% 2.70% 2.65%
≤ 1,000 0.79% 0.84% 0.84% 0.79% 0.84% 0.81%
≤ 500 1.13% 1.20% 1.20% 1.15% 1.12% 1.09%
Others - - - - - -
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: National Bank of Cambodia
Figure 10
Number of Deposits According to Class of Deposits
Limit 01/2009 02/2009 03/2009 04/2009 05/2009 06/2009
> 
20,000
2.09% 2.04% 2.56% 2.02% 2.02% 3.02%
≤ 
20,000
1.41% 1.43% 1.39% 1.41% 1.44% 1.45%
≤ 
10,000
1.98% 2.03% 1.95% 1.97% 2.01% 2.02%
≤ 5,000 1.79% 1.77% 1.79% 1.83% 1.84% 1.83%
≤ 3,000 5.02% 5.06% 5.00% 5.05% 4.98% 4.94%
≤ 1,000 4.29% 4.43% 4.25% 4.25% 4.50% 4.40%
≤ 500 83.43% 83.24% 83.06% 83.48% 83.22% 82.34%
Others - - - - - -
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: National Bank of Cambodia66
3.2.2 Qualitative Measures
Other  qualitative  measures  are  also  taken  into  account  for 
consideration of the liquidity condition. Generally, these measures include 
banks’  overall  financial  condition,  off-  balance  sheet  commitments, 
and public confidence in banks. However, credit rating of banks is not 
applicable for liquidity assessment because of the absence of credit rating 
agencies and it is also not compulsory for banks to be rated in Cambodia. 
The assessment on banks’ overall financial condition also provides 
some insights for understanding liquidity condition of banks. Generally, 
bank  liquidity  and  solvency  are  linked.  Severe  liquidity  problem  can 
trigger insolvency problem, and vice versa. This study focuses on the 
liquidity problem of banks which are otherwise solvent. While solvency 
position of banks can be studied using various approaches, the discussion 
here is focused only on the profitability and asset quality of banks.
Poor asset quality affects the liquidity of banks in the sense that 
if the expected cash flow from loan repayment are not received on time, 
banks would not be able to relend or meet their obligations at the projected 
date. Thus, banks may need to find other funding sources for replacement. 
This is something that could trigger a serious liquidity problem. As in the 
case of Cambodia, non-performing loans declined to its lowest level at 
3.44% by end-2008 and then gradually rose to 5.17% in June 2009. The 
global crisis caused an economic slowdown in the country and impacted 
on non-performing loans causing   to surge slightly.  The level of non-
performing loans was still considered satisfactory and the risk of poor 
asset quality triggering a liquidity problem at that time was considered 
minimal. However, the prolonged impact of the global crisis may severely 
deteriorate banks’ asset quality and the potential danger of rising non-
performing loans could squeeze banks’ funding sources and give rise to a 
liquidity shortage.      67
Figure 11
Ratio of Non-performing Loans and Loans to Related Parties
Source: National Bank of Cambodia
Similarly, banks’ profitability affects liquidity. Poor performing 
banks are likely to have less funds available for further investment or for 
meeting obligations.  Losses, if severe, will erode the capital base of banks. 
The banks may fall into a liquidity problem requiring fund injections. 
Poor bank performance, which is mostly caused by poor asset quality, 
high transaction cost, intense competition, and narrow interest margin, 
ultimately jeopardizes banks’ reputation. Banks that are solvent are able 
to borrow at lower cost, whereas less solvent banks incur higher cost for 
borrowing. This is referred to as the risk of credit spread which affects 
banks’ liquidity. According to Figure 12, banks’ profitability indicators 
show that bank earnings declined significantly from 2007 to mid-2009, 
due particularly to the slowdown of credit expansion and the rising of 
non-performing loans. However, earnings   remained positive during this 
period and there was no serious pressure on bank solvency. Given that 
non-performing loans are expected to continue deteriorating, most banks 
may operate with losses, eroding their capital position. Funds are less 
likely to be available when banks make losses, and coupled with the risk 




Source: National Bank of Cambodia
The commitment of banks with regard to the off-balance sheet 
items also proves to be important in assessing the liquidity condition of 
banks since it partly indicates potential fund outflows. In the event that 
banks do not have sufficient funds to meet such commitments, they may 
encounter a liquidity problem. Figure 13 shows that the off-balance sheet 
commitments  in  proportion  to  liquid  assets  declined  overtime  and  it 
accounted for 12% by mid-2009.  Such a reduction was much consistent 
with the fall in the rate of credit growth as well as the slowdown of 
economic activities. With this low ratio, banks were considered to have 
sufficient funds to meet their obligation. 
Figure 13
Off-balance Sheet Commitment to Liquid Assets
Source: National Bank of Cambodia69
Finally, assessment on bank’s liquidity condition must also take 
into account reputation risk as public confidence in the banking system 
is crucial to avoid bank-runs. The lack of public confidence was a major 
concern. It was attributed mainly to this issue why the financial deepening 
as well as intermediation in the banking sector remained low as compared 
to GDP. The supervisory authority and the banking community at large 
have been collaborating to enhance public confidence in banks. Some 
progress had been achieved over the past few years after the restructuring 
programme in 2000. The safety and soundness of the banking sector were 
largely better than ever before. However, with the outbreak of the global 
crisis, there was speculation that most of the banks are in a very vulnerable 
position.  The  media  tended  to  exaggerate  the  problem.  However,  the 
authority had anticipated the problem and was well prepared to deal with 
it. The policies adopted by authority to minimise the impact of the global 
crisis, such as easing liquidity constraint and enhancing the safety and 
soundness of banks through increasing their capital base, governance, 
and risk management process, proved to be effective to some extent, and 
the banks were able to withstand the most stressful period particularly in 
late-2008. Despite this optimism, the Cambodian banking system remains 
vulnerable to sudden changes in the global economic condition which 
could easily give rise to negative public sentiment. 
3.3  Factors Affecting Liquidity Risk in Cambodia   
After  reviewing  liquidity  profile  and  indicators  for  assessing 
liquidity condition, we may reach some conclusions regarding the factors 
affecting liquidity risk in Cambodia. These factors can be categorised as 
macro- and micro-factors. The macro surveillance of liquidity condition 
in the banking system provides that monetary policy, regulations of the 
supervisory authority, and potential capital reversal are the major factors 
affecting liquidity risk, while the micro assessment pinpoints that banks’ 
financial  condition,  especially  potential  insolvency  problem  due  to 
substantial rising of non-performing loans and severe losses, and lack of 
public confidence in individual banks, are the significant factors to impact 
on liquidity condition. 
Of the macro factors, monetary policy adopted by the central bank 
is most likely to affect the liquidity position of banks. As occurred in mid-
2008, the central bank raised the reserve requirement to 16% in order to 
combat inflation. However, this policy led to severe liquidity tightening 
in banks. Currently, inflation is relatively stable which does not require 
drastic  policy  response.  However,  given  that  the  CPI  basket  consists 70
largely of imported commodities from neighboring countries and the riel, 
the national currency, is depreciating against the currencies of Cambodia’s 
major trading partners, and coupled with the recent surge in the world 
oil price, the tendency is for inflation to rise again. Any policy actions in 
response to this will cause the recurrence of a liquidity crunch.     
Prudential regulations imposed by the supervisory authority also 
had some major impact on liquidity in the banking sector. The central bank 
tripled the minimum capital requirement to US$38 million from US$13 
million and adopted a new ruling on governance where banks’ shareholders 
are required to meet some minimum qualification criteria in an attempt 
to enhance banks’ viability. However, some small banks had difficulty 
meeting the criteria. In addition, the central bank also introduced more 
stringent liquidity measures which required banks to establish prudent 
liquidity management policy, conduct stress-test scenarios, and formulate 
liquidity contingency plans. All these measures impacted the environment, 
making it less conducive for liquidity demand. 
Capital  reversal  was  largely  explained  mounting  liquidity  risk 
in the banking sector during mid-2008 and early-2009. In the absence of 
money market and capital market, a large portion of the capital inflows 
went into the banking sector accumulating substantial shares of foreign 
capital. With the outbreak of the global financial crisis, foreign capital 
flowed  out  from  Cambodia  causing  a  severe  liquidity  shortage  in  the 
country. The situation has improved recently with the return of foreign 
capital. However, uncertainty regarding world economic recovery makes 
the inflow of foreign capital into Cambodia unsustainable. This may have 
a significant impact on liquidity in the banking sector. 
Of the micro factors, bank insolvency is one of the major factors 
that has a bearing on liquidity in the banking system. Bank insolvency 
is  normally  caused  by  poor  asset  quality,  severe  losses,  management 
incompetence in coping with banking risk, and poor business strategy 
in an intensely competitive environment. In the event that the impact of 
the global crisis on the Cambodian economy persists for a longer period, 
firms and households are expected to go through a most stressful period. 
Currently, non-performing loans in the banking sector are on the rise and 
are  expected  to  climb  significantly. The  expansion  of  non-performing 
loans may lead to refinancing problem and it may cause the profitability of 
banks to plunge. While the banks may require additional funds to sustain 
their solvency, obtaining additional fund support during such stress period 
will be extremely difficult for the banks. If this scenario materialises, it 
will deepen the liquidity problem in the banking system. 71
Liquidity Risk Management in Banks 4. 
4.1   Past Development        
As  discussed  earlier,  there  was  high  excess  liquidity  in  the 
banking system long before the global crisis hit the Cambodian economy 
in mid-2008. Before the crisis, the management of liquidity by banks was 
conventional. Banks held substantial cash and placements which were the 
most highly liquid assets in the Cambodian banking system. Cash played 
a significant role in liquidity management of banks. What banks did was to 
maintain cash level sufficient to meet the cash demands of their customers. 
Based on previous performance, banks were able to estimate the daily, 
weekly, and monthly demand for cash. Cash inflows and outflows within 
these periods were used to construct the trend, project the cash demand 
cycle and determine the reserved cash level. Generally, banks hold their 
cash level at an average of 7% of total assets. This level of cash holding 
was high compared to banks in the neighboring countries of the region. 
The reason is due to the fact that Cambodia is a cash-based economy. 
Besides  holding  cash,  banks  maintained  placements  with  the 
central bank and with other banks, both local and overseas, as part of 
their liquidity management process. Such placements consisted mainly of 
correspondent accounts and certificate of deposit accounts. Correspondent 
accounts are generally used for settlement purposes, especially inward and 
outward remittance and trade financing activities. Certificate of deposit is 
a form of investment for banks to generate some profit. This investment 
is of benefit to the banks as it is much less riskier than loans, and could 
be liquidated quickly to meet an extraordinary need for cash. In a manner 
similar to the management of cash, banks observed the previous trend and 
cycle to determine what proportion of their funds should be placed under 
correspondent accounts and under certificate of deposit accounts, the latter 
bearing interest but with some maturity constraint. 
In addition to this, liquidity management in banks was driven 
by the lack of liquid financial instruments and the prudential regulations 
of the supervisory authority. As indicated earlier, loan disbursements to 
total deposits was less than 55% between 2000 and 2004, and the ratio 
was around 65% from 2005 to 2008. With the lack of liquid financial 
instruments in the country, the rest of the deposits were largely held in 
the form of placements with banks, apart from the cash holdings required. 
Investment on foreign financial instruments was not an option for banks 
since prudential regulation restricted banks from using local source of 72
funds in overseas markets. In line with this, banks are required to maintain 
a liquidity ratio of above 50% at all times, and this ratio is the norm used 
as a benchmark for liquidity management.  
The liquidity management practices of banks before the global 
crisis was characterised by several common weaknesses in their internal 
governance. Generally, banks were without a liquidity management policy. 
The absence of assets and liabilities management committee often troubled 
banks in the assessment and management of liquidity risks. The pricing, 
cost of funds and market risk control rested in the hands of the treasury 
department, but most of the time the treasury function performed poorly. 
Liquidity contingency plan was not widely used in banks to identify the 
immediate sources of funding support. This was the case since banks 
did not perceive the need to have such complex liquidity management 
framework once they had high liquidity in hand and were only engaged in 
such traditional banking activities, like collection of deposits and extension 
of loans. 
The scope of liquidity management practice before the global crisis 
varied across banks. It cannot be simply generalised that foreign banks 
had a better liquidity management process than local banks. This question 
rested on the management capacity of the banks. Some local banks with 
good management expertise had proved to have high standard of liquidity 
management  on  par  with  the  world-class  foreign  banks  operating  in 
Cambodia. On the other hand, a number of foreign banks seemed to have 
poor practices like the other local banks. Foreign banks and local banks 
differ in their setup with regard to liquidity management. Foreign banks 
relied heavily on liquidity support from their head office whereas local 
banks seek support from the central bank. 
Current Practices 4.2 
With the looming threat of the global crisis to Cambodian banking 
sector, liquidity management framework in banks acquired new impetus. 
Banks were more focused on controlling liquidity risk in order to withstand 
this stress condition. The supervisory authority at the same time pushed 
banks to adopt a more stringent liquidity management process. As has 
been long the traditional practice, banks still concentrated in maintaining 
sufficient liquid assets in the form of cash and banks’ placement to meet the 
projected demand of funds from their customers. The financial projections 
to determine the level of reserve funds to hold was still mainly based on the 
demand cycle, but done in a more prudent manner. Since credit expansion 73
was speeded up rapidly shortly before 2008, there was room for banks to 
accommodate the demand for credit and reduce their liquid assets over 
time.  
In  response  to  mounting  liquidity  pressure  in  2008,  banks 
developed more tools and tighter liquidity management process. As part of 
the prudential requirements, daily liquidity ratio monitoring was adopted 
for banks to review their liquidity condition in a timely manner. Credit and 
deposit growth projections were also implemented to ensure stable flow of 
funds. Banks’ interest rate for deposits increased from an average of 4% per 
annum by end-2005 to around 7% per annum in 2008 to attract additional 
deposits. It was fortunate that the competition for deposits among banks 
during the period did not create a liquidity shortage as higher interest rate 
attracted foreign capital as well as additional saving in banks. 
Another important tool for monitoring liquidity is the application 
of maturity mismatch. Most of the banks attempted to maintain a positive 
gap though the prudential regulation did not specify any requirements for 
the gap. The mismatch of maturity between assets and liabilities generally 
occurred when short-term source of funds are used for long-term financing. 
To minimise the impact of the mismatch, banks were seeking long-term 
funding sources. However, long-term funds were not easily available in 
domestic market. Banks, therefore, largely depended on foreign capital.   
Apart from liquidity ratio and the maturity gap, banks took into 
account potential non-performing loans, off-balance sheet commitments, 
and potential withdrawal of large deposits to determine whether the impact 
of these factors on liquidity was material. Banks reviewed non-performing 
loans to identify if their projected cash inflows were short by problem loans, 
rendering them unable to meet their projected cash outflows. Off-balance 
sheet commitments were also considered in determining potential cash 
outflow from banks. These factors could deepen the liquidity condition of 
banks. While the calculation of liquidity ratio and maturity gap required 
by the supervisory authority ignored these effects, some banks attempted 
to incorporate the effect of these factors in their internal procedure for 
liquidity  management,  such  as  adjusted  liquidity  ratio  and  adjusted 
maturity gap. To contain immediate cash shortfalls, banks established a 
norm for large withdrawals. Prior notice up to 72 hours was required for 
the withdrawal of large deposits. This provided some breathing space for 
banks to deal with the problem in the event of any cash shortfall.   74
In addition, some large banks employed stress-test scenarios to 
project the adverse impact of market conditions on their liquidity position. 
As a minimum, the stress test projected the magnitude of deposit outflows 
that could bring down the liquidity ratio below the prudential limit of 50%. 
The test then incorporated scenarios of credit default and obligation to meet 
off-balance sheet commitments. Generally, credit defaults were projected 
based on credits to the highly vulnerable sectors, such as garment, real 
estate and construction, and tourism. Besides these, the test could employ 
the worst-case scenario with extreme deterioration in solvency condition, 
or the contraction of capital from home country in the case of foreign bank 
subsidiaries and branches. 
As the banking sector faced increased pressure in liquidity, banks 
acknowledged the need to improve their internal governance procedure for 
managing liquidity. Many small banks started introducing the practice of 
assets and liabilities management committee while the large banks made 
further improvement in their practices. Such a committee was essential 
in the sense that it addressed policies and procedures for maintaining 
adequate  liquidity  and  controlling  interest  rate  and  maturity  risk.  It 
was also necessary for optimising the interest earnings of banks. At the 
same time, banks enhanced the efficiency of their treasury departments 
to implement the policies and procedures established by the assets and 
liabilities  management  committee.  Also  other  key  risk-management 
areas were strengthened, especially credit risk and strategy risk. A new 
set of rules was strictly enforced by the supervisory authority on banks 
concerning the recognition of non-performing assets.    
Annual liquidity contingency plan was also established as part 
of the toolkit for the improvement of the liquidity management process. 
As a minimum, the plan identified the funding sources in the event of an 
immediate need. Also the back-up funding sources needed to be specified 
once the primary funding sources were not available. The amount of funds 
available  from  influential  shareholders,  any  shareholders,  prospected 
shareholders, or any available sources could be addressed in the plan. In 
addition, it included an analysis of the cost of funds for immediate liquidity 
need. In particular it specified the cost for which banks are willing to pay or 
have to pay for obtaining such liquidity. The average term of contingency 
funds include that of matching the average term in banks’ current liquidity 
position. Generally, the contingency plan of local banks relied heavily on 
shareholders’ funds while foreign banks’ subsidiaries and branches had 
their fund support from their head offices. Due to the absence of a money 
and interbank market and lack of liquid financial instruments, banks are 
constrained in setting up their back-up funding sources.75
Currently, there is initiative to introduce liquid financial instruments 
to  facilitate  liquidity  management  in  banks.  The  legal  and  regulatory 
framework for money and inter-bank market, government securities, and 
capital market is almost in place. Banks are discussing among others 
to process these arrangements. Some banks have reached agreement in 
adopting repurchase agreement and commercial paper instruments. It is a 
positive first step towards the development of the interbank market offering 
more tools for managing their liquidity. In the past, banks were reluctant to 
lend to one and another. With established arrangement and a more stable 
financial condition, banks today engage in more of such transactions and 
have shown readiness to cooperate in the banking community. This is a 
positive sign towards the establishment of the interbank market. Facing 
the current economic slowdown and continuing pressure of liquidity risk, 
banks coordinate with their counterparts for liquidity assistance whenever 
needed. 
Lessons Learned 5. 
5.1   Trend in Liquidity Risk Management        
Liquidity management practices in banks have changed significantly 
after the impact of the global crisis on Cambodia. It is well worth repeating 
that, until late-2006, banks did not put in place mechanisms for proper 
liquidity management. What they did was to maintain highly liquid assets 
and to meet the regulation of the supervisory authority. Gradually, banks 
perceived the need to have a proper risk management framework as they 
faced mounting liquidity pressure due to rapid credit expansion. Additional 
funds were required to accommodate credit expansion as well as meet self-
sufficiency for liquidity with the absence of a local interbank and money 
market. Obtaining additional deposits and borrowing from overseas were 
only  the  two  options  available  for  banks  to  meet  the  need  for  funds. 
Banks saw the role of assets and liabilities management as crucial to their 
operation as well as to managing liquidity risk. At the same time, banks 
put in place some additional tools, such as maturity-gap analysis. A few 
large banks even introduced sophisticated techniques for conducting stress 
test to evaluate their liquidity position.      
By late-2008 and early-2009, at the height of the impact of the 
global crisis, banks produced or revised their liquidity contingency plan to 
withstand their worse-case scenarios. As a minimum, the banks’ liquidity 
contingency plan consisted of capital injections from existing and potential 
shareholders, borrowings from head offices or motherhouses, borrowings 76
from regional financial institutions, and securing of credit facilities from 
the central bank. At the same time, some banks reached agreement to 
assist one and another in the event of an emergency liquidity need. The 
repurchase agreement is the tool adopted between banks as a form of 
liquidity assistance. 
On the whole, liquidity risk management framework in banks has 
developed remarkably in recent years. Banks generally have introduced 
more tools and techniques to improve their liquidity risk management 
framework. The small banks appear to lack behind the large banks in 
upgrading their liquidity management framework. However, the risk to 
their system is relatively low as compared to the large banks. 
5.2   Role of Liquidity Risk in Triggering Financial Crisis     
Cambodia is not isolated from the rest of the world. Even though the 
banking system in Cambodia is very traditional engaging mostly in deposit-
taking and lending activities, nevertheless, liquidity risk is considered one 
of the most important factors for banks to fail. Generally, for the economy 
as a whole, the shortage of liquidity is likely to result in the shortage of 
funds for investment. This would lead to lower employment and reduction 
of income for households, and this trend was observed in Cambodia in 
late-2008 and early-2009. A study conducted by the Cambodia Institute 
for Development Study (Kang Chandararoth et al., 2009) estimated that 
the impact of the global crisis reduced Cambodia’s potential output by 
US$282 million in 2008 and US$677 million in 2009, while unemployment 
rose substantially in the major sectors of the economy. Estimates of the 
garment and textile sectors indicated approximately 27,000 jobs were lost. 
The estimated job losses in the construction sector were around 15,000. 
The tourism sector also suffered massive layoffs.       
The shortage of liquidity in the financial sector caused banks to 
have less funds to meet their obligation. With the adoption of prudential 
measures in response to rapid credit growth and slowdown of capital 
inflow  due  to  the  global  recession,  Cambodia  experienced  a  liquidity 
freeze in the banking sector in late 2008 which poised a huge threat to the 
entire economy. Banks had difficulty meeting the demand of depositors 
as well as coping with the flight of capital. Banks drew down their liquid 
assets, with some banks seeking liquidity support from the central bank. 
Considering  the  possibility  of  bank-runs  which  could  damage  public 
confidence in the banking system and the possible spread of the contagion 
effect across the banking industry, the central bank took swift action to 77
remedy the situation through relaxation of the prudential measures to ease 
liquidity flow in the banking sector. Fortunately for Cambodia, it saw the 
return of capital with the gradual improvement of the global and regional 
economy, which contributed in sustaining the liquidity situation. 
5.3   Development of Liquidity Situation
The liquidity risk pressure has been easing in recent times. Public 
confidence remains strong in the banking system, and banks continue to 
absorb new deposits and foreign capital inflows. The central bank and 
the banking community work together in close collaboration to maintain 
public  confidence.  Banks  show  progress  in  developing  their  liquidity 
management framework, and are mostly compliant with the prudential 
regulations on liquidity. The central bank continues to monitor the liquidity 
situation closely. Tools and techniques for liquidity assessment both at 
micro- and macro-levels are being updated, and new additional tools for 
liquidity management are being put in place. The institutional and legal 
framework is being improved upon to allow more room for the banks to 
introduce new products, services, and financial instruments, and for them 
to better manage their liquidity position. 
5.4   Future Prospect
In the near term, the money and interbank market and capital market 
will come on stream and be fully operational. They will provide additional 
framework for liquidity management for the banking community as well 
as for the central bank. Various financial instruments such as repurchase 
agreements,  commercial  papers,  government  bills,  and  corporate  debt 
security, will be readily available in the market. This will provide flexibility 
for banks to match their financial assets and financial liabilities, therefore 
improving  the  liquidity  management  framework  in  these  institutions. 
These financial instruments will also enable banks to access new sources 
of funding besides customer deposits and borrowings. 
However, with new financial instruments coming on stream, banks 
will be more exposed to market risk. In the past, exchange-rate risk and 
interest-rate risk were the predominant risks in the banking sector. The 
introduction of these instruments will subject the banks to another risk – 
the price risk. Due to the lack of experience in managing these instruments, 
banks may face potential losses dealing in these financial instruments. 
While the price risk associated with the financial instruments is highly 
correlated with liquidity, banks will need to strengthen their framework for 
managing market liquidity risk. 78
Conclusion      6. 
The financial system in Cambodia is at a rudimentary stage of 
development and is dominated by the banking sector. Banks engage in 
the traditional form of banking business, notably deposit collection, credit 
disbursement, and payment settlement. With the absence of a money and 
capital market, banks have to cope with funding liquidity risk. Since the 
restructuring programme in 2000 until late-2006, banks in Cambodia were 
in excess liquidity. During this time, the liquidity management framework 
of  banks  was  extremely  simple  as  banks  only  acted  to  comply  with 
prudential regulation on liquidity and held sufficient cash reserves to meet 
the demand of their customers.
After 2006, banks gradually encountered a liquidity squeeze due to 
rapid credit expansion and insufficient deposit collection to accommodate 
such expansion. Lacking the setup of an ALCO committee within bank, or 
with a poorly functioning ALCO, banks projected on the need of funding 
and the cost to acquire it, and focused on achieving a positive maturity 
gap. Banks felt the compelling need to enhance their liquidity management 
framework for the first time. Matching the sources and uses of funds to 
create a positive gap was a difficult challenge as the sources of funds were 
typically short term in nature while the uses of funds were long term. Due 
to the constraint in obtaining long-term financing in the domestic market, 
some banks resorted to long-term overseas funding or borrowing from 
their parent banks, while other banks left the mismatch maturity exposure 
in their books.
By mid-2008, the banking sector faced liquidity crunch due to the 
reduction of deposits and capital outflows. Most of the banks encountered 
liquidity  shortage  and  even  breached  the  prudential  regulation.  The 
supervisory  authority  moved  swiftly  to  relax  the  prudential  measures 
which contributed to the liquidity tightening. In addition, the central bank 
made available its credit facilities to support the troubled institutions. 
The  banking  community  acknowledged  the  need  to  further 
upgrade their liquidity management framework. Banks employed stress 
test scenarios to assess the impact on their liquidity position and improved 
their governance relating to liquidity, such as the establishment of assets 
and  liabilities  framework,  liquidity  management  framework,  and  the 
formulation of liquidity contingency plan. These efforts contributed in 
helping banks to tide through the most stressful period in late-2008. Public 
confidence in the banking system was restored to some extent. Customer 79
deposits and capital inflows returned to the banking sector while recession 
in the region gradually receded. 
Currently, the liquidity condition in the banking industry is stronger 
than ever, particularly with regard to the adoption of better liquidity risk 
management  framework.  Banks  possess  more  tools  and  techniques  in 
managing their liquidity risk and can depend on the support of the central 
bank in the event of liquidity need contingency. In the near future, the 
introduction of a money and interbank market will provide banks with 
additional flexible tools to manage liquidity risk. However, banks will have 
some exposure to additional risk, such as price risk and market liquidity 
risk. 80
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CHAPTER 3
LIQUIDITY MEASUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT IN KOREA
by Myeong-suk Kim1
1.  Introduction 
The recent crisis in the global financial markets has shown the 
importance of liquidity risk. The crisis brought about a credit crunch due 
to the liquidity risk of financial companies and the total financial system, 
and posed a threat to global financial system stability. 
Liquidity refers to the capacity of financial companies to obtain 
the necessary funds to increase their assets and repay their debts due. 
Liquidity risk is divided into funding liquidity risk and market liquidity 
risk. Funding liquidity risk refers to the risk of financial companies being 
unable to repay present and future liabilities. Market liquidity risk refers 
to the risk of financial companies suffering losses during the process of 
converting assets into money, owing to decreases in asset market prices 
due to shortages of trading volume and market collapse.
The linkage between funding liquidity and market liquidity may 
lead to a vicious liquidity cycle. As asset prices fall, financial institutions 
that borrow to acquire assets face funding liquidity problems, and some 
of them will have to sell assets to resolve their funding problems. If asset 
markets are relatively illiquid, however, they may be forced to sell at low 
prices. That could cause more losses, which will in turn exacerbate the 
funding problems. In extreme cases, a vicious cycle between the two may 
be generated.
  Central banks have a strong interest in liquidity in terms of the 
efficient implementation of monetary policy operations, as well as the 
stability of the financial markets and institutions.
2.  Overview of Financial System and Commercial Banking Industry 
in Korea
The foundation of the modern financial system in Korea was laid 
during early the 1950s when the central and commercial banking systems 
1.     Author is the Economist from the Financial System Stability Department, Bank of 
Korea.  82
were established with enactment of the Bank of Korea Act and the Banking 
Act. Since then, the Korean government has introduced various types of 
financial industries, including the securities and insurance industries. As 
a result, Korea has a well diversified financial system to meet the changes 
in financial service demand of the economic participants resulting from 
enhanced industry structure, increasing incomes, and so on. 
The financial institutions in Korea may be divided into the central 
bank, which is the Bank of Korea (BOK), banking institutions, and non-
banking  institutions,  including  merchant  banking  corporations,  mutual 
savings banks, credit institutions, insurance institutions, securities-related 
companies, etc.
The growth of the capital markets in Korea has been substantial. 
As a result of government efforts, rapid economic growth and the opening 
of  the  stock  market,  their  role  of  mobilising  funds  has  continued  to 
strengthen.
2.1   Share of Banking Sector vs. Capital Market (Bond and    
  Equity  Markets)
Commercial and specialised banks are the most influential players 
in the financial system of Korea, considering the fact that the total assets of 
the banking sector overwhelm that of other non-banking institutions. As of 
end-September 2009, their total assets amounted to 2,170.2 trillion won, 
56.8% of the total assets of all financial institutions.
Insurance is the second largest financial sector in Korea. However, 
the uses of insurance companies’ assets are severely restricted to protect 
policyholders, and their influence is relatively limited.83
Figure 1 
Total Assets in Korea, by Financial Sector
(Period end, trillion won, %)
 
Note:   1) Covers accounts and trust accounts 
  2) Covers mutual funds, postal saving and venture capital companies, etc.
Source: Bank of Korea 
In the capital market consisting of the bond and stock markets, 
the bond market accounted for around 70% of the outstanding value of the 
capital market as of end-September 2009. In the bond market, financial 
debentures show the largest outstanding amount and government bonds 
the second largest one. Stock market assets have shown large fluctuations 
in accordance with the stock price level. At the end of 2008, notably the 
share of the stock market fell to the mid-20% level, due to outflows of 
foreign investment induced by the global financial crisis.
Figure 2
 Outstanding Amount of Capital Market in Korea
(Period end, Trillion won, %)
Note:  1) Monetary Stabilisation Bonds issued by the Bank of Korea (excluding those   
       with maturities less than 1 year)
  2) Total market value (based on listed companies)
Source: Bank of Korea84
2.2   Characteristics of Banking Sector
In Korea, the banking sector consists of commercial banks and 
specialised banks. As of end-September 2009, there were 13 commercial 
banks, five specialised banks and 39 foreign bank branches. 
Commercial  banks  have  adopted  the  branch  banking  system. 
They  can  be  divided  into  nation-wide  commercial  banks  and  local 
banks, depending upon their areas of operations. In terms of the scope 
of their operations, however, there is no difference between nation-wide 
commercial banks and local banks. 
A nation-wide commercial bank is a commercial bank which 
operates nation-wide. As of end-September of 2009, the average number 
of branches of a nation-wide commercial bank was about 600. This was 
almost five times the average number of branches of a local bank. A 
local bank is a commercial bank which does not operate nation-wide but 
operates with a province-wide network. Local banks were founded for 
the purposes of decentralisation of the banking business and promoting 
balanced growth among regions. As of end- September 2009, the average 
total asset volume of nation-wide commercial banks was 150 trillion won, 
more than eight times that of the local banks.
Foreign bank branches carry on their businesses under almost 
identical conditions to Korean banks nowadays, as preferential treatment 
has been reduced and discriminatory business regulations lightened.
The non-banking sector consists of merchant banking corporations, 
mutual savings banks, credit institutions, insurance institutions, securities-
related companies, etc. Insurance institutions comprise the largest non-
banking industry. Recently, the market share of mutual funds has increased 
rapidly due to the increase in stock prices and low interest rates on bank 
deposits.
2.3   Nature of Bank and Non-bank Businesses
Nation-wide commercial banks held total assets amounting to 
about 1,053 trillion won as of end-September 2009, which was 90.8% of 
the total assets of commercial banks.
Their principal sources of funds are deposits in domestic currency. 
At the end of September 2009, deposits and debentures issued in won 85
accounted for 51.8% and 11.7%, of their funding sources, respectively. As 
for their uses of funds, nation-wide commercial banks operate the largest 
proportion of their funds, 29.3%, as household loans. Their shares of 
loans to corporations and securities in total assets were 27.6% and 16.4%, 
respectively.
The financial structures of local banks are largely similar to those 
of nation-wide commercial banks, but their reliance on domestic currency 
deposits and loans to corporations is higher. At the end of September 2009, 
deposits in domestic currency accounted for 53.2% of their total sources, 
while the share of loans to corporations in their total assets was 42.3%.
Foreign bank branches’ most important source of funds, typically 
debt in foreign currency, which as of end-September 2009 represented 
53.1% of their total funding sources, followed by inter-office accounts 
(18.4%), while their deposits in domestic currency constituted only 2.2%. 
As for their uses of funds, derivatives investment accounted for the largest 
proportion, at 30.9%. Securities investment accounted for 22.3%, while 
loans  to  households  and  loans  to  corporations  represented  10.7%  and 
10.5%, respectively.
In  Korea,  specialised  banks  share  the  following  main 
characteristics. First, they were established to provide funds to particular 
sectors whose access to funds through commercial banks was insufficient 
due  to  limited  availability  or  their  low  profitability.  With  subsequent 
changes in the financial environment, however, specialised banks have 
expanded their businesses into commercial banking areas, although the 
shares of their funds allocated to the sectors they originated to serve is still 
relatively high. Most specialised banks now have, by and large, the same 
patterns of business as commercial banks.
Second,  specialised  banks  rely  heavily  on  deposits  from  the 
public for their sources of funds in addition to the issuance of debentures 
and  borrowing  from  the  government.  Therefore,  they  compete  with 
commercial banks in acquiring deposits.86
Figure 3
 Sources and Uses of Funds of Banking Sector1
(as of end-September 2009, trillion won, %)
Notes:   1) Covers only banking accounts    
  2) In domestic currency   
  3) Loans in domestic currency
Source: Bank of Korea
2.4   Characteristics of Government Bond Market
The share of Korean Treasury Bonds (KTBs) in total government 
bond issuance in Korea amounted to 85% as of end-September 2009. 
Therefore,  the  government  bond  market  in  Korea  will  be  explained 
centering on KTBs.
There are currently four types of KTBs issued, based on maturity: 
3-year, 5-year, 10-year, and 20-year. KTSs are issued as fungible issues, 
meaning that the terms in the maturity and the coupon rates of the bonds 
issued within a certain period are the same, and the bonds issued during 
that period are treated as the same type. Due to increased liquidity through 
the raising of the volume of each type issued and the trading volume, 
interest expenses are saved and a credible benchmark rate is established. 87
Figure 4
Government Bond Holdings by Investor Group
Source: Bank of Korea
Figure 5
Outstanding Bond Issuance Amounts in Korea
( period-end, trillion won, %)
Note:   1) Monetary Stabilisation Bonds issued by the Bank of Korea (excluding those   
      with maturities less than 1 year)
  2) Total market value (based on listed companies)
Source: Bank of Korea
A primary dealership system was introduced in 1999 to stimulate 
the Treasury bond market. Primary dealers are financial institutions which 
have the right to participate in bidding in the primary market but are also 
under an obligation of market making through setting Treasury bond prices 
in the secondary market and so on. There are seven commercial banks and 
12 securities companies designated as primary dealers.
The  over-the-counter  (OTC)  market  accounts  for  80%  of  the 
secondary bond market in Korea. Before the Korean Government made 88
it mandatory for primary dealers to deal in the exchange market in order 
to develop the KTB market in October 2002, the OTC market accounted 
for around 99% of all bond trading. Since that implementation of measure, 
however, PDs have begun to trade increasingly in the exchange market, 
and the share of the exchange market has increased.
2.5   Regulations and Restrictions Regarding Banks’ Business
Commercial  banks  are  incorporated  in  accordance  with  the 
Banking Act and engage primarily in the business of collecting deposits, 
lending and payment settlement. The business of commercial banks can be 
sub-divided into three categories: indigenous business, incidental business, 
and concurrent business.
Indigenous  business  refers  to  the  lending  of  funds  typically 
acquired through deposits and securities issuance as well as the foreign 
exchange business. Incidental business refers to banking businesses that 
accompany indigenous businesses, such as payment guarantees, acceptance 
of commercial paper, mutual installments, securities investment, repurchase 
agreements, underwriting, securities sales and bancassurance. Concurrent 
business, which requires additional regulatory authorisation, includes the 
trust and credit card businesses.
Commercial  banks  must  comply  with  management  guidance 
set by the Financial Services Commission (FSC) in respect of capital 
adequacy, soundness of assets, liquidity and other matters necessary for 
securing management soundness. The principal objective of prudential 
regulations is to ensure sound management decisions. Because prudential 
regulations are designed not to supplant management decisions but to 
ensure minimum safety and soundness, they are a key component of market-
oriented supervision. Where any bank is deemed to threaten serious harm 
to its sound management, due to failure to meet the guidelines, the FSC 
may require that it take measures necessary to improve its management, 
for example, imposition of requirement to increase its capital stock and 
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The  Banking  Act  bars  commercial  banks  from  operating  in 
businesses including  loans for the purpose of speculation in commodities 
or securities,  loans made directly or indirectly on the pledge of a bank’s 
own shares or on the pledge of shares in excess of 29% of the outstanding 
shares of another company,  loans made directly or indirectly for purchase 
of the bank’s own shares,  loans made directly or indirectly to finance 
political activities,  loans to any of the bank’s officers or employees 
except for small, insignificant loans as determined by the Financial Services 
Commission (FSC) /Financial Supervisory Service (FSS),  investment 
in stocks or other securities (excluding state bonds and BOK Monetary 
Stabilisation Bonds (MSBs) with a period of redemption not less than 
three years, which exceeds the 60% of its equity capital,  ownership of 
real estate (excluding real estate acquired through exercise of a security 
interest such as mortgage) other than real estate for business purposes, and 
 ownership of real estate used for business purposes in excess of 60% of 
the bank’s equity capital.90
3.   Role of the Bank of Korea
The Bank of Korea Act provides that the sole purpose of the Bank 
is to contribute to the sound development of the national economy by 
pursuing price stability through the formulation and implementation of 
efficient monetary and credit policies. Practically, however, the Bank’s 
policy objectives involve the following three:
(a)   Price Stability — the Bank conducts monetary policy to pursue price 
stability under an inflation targeting regime,
(b)   Safety  and  Efficiency  of  the  Payment  System  —  the  Bank  is 
responsible for the safety and efficiency and oversight of the payment 
and settlement system in Korea, and operates BOK-Wire+, which 
serves as the center of all payment systems,
(c)   Financial  stability  —  the  Bank  constantly  monitors  the  market 
developments  and  analyses  the  flows  of  funds  among  financial 
institutions, while, if necessary, carrying out joint examinations of 
banks with the FSS.
3.1   As a Liquidity Provider  
The Bank of Korea adjusts market liquidity including banks’ 
reserves through open market operations, so that the call rate does not 
deviate too far from the policy Base Rate set by the BOK’s Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC).
There  are  two  types  of  open  market  operations:  operations 
involving the issuance of MSBs and the purchases and sales of securities. 
MSBs, which are issued only by the BOK, originated as a major 
tool of monetary policy during the period when the volume of government 
and public bonds essential for open market operations remained insufficient. 
These central bank obligations have relatively long maturities, and once 
issued are not in principle redeemable prior to maturity. Thus, they are 
used as a major structural adjustment tool whose policy effects are long 
lasting. Currently, a ceiling on the issuance of MSBs is set by the MPC 
every three months, in consideration of market liquidity conditions. MSBs 
are issued in 11 different maturities ranging from 14 days to two years.91
Securities transactions, meanwhile, are employed to supply or 
withdraw funds through the sale and purchase of government and public 
bonds as a tool adjusting short-term liquidity. Securities eligible for use 
in  such  transactions  are  confined  to  government  bonds,  government-
guaranteed bonds and MSBs, in consideration of the credit risk involved 
and the efficiency of open market operations.
Open  market  operations  involve  both  outright  transactions 
and repurchase agreements or Repo (RP) transactions. Among outright 
transactions, outright sales, which soak up liquidity, have found little use 
since they have the same effect as issuance of MSBs. 
Outright purchases, which supply liquidity, have in contrast been 
employed to expand the pool of securities available for use in open market 
operations, although apart from that, they have not been frequently used, 
as market liquidity generally remains in a state of structural surplus.
Accordingly,  securities  transactions  focus  mostly  on  RP 
transactions used as an instrument for routine liquidity adjustment. The 
longest RP maturity stands at 91 days, however, the maturities of most RP 
contracts range from overnight to 14 days, as they are used as a tool for 
fine-tuning of shortages and excesses of reserve funds. With the reform of 
the monetary policy operational framework in March 2008, the carrying 
out of RP transactions as and when necessary was changed so that it is 
now done on a regular basis,  with 7-day RP transactions offered once a 
week on Thursdays. Since then, 7-day RP transactions have become the 
mainstay of overall transactions.
  Its  lending  facilities  allow  the  central  bank  to  provide  loan 
support to individual banks. The loan policy of the BOK is operated by the 
rediscounting of bills that banks have received from corporations in return 
for loans, or by extending loans to banks against the collateral of eligible 
securities. The eligibility of securities that may be used as collateral is 
strictly  regulated;  only  credit  securities  such  as  re-discountable  bills, 
Treasury bonds, government-guaranteed bonds and MSBs are recognised 
as eligible collateral. When shortages of liquidity occur due to financial 
market  instability  or  incidents,  such  as  computer  system  failures,  the 
MPC may temporarily extend eligibility to other assets apart from those 
mentioned above. The lending facilities of the BOK available to financial 
institutions  consist  of  Liquidity  Adjustment  Loans,  Aggregate  Credit 
Ceiling Loans, Intra-day Overdrafts and Special Loans.     92
Figure 7
Bank of Korea Lending Facility (as of October 2009)
 
3.2   As a Financial Regulator    
  Before April  1998,  the  BOK  Office  of  Bank  Supervision  had 
full authority to supervise commercial banks. Four separate supervisory 
agencies  (the  BOK,  the  Securities  Supervisory  Board,  the  Insurance 
Supervisory Board, and the Non-bank Supervisory Authority) executed 
sectional supervision. 
  Since April 1998, however, the Financial Services Commission 
(FSC) and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), as a consolidated 
body, have had the supervisory power. The BOK exercises supervision-
related  functions  within  a  limited  scope.  It  has  the  right  to  request 
materials, the right to undertake joint examinations, and the right to appeal 
for reconsideration of a decision of the FSC.     
 
  The  role  of  ensuring  financial  stability  is  the  central  bank’s 
original role, irrespective of its having full financial supervisory authority 
or not. The role includes monitoring of the financial system and evaluation 
of  its  stability,  analysis  of  management  statuses  and  conduct  of  joint 
examinations  of  financial  institutions,  operation  and  supervision  of 
the  payment  and  settlement  system,  provision  of  emergency  liquidity 
assistance, and publication of the Financial Stability Report. More specific 
details follow. 
  The BOK monitors the financial system and evaluates its stability. 
It  reviews  domestic  and  overseas  economic  conditions,  analyses  the 
financial market environment and examines the debt servicing capacity 
of the household and business sectors to get an overall picture of financial 93
institution soundness. The Bank also contributes to the maintenance of 
financial stability by identifying and publicising potential risk factors in 
the financial sector, to prevent them from causing financial system unrest. 
  The BOK analyses the management statuses of financial institutions 
and evaluates their soundness, based upon information collected from 
reports and surveys, while, if necessary, conducting joint examinations of 
institutions with the FSS. These efforts enhance the effectiveness of the 
BOK’s monetary policy and contribute to the maintenance of financial 
system stability, by allowing the Bank to more accurately understand the 
business conditions of individual financial institutions and to collect and 
evaluate various kinds of on-site information.
  The BOK publishes a regular Financial Stability Report, which 
includes analysis of the current status and potential risks of Korea’s financial 
system and an overall assessment of its stability. The main purpose of 
the report’s publication is to further strengthen financial system stability, 
by stimulating the market participants’ active discussion of a wide range 
of risk factors in the financial sector under the rapidly changing global 
financial environment. The BOK began to publish the Financial Stability 
Report, the first of its kind in Asia, from April 2003, and has since then 
continued to publish it twice a year. 
3.3   Collateral Criteria for Borrowing from the Central Bank
  In November and December 2008, to facilitate the movement of 
funds into the bond market, the BOK included bank debentures and certain 
government agency bonds among securities eligible for use in open market 
operations which were originally Treasury bonds, government-guaranteed 
bonds and MSBs. In December, additional 12 securities companies were 
selected to join the existing 19 banks, one securities company, and the 
Korea Securities Finance Corporation as the BOK’s counterparts for RP 
transactions.94
Figure 8
Expansion of Eligible Securities and Counterparts of Open Market 
Operations
Note:   1)  Debentures issued by financial institutions subject to ‘Banking Act’, Korea   
Development Bank, Industrial Bank of Korea, National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation, National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives, and Export-Import 
Bank of Korea
The  BOK  drew  up  a  plan  for  improvement  of  the  collateral 
system for its lending facilities, which it then put into effect from February 
9 this year. Credit instruments2 held by financial institutions were allowed 
to be used as collateral for the Bank’s lending facilities3 -- its Liquidity 
Adjustment Loans and Intra-day Overdrafts, in addition to its Aggregate 
Credit Ceiling Loans. Moreover, by abolishing conditions for the eligibility 
of credit instruments, the BOK allowed as acceptable collateral all credit 
instruments with remaining maturities of not more than one year acquired 
by financial institutions against loans. 
A haircut ratio scheme was also introduced for marketable and 
non-marketable  securities. According  to  this,  the  collateral  value  of  a 
marketable security is assessed on a mark-to-market basis, with adjustment 
by a certain haircut depending upon the remaining maturity and the method 
of principal and interest repayment. For non-marketable government and 
public bonds, 80% of the face value (the issue price in the case of discounted 
bonds) is recognised as the collateral value. For credit instruments, 70% of 
the financial institution’s loan principal is recognised.
2.    Promissory notes and bills of exchange accepted by banks when making loans to 
firms.




Notes:  1)   Remaining maturity is fixed on the day the market price is appraised. 
  2)   Coupon  bond  basis,  figures  in  parentheses  are  discount  bonds  and  other 
securities without coupons. 
    3)   Promissory notes and bills of exchange accepted by banks when making    
loans to firms.
4.   Development and Determinants of Liquidity Risk
4.1   Liquidity Profile in Korean Financial System    
  Since March 2009, liquidity conditions in the Korean financial 
system have recovered rapidly from the severe shock arising from the 
global financial crisis following the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing in 
September 2008. This has been mainly due to the easing of international 
financial market unrest and the proactive policy responses of the Korean 
government and the BOK.
4.2   Development of Liquidity Indicators
4.2.1 Funding Liquidity  
The average won liquidity ratio of Korean commercial banks was 
117% as of end-September 2009, having shown an upward trend since 
September 2008 when it hit a bottom of 107%. The level of the ratio was 
much higher than the guideline Korean banks are required to observe. In 
fact, no Korean banks have been unable to maintain liquidity ratios of 
100% or higher since the end of 2004.
The average foreign currency liquidity ratio of Korean commercial 
banks recorded 104% in September 2009, much higher than the guideline 
of 85%.96
Figure 10
Liquidity Ratios of Korean Commercial Banks (2004.4/4~2009.3/4)
The  average  loan-to-deposit  ratio  (excluding  Certificates  of 
Deposit [CDs]) of Korea commercial banks was 111.7% at the end of 
September 2009 having followed a downward trend since June 2008 when 
it hit a peak of 128.3%, but still well over 100%.
CDs are generally excluded when we calculate loan-to-deposit 
ratios as CDs are issued to take large funds usually targeted for institutional 
investors such as securities firms and MMFs. However, in the case of 
the Korean banks, CDs are largely marketed through their retail branch 
networks. In other words, the stability of CDs is similar to that of deposit 
as the Korean banks are using CDs for taking funds from households who 
want higher interest rate.
Given the nature of CDs in the Korean banking sector, the average 
loan-to-deposit ratio of Korean commercial banks with CDs, included has 
remained stable; it had only increased to 108.2% in March 2008 from 
92.0% in the end of 2004. It also decreased to 97.8% in September 2009 
having remained below 100% since June 2009.97
Figure 11
Average Loan-to-deposit Ratio of Korean Commercial Banks 
(2004.4/4~2009.3/4)
Source: Financial Supervisory Service
The retail deposit growth rate has reversed to an increasing trend 
since the 3rd quarter of 2008, partly due to the Korean commercial banks’ 
own efforts to increase the ratio of this stable source of funds instead 
of relying excessively on wholesale funding, and partly due to growing 
investor preference for safe assets.
Figure 12
Trend of Retail Deposit Growth Rate
Source: The Bank of Korea
Until the global financial crisis broke out after the collapse of 
the Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Korean commercial banks were 
relying more and more on wholesale funding. The share of wholesale 
funding in total sources of funding hit a peak of 24.9% at the end of June 
2008, and then reversed to a sharp downtrend. As of end-September, 2009, 
the wholesale funding ratio had declined to 20.1%.98
Figure 13
Sources of Funding of Korean Commercial Banks 
(2004.4/4~2009.3/4)
Source: Financial Supervisory Service
Korean commercial banks’ fund usage centers on extension of 
loans. The ratio of loans to total assets has been maintained at around 70%. 
Securities and cash account for around 15% and 10%, respectively. 
Figure 14
Uses of Funding of Korean Commercial Banks (2004.4/4~2009.3/4)
Source: Financial Supervisory Service99
The positive maturity gap between assets and liabilities of within 
3-month maturity has shown an upward trend. Since the first quarter of 
2009, however, the positive maturity gap of nation-wide commercial banks 
has decreased, in line with the change in the base maturity of the liquidity 
ratio (from 3-month to 1-month).
Figure 15
Maturity Gap for 3-month Maturity Bucket (2004.4/4~2009.3/4)
Source: Financial Supervisory Service
4.2.2 Market Liquidity (Monthly Data from 2005-2009)   
The concept of market liquidity includes several characteristics of 
a given market. These characteristics are tightness, depth and resilience. 
Tightness  of  the  market  means  the  difference  between  the 
prices at which a financial instrument can be bought and sold. Tightness 
is measured by the bid-ask spread, which in normal times is determined 
mainly by structural characteristics in the market. In cases where there 
is a lack of liquidity, however, market-makers will increase their bid-ask 
spreads to compensate for the possibility that they might be unable to sell 
the assets they are holding.
Depth of the market means volume of trading possible without 
effect on prevailing market prices. Resilience of the market means the 
speed at which price fluctuations resulting from trading dissipate. Depth 100
and resilience are measured by return to volume. In illiquid conditions, the 
price will move more for a given trading volume, so the return to volume 
will be higher. 
In  addition  to  the  three  characteristics  just  described,  many 
academic researchers refer to the liquidity premium. They suggest that 
investors will require a higher liquidity premium for assets with greater 
market liquidity risk.
In consideration of these facts, three measures -- bid-ask spread, 
return to volume, liquidity premium are therefore used to measure market 
liquidity.
Among the major central banks, the Bank of England and the 
European Central Bank calculate a composite market liquidity indicator 
to  monitor  their  market  liquidity  conditions.  The  composite  market 
liquidity indicators of both banks cover seven markets and eight individual 
measures.
4.3   Measuring a Korean Market Liquidity Indicator 
The process of calculating a Korean financial market liquidity 
indicator has five steps: 
Figure 16
Process of Calculating Market Liquidity Indicator
Step Details
Step 1 Selecting appropriate individual financial markets
Step 2 Determining liquidity measures for individual markets
Step 3 Calculating individual market liquidity measures
Step 4
Normalising individual market liquidity measures
(standard deviations from historical average)
Step 5 Calculating composite liquidity indicator101
The indicator measuring liquidity of the Korean financial markets 
is based upon quantitative and price data from seven domestic financial 
markets and nine individual measures.
Figure 17
Liquidity Measures for Korean Financial Market
Market Bid-ask spread RTV
Liquidity 
Premium
Treasury bonds - O -
Corporate bonds - O O
Stock market O O -
FX-market - O -
Equity index options - O -
Equity index futures - O -
Interest rate futures - O -
Figure  18  shows  the  summarised  composite  indicator,  which 
indicates the situation of market liquidity. Until the end of the first half 
of 2007, market liquidity was relatively strong. After that, it started to 
fall, and then dove sharply after the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers 
(2009.9). The gray area is the period in which the BOK implemented 
numerous policies to stabilise the financial system and supply liquidity, 
from October 2008 to February 2009.
Due  to  the  easing  of  international  financial  market  unrest, 
liquidity conditions in the Korean financial system have improved rapidly 
since March 2009. Surplus liquidity increased, the loan-to-deposit ratio 
has fallen, as deposits have increased more than loans, and the foreign debt 
environment has improved owing to the decrease in CDs premium. With 
the sharply reduced volatility of the financial markets, market liquidity 
condition has returned to their pre-crisis level.102
Figure 18
Market Liquidity Indicator (2004.12~2009.9)
Supervisors increasingly point to the liquidity risk of banks as a 
major factor behind the financial stability of markets worldwide. Liquidity 
problems  within  an  individual  bank  have  the  potential  to  propagate 
not only to other banks but also throughout the entire global financial 
environment. The ongoing crisis in the subprime segment of real estate 
mortgage lending in the U.S. is the most recent example. A phenomenon 
that started as a narrowly focused fear regarding increased delinquency in 
one specific financial sector has since widened its effects to bring about a 
systemic liquidity shortage globally. 
4.3.1  Qualitative Measures 
There  is  no  case  in  which  Korean  commercial  banks  have 
approached or breached the regulatory limits. Even banks with the lowest 
level of liquidity ratio well exceed the regulatory requirement of 100%. 
The nearer a bank approaches a 100% of liquidity ratio, the  more the 
bank can be viewed as carrying out efficient risk management, in light 
of the costs and benefits of liquidity management. Therefore a bank may 
not be estimated to be risky just based on its liquidity ratio near 100%. In 
fact, subsidiaries of foreign banks which can borrow funds from holding 
companies tend to maintain their liquidity ratios nearer 100%.103
Figure 19
Liquidity Ratios of Korean Commercial Banks
Source: Financial Supervisory Service
Bank asset quality has remained at a very high level. In fact, there 
have been no bad loan problems during the recent global financial crisis. 
The  delinquency  rate  of  corporate  loans  declined  to  1.78%  as 
of  end-September  2009,  after  hitting  around  2.27%  at  end-April. The 





Note: Rates are three-month moving averages, based upon loans delinquent one day or 
longer.  
Source: Financial Supervisory Service104
4.4   Factors Affecting Liquidity Risk in Korea   
The cause of the liquidity problems which the Korean financial 
system has experienced throughout the recent global financial crisis can be 
summarised as a sudden rise in uncertainty. Given the Korean economy’s 
large  trade  volume  and  financial  integration  with  the  rest  of  world, 
investors’ views of it deteriorated when global de-leveraging intensified 
and world growth slowed markedly.
The immediate impact appeared in the bond markets, as foreigners 
began to repatriate their funds from the Korean financial market. The 
outstanding balance of bonds held by foreign investors in the Korea bond 
market decreased to 35.3 billion won at the end of April 2009, from its 
peak of 51.5 billion won at end-August 2008. The outflow of foreign 
investors fund led to the evaporation of liquidity in the bond market. As a 
result, domestic credit spreads on corporate and bank bonds also widened 
rapidly, and Korean banks had difficulties in issuing bank bonds in the 
domestic and international bond markets.
Korean banks’ high loan-to-deposit ratios also amplified foreign 
investor risk aversion toward them. The loan-to-deposit ratio of Korean 
commercial banks has stayed above 100% for a long time, and at end-
June 2008, hit a peak of around 130%. A loan-to-deposit ratio over 100% 
means that a bank has to fund its loans from non-deposit sources, such as 
bank bonds. Bank bonds are not a stable source of funds, since unexpected 
redemptions by creditors that may occur during a market downturn force 
a bank to repay creditors by selling off assets. Since loans are usually not 
liquid assets, the bank can face a liquidity problem. In normal times, a 
high loan-to-deposit ratio does not concern investors due to the affluence 
of market liquidity. In stress times, however, it does. 
5.   Management of Liquidity Risk by Commercial Banks  
Won-liquidity ratio requirement was introduced by the FSS after 
the foreign currency crisis of 1997. The FSS required banks to maintain 
the won liquidity ratios, calculated based on won-denominated assets and 
liabilities with remaining maturities of three months or less, at above 100%. 
Since October 2008, the won liquidity ratio has been based on assets and 
liabilities with remaining maturities of one month or less.105
  For foreign currency liquidity, the FSC/FSS requires banks to 
maintain internal foreign currency liquidity management systems based 
on the maturity ladder approach.
After  July  1997,  banks  were  required  to  maintain  minimum 
liquidity ratios of 70% for assets and liabilities denominated in foreign 
currencies maturing in less than 90 days. In April 2004, the mandatory 
ratio was raised to 85%. The ratio is calculated by including the foreign 
currency-denominated  assets  and  liabilities  of  overseas  subsidiaries 
and  offshore  accounts  with  the  foreign  currency-denominated  assets 
and liabilities of both the head office and domestic/overseas branches. 
Since January 1999, banks have also been required to maintain positive 
maturity gap ratio for residual maturity period no longer than seven days 
and negative 10% or higher ratios for residual maturity periods no longer 
than one month. Banks are also required to finance 50% of their foreign 
currency-denominated borrowings in maturities of one year or longer.
The FSC/FSS regularly monitors banks’ compliance and liquidity 
statuses and may take action against banks that do not meet the foreign 
currency liquidity requirements. Banks should report the reasons for this 
and the corrective actions taken in response in the event of violating their 
liquidity ratio requirement.
5.1   Regulations on Liquidity Risk Management
Banks  are  also  required  to  have  risk  management  system  in  place  as 
following by regulation.
5.1.1 Risk Management System
(1)  A financial institution shall establish a system for ensuring 
timely  recognition,  assessment,  monitoring,  and  control 
of various risks arising in all kinds of transactions and for 
evaluating and managing the appropriateness of its inside 
capital.
(2)  For efficient risk management, a financial institution shall 
set up and operate adequate risk-bearing and transaction 
limits by department, transaction or person in charge. 
(3)   A financial institution shall assess and manage, for each 
type of transaction, its credit risk (including risk of placing 
too much emphasis on credit), operation risk, market risk, 106
risk of interest rate in non-trading position (banking book), 
liquidity  risk,  risk  of  strategy  and  reputation  and  other 
various risks which may occur.
 (4)   A financial institution shall comprehensively recognise and 
monitor any significant change in risks in connection with 
its subsidiaries.
(5)   The  Governor  may  evaluate  the  risk  management, 
appropriateness of inside capital and management system 
of financial institutions, and reflect the results thereof in his 
supervisory and examining functions.
5.1.2 Risk Management Organisation
(1)  The  board  of  directors  of  a  financial  institution  shall 
deliberate  and  decide  on  the  matters  necessary  for  risk 
management  falling  under  any  of  the  following  items. 
(If necessary, for efficient risk management, a committee 
for risk management may be established in the board of 
directors to take over these duties.)
a.   Establishment  of  basic  policy  on  risk  management 
consistent with the management strategy; 
b.   Determination  of  risk  levels  which  the  financial 
institution can bear; 
c.   Approval of limits on optimum investments or limits 
on loss allowances; and
d.   Establishment  and  revision  of  regulations  on  risk 
management. 
(2)  A financial institution shall set up a risk management unit 
for comprehensive management of the risks which may 
occur in its business and providing support to the board of 
directors (including the committee) and management. 
(3)   The risk management unit shall be independent of other 
business departments and perform duties under any of the 
following items: 
a.   Examination and analysis of operational status of risk 
limits; 
b.   Operation of the risk management information system; 
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c.   Timely submission of risk management information 
to the board of directors (including the committee) 
and management.
The FSS has produced the guidance Bank Standards on Liquidity 
Risk Management with a view to strengthening domestic banks’ liquidity 
risk management. 
The guidance contains a comprehensive treatment of liquidity 
risk  management  systems,  including  liquidity  risk  management,  stress 
tests, and contingency funding plans. Banks shall establish and operate 
liquidity risk management strategies comprising at the minimum liquidity 
risk management targets, management policies, and internal controls. The 
board of directors of a bank will approve and review the strategies with 
respect to reports on liquidity conditions and stress test results submitted 
on a regular basis. Banks are required to assess their liquidity-related 
costs and risks for reflection in their performance evaluations and in their 
process for approval of new products. In particular, banks should manage 
their  liquidity  risk  tolerance  through  accumulated  net  cash  outflows 
derived from their financial positions and funding capacities. Banks are to 
establish and operate early warning systems. Funding sources should be 
diversified to prevent concentration in a particular currency and maturity.
Banks shall conduct stress tests regularly and reflect the results in 
their liquidity risk management strategies, risk tolerance, and contingency 
funding plans. They are also required to make practical contingency funding 
plans with respect to the graduated stress levels and regularly review 
these plans for appropriateness. The FSS plans to provide guidelines that 
include review of previous management cases, to help banks’ liquidity risk 
management systems take fast and firm root.
6.   Lessons Learned in Korea   
6.1   Trends in Liquidity Risk Management Practices Before and 
After Recent Global Financial Crisis          
The typical liquidity risk management of Korean banks before the 
recent global financial crisis can be described and evaluated as follows.
For  their  everyday  management  of  liquidity  risk,  Korean 
commercial  banks  draw  up  monthly  asset  and  liability  management 
plans,  taking  into  account  the  prudential  liquidity  ratio  set  by  the 108
financial  supervisory  authorities,  and  review  and  analyse  the  results 
of implementation of those plans on a monthly basis. Aside from their 
liquidity  ratios,  banks  use  a  variety  of  other  liquidity  management 
indicators, including the volumes of their short-term funding shortfalls 
and their liquidity gaps. Most indicators used by banks are for measuring 
and managing short-term liquidity, however, and medium- to long-term or 
structural liquidity management is comparatively neglected.
Aside from these procedures for routine liquidity risk management, 
banks also have multi-stage contingency plans for responding to sudden 
liquidity  shocks,  and  they  conduct  stress  tests  to  internally  measure 
their capacities for coping with situations of crisis and to identify any 
vulnerability. Banks’ liquidity contingency plans usually distinguish three 
stages of crisis and use a series of crisis indicators. When an indicator falls 
or rises above a certain threshold value, banks undertake appropriate crisis 
response measures as laid down in their plans. However, these liquidity 
contingency plans leave something to be desired, in terms of response 
measure effectiveness and more particularly in terms of the effectiveness of 
their emergency funding measures. Moreover, banks’ liquidity contingency 
plans need to be more closely aligned with their stress tests. Meanwhile, 
by taking into consideration a more comprehensive set of liquidity risk 
factors, including off-balance sheet items, such as loan commitments and 
derivatives trading activities, the stress tests could be made more reliable 
and accurate. 
To  address  these  weaknesses  in  liquidity  risk  management 
procedures  and  ensure  their  relevance  to  the  changing  financial  and 
economic environment, banks must make a variety of improvement efforts. 
First, their liquidity risk management systems should not just focus on 
short-term horizons, but also consider the long-term stability and efficiency 
of their funding and liquidity management structures. Second, to develop 
stable sources of funding, they must design diversified and competitive 
deposit products that meet the needs of their customers. Third, with the 
understanding  that  even  institutions  having  healthy  assets  and  sound 
profitability can be brought to their knees if they lack adequate liquidity 
risk  management  skills  and  procedures  for  responding  to  unforeseen 
shocks, banks must strive to improve their risk analysis techniques and 
enhance  the  effectiveness  of  their  contingency  plans.  In  line  with  the 
changing financial and economic environment, they should also work to 
implement more broad-based and updated stress testing systems.109
As for the financial authorities, they must step up their efforts to 
monitor banks’ funding practices and their maturing assets and liabilities, 
so as to detect and respond to potential liquidity risk in a timely fashion. 
The financial authorities should also encourage banks to improve their 
liquidity risk management capacities, by consulting with them on means 
of more effectively capturing liquidity risk and on further development of 
crisis scenarios for stress testing.
6.2   Role of Liquidity Risk in Triggering Past Financial Crises, 
including a Fast Case Study
Korea experienced a twin crisis – i.e., a banking and currency crisis 
- in late 1997. Although various factors, including structural weaknesses 
(for example, the over-leveraged corporate sector), can be attributed to 
the crisis, the buildup in short-term debt and foreign currency exposure 
may have been the immediate reasons why Korea was so suddenly hit 
by financial contagion and a sudden capital flow reversal following the 
outbreak of the Southeast Asian crisis earlier that year.
The rapid buildup of private short-term external debt created 
the potential for liquidity problems. In the early 1990s, Korean financial 
institutions borrowed short-term external debt and used it to finance long-
term investment by corporations in line with the Korean government’s 
expansion of short-term overseas borrowing by removal of controls on 
such borrowing by banks. As a result, the short-term external debt of 
financial  institutions  increased  rapidly,  creating  maturity  mismatches. 
The short-term external debt rose from US$40 billion in 1993 to US$98 
billion at end-September 1997, when it represented 54% of total external 
liabilities. And the ratio of usable international reserves to short-term debt 
(on a residual maturity basis) fell from 42% in 1993 to 29% at end-1996.
Before outbreak of the crisis, strong macroeconomic performance 
made the risk invisible. However, the changing external environment, 
including  increased  oil  prices,  falling  semiconductor  prices,  and 
depreciation of the Japanese yen, together with slowing of the domestic 
economy, gradually revealed the weaknesses in Korea’s corporate and 
financial  sectors  that  had  been  hidden  behind  its  impressive  growth 
record.
After devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997, international 
banks began to reduce their exposure to Korean financial institutions and 110
to cut back their short-term credit lines. Korean banks scrambled to find 
foreign currency to repay their loans that were no longer being rolled 
over.
6.3   Development  of  Liquidity  Situation  (in  Banking  Sector) 
Before and After Recent Global Financial Crisis   
The banking sector liquidity remained abundant before and after 
the recent global financial crisis. Before the crisis, Korean banks did not 
have difficulty getting the funds necessary to rapidly increase their assets 
centering on loans, through wholesale funding including CD and bank 
bonds  issuance. After  the  crisis,  Korean  banks  also  enjoyed  abundant 
liquidity  as  their  deposits  increased  rapidly  due  partly  to  banks’  own 
efforts to improve liquidity and partly to growing investor preference for 
safe assets.
As a result, the funding structures of commercial banks have 
gained  in  stability,  as  the  share  of  deposits  in  their  total  funding  has 
grown and that of wholesale funding declined. Banks’ liquidity premium 
(assessed based upon bank bond interest rate and swap rate data), after 
having surged to 370bps in early December 2008, has since then narrowed 
to settle in the 90bps range in October 2009. This is a reflection of a vast 
improvement in bank liquidity positions over the same period.
6.4   Future Prospects
In  September  2009,  the  FSS  produced  the  guidance  Bank 
Standards on Liquidity Risk Management, containing a comprehensive 
treatment of liquidity risk management systems, including liquidity risk 
management  practices,  stress  testing,  and  contingency  funding  plans. 
Therefore, it is expected, that more sophisticated and integrated liquidity 
risk management will be effected in the future.
The FSC announced a plan to implement guidelines for loan-to-
deposit ratios (which were abolished after the 1997 currency crisis) during 
2010. As a result, commercial banks’ loan-to-deposit ratios (excluding 
CDs) are expected to decline although they still hover above 100% on 
average.  This  is  an  indication  of  continuous  improvement  in  banks’ 
liquidity risk management.111
7.   Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
7.1   Conclusion
It  is  well  known  that  among Asian  countries  Korea  was  hit 
most  severely  by  the  global  financial  crisis  following  the  collapse  of 
Lehman Brothers. As of the end of November 2008, the Korean won had 
depreciated by over 25.4% in dollar terms since the September Lehman 
Brothers failure, the largest rate of decline among major Asian countries 
except Turkey. The Stock prices in Korea had plummeted 27.2% during the 
same period. External debt conditions for Korean banks had deteriorated 
severely due to the evaporation of global liquidity and the CDs (5-year) 
premium on Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Fund bonds shown a marked 
upward trend (9.14 135bp → 11.30 368bp). 
The Korean financial system then regained its stability rapidly from 
the beginning of 2009, as the liquidity crunch caused by the international 
financial market turmoil eased. Compared with other countries, in fact, 
Korea had appeared to have advantages in enduring the shock from the 
global crisis -- thanks to the cushion of its substantial volume of official 
reserves, its improved policy framework, and its very limited exposure to 
toxic assets. The severe degree of the shock that hit Korea therefore seems 
a little surprising.
 Even before the global financial crisis, however, worries about 
the liquidity risk of Korean commercial banks had been voiced, as their 
exposures to liquidity risk have widened due to their expansionary drives 
centering around loan assets and their deepening reliance on wholesale 
funding. These factors might have led to the rapid deterioration of foreign 
investors’ views on Korean banks.
7.2   Policy Recommendation  
  The policy authorities need to induce Korean banks to lower their 
loan-to-deposit ratios (excluding CDs) which still hover above 100% and 
to decrease their reliance on wholesale funding.
In fact, the ratio of loans to deposits has been pointed out as a 
source of fragility at Korean banks. Loan-to-deposit ratios over 100% 
mean that a bank has to fund loans from non-deposit sources, such as bank 
bonds. When liquidity is abundant in the financial markets and system, 
wholesale  funding  can  be  regarded  as  more  efficient  than  traditional 112
funding including deposits, because wholesale funding does not require 
stable and widespread sales networks for efficient access to customers -- 
which is essential to retail deposit-taking.
 Bank bonds are not a stable source of funds, however, since 
unexpected redemptions by creditors may occur during a market downturn 
to force a bank to pay back creditors by selling off assets. Since loans are 
usually not liquid assets, a bank can in this case face a liquidity problem. 
To lower their loan-to-deposit ratios, banks should make efforts 
to attract more deposits, while increasing loans at a more moderate pace.  
Banks must also strive to improve their risk analysis techniques 
and enhance the effectiveness of their contingency plans. In line with the 
changing financial and economic environment, they should additionally 
work to implement more broad-based and updated stress testing systems. 
Even  institutions  having  healthy  assets  and  sound  profitability  can  be 
brought to their knees if they lack adequate liquidity risk management 
skills and procedures for responding to unforeseen shocks.
As for the financial authorities, they must step up their efforts to 
monitor banks’ funding practices and their maturing assets and liabilities, 
so as to be able to detect and respond to potential liquidity risk in a 
timely fashion. The financial authorities should also encourage banks to 
improve their liquidity risk management capacities, by consulting with 
them on means of more effectively capturing liquidity risk and on further 
development of crisis scenarios for stress testing.113
CHAPTER 4
MALAYSIA LIQUIDITY RISK: 
SAILING THROUGH THE TURBULENT YEARS
by Syarurizal Mohd Sabri1
Overview of Financial System and Commercial Bank Industry  1. 
in Malaysia
The Malaysian financial system may be divided into two main 
structures,  Financial  Institutions  and  Financial  Market.  The  Financial 
Institutions comprise the Banking System and Non-Banking Financial 
Intermediaries, while the Financial Market consists of four major markets, 
namely,  the  Money  &  Foreign  Exchange  Market,  Capital  Market, 
Derivatives Market and Offshore Market. An overview of the Malaysian 
financial system is presented in Figure 1.
1.1  Share of Banking Sector vs. Capital Market (Bond and    
Equity  Market)
The banking sector is a significant player in the Malaysian debt 
securities market more as a subscriber than as an issuer. This is evident 
from the average subscription of 34% of debt securities outstanding amount 
between May 2008 to June 2009, while exposure to equity is, on average, 
only 0.2% of the outstanding amount for the same period. As at June 2009, 
the outstanding amount of the debt securities and equity2 markets stood at 
RM622b and RM821b, of which the banking sector subscribed 27% and 
0.258%, respectively. Apart from banks, other major subscribers in debt
securities  market  include  asset  management  companies,  insurance 
companies, pension funds and unit trusts.
1.  Senior Executive of the Banking Supervision Deparment of Bank Negara Malaysia. 
The opinions expressed by the writer in this research paper do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the Bank Negara Malaysia. Any data published within this paper should 
be used in good faith. Furthermore, this research should only be used for academic 
purposes in enriching and enhancing the study of funding and market liquidity risks 
as well as appropriate regulatory and supervisory response within the central banks 
members of SEACEN. This research should be periodically reviewed and enhanced 
to ensure any obsolete or misrepresented opinions be corrected.
2.  Equity,  as  defined  by  Malaysia  Exchange,  includes  Share  Capital,  Fixed  Income 
Securities, Exchange Traded Funds, Warrants, Property Trusts and Close End Funds.114
Figure 1
Overview of Malaysian Financial System
As  an  issuer,  banks  only  constituted  on  average  6%  of  the 
outstanding amount of debt securities market. The major issuer of debt 
securities is the Government of Malaysia which issued on average 43% 
of outstanding amount. The significant amount of government-issued debt 
securities are used to finance fiscal policies and they serve as benchmarking 
purposes in the development of the debt securities market in Malaysia.
In terms of derivatives, Malaysian banks are also quite active. 
Between 2008 to 2009 there were on average RM1,256b notional amount 
of  derivatives  in  banks.  Out  of  this,  interest-rate-related  derivatives 
constitute the highest portion with RM755b, while FX-related derivatives 
was second with RM430b. The notional value of derivatives stood at 
RM1,094b as at June 2009.    115
1.2   Characteristics of Malaysian Financial Institutions
The  banking  sector  in  Malaysia  consists  of  conventional  and 
Islamic  commercial  banks  and  investment  banks.  There  are  currently 
54 banks operating in Malaysia. These banks can be classified into the 
following groups:
 
Large Domestically-owned Commercial Banks (DCB):  9  i. 
Entities 
Domestically-owned  banks  went  through  a  few  rounds  of 
merger-and- acquisition exercise under Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM)’s 2000 to 2010 Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) 
to form 9 conglomerates. 
ii.   Locally-incorporated Foreign Commercial Banks     
      (LIFB): 13 Entities
Foreign banks in Malaysia can be divided into two groups. 
The first group of LIFB are retail players which have huge 
core-banking base (i.e. they solicit deposits and issue loans) 
while second group opt for niche business mostly in treasury-
based and trade-related activities, such as proprietary treasury 
activities, serving Multinational Companies (MNCs), treasury 
transactions and cash management services.  
Investment Banks (InvB): 15 Entities ii.    
Former merchant banks and universal brokers anchored the 
transformation  of  discount  houses  into  investment  banks. 
Eight  of  these  banks  are  either  subsidiaries  of  DCB,  or  a 
part of the same banking group as DCB, while the rest are 
on  standalone  basis.  In  terms  of  business  model,  most  of 
the investment banks are relying on interbank borrowings, 
especially from their group to support their business, while 
those without banking group have sizeable corporate deposits 
to fund their assets. Although these standalone investment 
banks rely heavily on corporate deposits to fund their assets, 
the tenors between assets and liabilities are usually matched. 
The regulatory and supervisory approaches to InvB are as 
rigorous  as  those  applied  to  commercial  banks,  with  two 
notable differences. The first difference is, InvB are regulated 116
and supervised by both BNM and the Securities Commission 
with clear accountabilities to minimise regulatory gaps and 
overlaps.  The  Securities  Commission  is  responsible  for 
InvBs’  business  and  market  conduct  in  order  to  promote 
market integrity and investor protection in the capital market, 
while BNM is responsible for InvB prudential regulation. The 
second notable difference is, InvB are only allowed to accept 
deposits of a minimum of RM500,000. No similar limitation 
is imposed on commercial banks. 
iv. Islamic Banks (IB): 17 Entities
The earliest form of Islamic banking in Malaysia may be traced 
back to September 1963 when Perbadanan Wang Simpanan 
Bakal-Bakal Haji (PWSBH) was set up. PWSBH was set up 
as an institution for Muslims to save for their Hajj (pilgrimage 
to Mecca) expenses. In 1969, PWSBH merged with Pejabat 
Urusan Haji to form Lembaga Urusan dan Tabung Haji (now 
known as Lembaga Tabung Haji). The first Islamic bank in 
Malaysia was established in 1983. In 1993, commercial banks, 
merchant banks and finance companies were allowed to offer 
Islamic  banking  products  and  services  under  the  Islamic 
Banking  Scheme  (IBS).  These  institutions,  however,  are 
required to separate the funds and activities of Islamic banking 
transactions from that of the conventional banking business to 
ensure that there would not be any co-mingling of funds. In 
Malaysia, the National Syariah Advisory Council additionally 
set up at Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) advises BNM on the 
Shariah aspects of the operations of these institutions, as well 
as on their products and services. Since the launch of FSMP 
in 2000, the number of IBs grew exponentially to its current 
state. About  9  of  these  banks  are  either  sister  companies 
or subsidiaries of DCBs, while 6 are foreign-based IBs. In 
terms of business model, these IBs follow a similar model as 
commercial banks except their products have to be Shariah-
compliant.   117
1.3   Nature of Banks’ Business
As can be seen from Figure 2, as at end of June 2009, deposits 
remained a major source of funding for all banks.
Figure 2




DCB LIFB InvB IB
Corporate 
Deposits
29.87 34.27 37.35 60.58
Retail Deposits 40.59 45.96 0.30 16.56
Short term 
Deposits




3.63 1.25 1.10 1.28
NIDs and BAs 7.80 3.38 7.77 15.75
Interbank 
borrowings
1.78 6.53 12.85 3.51
Interbank repos 0 0 0 0.10
Note: *Funding via issuance of papers such as securities with or without recourse 
  DCB and LIFB have the largest component of stable funding 
in the form of retail deposits.  For InvB and IB, their main funding is 
mainly from corporate deposits which are normally more volatile than 
retail deposits. In terms of dependency on wholesale borrowings, InvBs’ 
interbank borrowings as well as LIFBs’ funding vide swap lines are also 
significant. The main reason why InvB have less composition in deposits 
is mainly due to the regulatory requirement which permits them to accept 
only deposits of minimum of RM500,000.   118
The uses of the funding for each group of banks are presented in 
the Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3
Uses of Bank Funds 
Use of funding RM Account (%)
DCB LIFB InvB IB
Issuance of loans 66.00 54.67 8.04 55.73
Subscriptions of 
debt securities
18.93 19.18 61.49 17.57
Subscriptions of 
equities
0 0 0.52 0
Reverse repos* 0.65 6.54 2.80 0
Interbank lendings 13.05 18.91 25.84 25.78
Cash 0.77 0.26 0.92 0.37
Reserve 0.60 0.44 0.39 0.56
Note:* Securities allowed under reverse repo include Private Debt Securities (PDS), BAs, 
NCDs and Other Securities, as maybe specified by BNM.
  Issuance of loans and subscription of debt securities stood out as 
the main usage of funds for all banks (except InvB with regard to issuance 
of loans). The operations of InvB are mainly fee-based, which explains 
for their low composition of loans issuance. The main reasons for the 
significant level of debt securities subscriptions are:
For purposes of liquidity management;  i. 
To benefit from Statutory Reserve Requirements (SRR)  ii. 
exemption; 
To  be  used  as  collateral  for  daily  emergency  liquidity  iii. 
acquired from the Central Bank; 
As a result of underwriting activities (mainly InvB); and  iv. 
As a result of banks’ role as Principal Dealers. v. 119
The detailed composition of securities held by banks as at June 
2009 is presented in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4




DCB LIFB InvB IB
NIDs 23.05 12.88 11.91 12.85
Unit trust 3.84 0.00 0.43 1.34
Government  30.31 64.85 23.42 34.97
BNM 4.56 11.49 2.94 4.31
Khazanah 0.32 0.55 0.80 4.12
Danaharta 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cagamas 1.65 2.58 2.69 2.88
Private debt 
securities





0.88 0.53 1.39 0.84
Other securities 1.63 0.98 2.32 0.22
  As shown above, LIFB holdings of securities are concentrated in 
government securities, which are actively traded. This is followed by IB. 
A significant composition of DCBs’, InvBs’ and IBs’ securities is private 
debt securities (PDS) which would expose them to both credit and market 
liquidity risks under the current economy.
  In terms of loan-to-deposit (LD) ratios, as at June 2009, DCBs’, 
LIFBs’,  InvBs’  and  IBs’  LD  stood  at  86.91%,  75.23%,  12.47%  and 
81.25%, respectively. It is intuitive that InvB have a low LD ratio as their 
main business activity is not issuance of loans.
1.4   Characteristics of Government Bond Market 
There  are  two  types  of  government  bonds  in  Malaysia.  The 
first  is  a  conventional-based  government  bond  known  as  “Malaysian 
Government Securities” (MGS) while the second represents an Islamic-
based  government  bond  called  “Government  Investment  Issue”  (GII). 
As at June 2009, DCB are the main holders of MGS, with an average of 
RM22.4b, and are followed by LIFB which hold on average RM19.8b. In 
terms of the top three banks, the biggest holder of MGS came from the 
DCB group where on average this bank held RM9.6b worth of MGS. The 
2nd and 3rd placing go to banks in LIFB group, with holdings of RM5.5b 120
and RM4.9b, respectively. In terms of GII, IB are the biggest holders, with 
an average of RM7b, and they are followed by DCB which hold RM6.6b. 
The bank with the highest holding of GII is the same bank with the highest 
holding of MGS, with an average holding of RM5.4b. This is followed by 
two Islamic banks with holdings of RM2.4b and RM1.4b. 
The  Principal  Dealership  system  was  introduced  since  1989. 
Under this system, Bank Negara Malaysia appoints on an annual basis 
selected banking institutions as Principal Dealers (PDs) based on a set of 
criteria, including their capabilities to handle large volume transactions 
as measured by their shareholders’ fund, their secondary market trading 
volume and the overall risk management capabilities. The PDs are obliged 
to participate actively in the primary and secondary market, to bid for at 
least 8.5% (Conventional PD’s) and 4% (Islamic PD’s) of the instruments 
specified in the primary auction (MGS, GII, MTB, MITB) and to provide 
reasonable two-way price quotations under all market conditions in order 
to ensure liquidity in the secondary market. In addition, the PDs are also 
required to assume the following responsibilities: 
Bid for MGS papers on behalf of clients for primary issues; •	  
Intervene on behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia when needed; •	  
Bid  at  least  10%  in  money-market tender  or  repo  auction  •	
conducted by Bank Negara Malaysia; and  
Maintain minimum 2.5% share of secondary traded volume.  •	
  In return, to reward the PDs for greater responsibilities entrusted 
upon them, they were granted certain privileges, such as: 
Allowed to be borrower or lender under Securities Borrowing and Lending 
Guidelines;  
Able to net off actual holdings of securities from Eligible  •	
Liabilities3 base; 
Able to on-sell securities received via reverse repo for purpose  •	
of market-making and hedging activities; and 
Allowed  to  amend  customer  bids  submitted  in  primary  •	
issuance. 
3.  Eligible  liabilities  form  the  basis  for  calculating  Statutory  Reserve  Requirement 
(SRR).121
  With the PD system in place, secondary trading in the bond market 
has improved significantly. As at February 2007, there were 10 principal 
dealers in the government securities market. In July 2009, the PD system 
was increased to 12 principal dealers for the conventional market and 6 
principal dealers were for the Islamic market.   
1.5   Regulations and Restrictions Regarding Banks’ 
  Business Activities
  Under the Banking and Financial Institution Act (BAFIA), 1989, 
specific regulations were issued by BNM defining the scope of activities 
each group of banks are allowed to undertake (see Figure 5).
Figure 5
 Scope of Activities of the Banking Groups
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IBs
Similar to DCBs and LIFBs with additional feature of having to obtain Syariah Council approvals for all 
transactions.122
  The Role of Central Bank 2. 
2.1   As Liquidity Provider   
The role of BNM in providing or withdrawing liquidity stems 
from its objectives of achieving monetary and financial stability.  The 
ultimate goal of monetary stability is to achieve price stability in order to 
manage inflation and the economy. This is done by influencing the level 
of interest rates and management of liquidity in the banking system. For 
example, when the economy is weak, liquidity would be injected into the 
banking system and interest rates lowered in order to boost consumption 
and investment to stimulate the economy. 
Financial stability, on the other hand, refers to an environment 
where financial institutions licensed and supervised by BNM remain strong 
in terms of liquidity and continue to meet their contractual obligations. 
BNM acts as financial regulator and supervisor as well as lender of last 
resort in order to ensure the financial institutions remain solvent and are 
capable of meeting their liquidity responsibilities.   
There are a few methods used by BNM to inject or mop up liquidity. 
They  include  sale  and  purchase  of  BNM  and  Malaysian  Government 
papers and other eligible securities under REPO agreement, changes in 
the statutory reserve requirement (SRR), and direct lending and borrowing 
in the interbank market. These methods may be used by BNM in normal 
time or during a crisis.
A classic REPO arrangement is where the seller of REPO requires 
cash and sells to REPO buyer a security with a commitment to repurchase 
the said security. Under REPO agreements, BNM would withdraw liquidity 
through the sale of eligible securities to the banking system and would 
repurchase these securities back in a future time. A reverse REPO would 
be used by BNM in order to provide liquidity vide purchasing eligible 
securities from the banking system.
SRR is the required reserve that banks in Malaysia must maintain 
as a percentage of Eligible Liabilities (EL) in order to manage liquidity. 
In using SRR to inject and mop up liquidity, BNM relaxes or makes more 
stringent some of the requirements under this guideline. For example, 
under the guidelines issued in 2007, EL was originally defined as MYR 
(Malaysia Domestic Currency) denominated liabilities net of interbank 
assets and placements with BNM. Furthermore, between 2008 and 2009 123
BNM made 3 downward revisions of SRR ratios from 3.5% to 1%. The 
last revision to SRR ratio prior to 2008 was in September 1998 where the 
SRR rate was 4% of EL.
The  last  method  that  could  be  employed  by  BNM  to  provide 
liquidity is to directly lend and borrow in the interbank market. BNM 
drew up extra tools to manage liquidity in the banking system to allow it 
to influence interest rates in the interbank market which came in the form 
of “New Interest Rate Framework” guideline. The guideline gives BNM 
the power to set overnight rate known as Overnight Policy Rates (OPR). 
The OPR, in turn, is a guide for banks to set their overnight interbank 
rate. BNM also stipulates, under the same guideline, that banks’ overnight 
interbank rates should be within the operating corridor as specified by 
BNM. The current specified corridor is within (-25bps+25bps) of the OPR. 
The guideline makes available Standing Facilities (SF) for the banking 
and insurance systems in the event they are faced with liquidity problems 
under normal or crisis scenarios. The SF includes Lending and Deposits 
facilities which are priced at ceiling limit for Lending and floor limit for 
Deposits. However, as BNM is a lender of last resort, banks are required 
to go through the interbank market first before resorting to borrowing from 
the central bank.
    
2.2   As Financial Regulator   
One  of  the  fundamental  roles  of  BNM  is  to  develop  a  sound 
banking system that is responsive to the changing needs of the economy 
and society, enabling strong and resilient financial players and a well-
functioning financial market. Liquidity management in the banking system 
is one of the most important aspects of banks’ activities that is closely 
regulated and supervised by BNM. 
  The regulatory arm of BNM had introduced several important 
guidelines in order to ensure that banks perform their liquidity management 
in a manner that would safeguard their depositors and ensure that banks’ 
obligations would always be met. The guidelines include, among others, 
“The  New  Liquidity  Framework  (NLF)”.  As  part  of  the  additional 
measures to safeguard customer deposits, the deposit insurance system via 
Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation (MDIC) to promote confidence 
in the banking system and to avert runs on individual banking institutions 
especially during a crisis.
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  The NLF was first issued in 1998 to replace the Liquid Asset Ratio 
(LAR) requirement. The framework was established to:
Create  awareness  among  banking  institutions  of  their  i. 
funding  structure  and  their  ability  to  handle  short-  to 
medium-term liquidity problems;
Adopt a more efficient and on-going liquidity measurement  ii. 
and management for banking institutions; and
Provide the central bank with a better means of assessing  iii. 
present  and  future  liquidity  position  of  the  banking 
institutions.
  The  framework  aims  to  address  both  institutional  and  market 
liquidity concerns:
The ability of banking institutions to meet all maturing  i. 
obligations is assessed through the projection of banking 
institutions’ inflows, and 
The framework gauges the ability of banking institutions  ii. 
to  access  funding  from  the  market  particularly  under 
stress scenarios.  
  One of the main weaknesses found from specifying LAR alone 
was some banks had more than enough liquefiable asset than they actually 
needed, while others did not have enough liquid assets to cover their 
liquidity obligations. The other major weakness was LAR only addressed 
sufficiency of liquid assets to meet short-term liquidity needs but did not 
address longer-term structural liquidity mismatches. Since 1998 additional 
refinements were made to the framework in 1999, 2004 and 2007. The 
NLF was again fine-tuned in 2009 to ensure that the NLF is up to date with 
the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) recommendations on liquidity 
risk measurement and management. 
 
The SRR came into force since 1959. Since its enforcement the 
SRR has been revised several times. The SRR has been dropping since 
1996 to its current state of 1%. 
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  The  supervisory  departments  of  BNM  also  play  important  roles  in 
banks’ liquidity management as they have to ensure banks comply with 
the minimum requirements as issued by the regulatory arms as well as 
assessing whether the complexity of banks’ products was complemented 
with  strong  liquidity  measurement  and  management  practices.  In  this 
sense, the supervisory departments had recognised the Asset and Liability 
Management (ALM) of banks as a significant activity under their Risk-
based Supervision Framework (RBSF) which needs to be periodically 
monitored and assessed.
2.3   Central Bank’s Requirement and/or Recommendations    
  Regarding Banks’ Liquidity Measurement and Management
  As mentioned above, liquidity measurement and management are 
mainly governed by the NLF and SRR requirements.  These guidelines 
propose at minimum how liquidity risk is to be measured and managed.
  Under the NLF, banks are required to submit prescribed information 
on a monthly basis. Liquidity risk is measured vide the use of cash-flow 
maturity mismatch where assets and liabilities, both ON and OFF balance 
sheets, are projected from 1 week up to above 1 year from the current 
position. These maturities are divided into 6 buckets: namely, up to 1 week 
(for InvB, up to 3 days), 1 week to 1 month (for InvB, 3 days to 1 month), 
1 to 3 months, 3 to 6 months, 6 to 12 months, and above 1 year. In the NLF, 
banking institutions are required to allocate their asset and liabilities based 
on their contractual and behavioural maturities. Both are reported in NLF 
submissions. Contractual maturity is based on the actual maturity agreed in 
the contract, i.e. a 1-month Fixed Deposits (FD) would be slotted either in 
the 1 week to 1 month bucket, if the remaining maturity of the deposit is 1 
month, while behavioural maturity is the maturity based on the behaviour 
of the assets or liabilities. An example of behavioural assumption is, if the 
1-month FD mentioned under contractual maturities is rolled over for a 
period up to 6 months, the amount of the FD may be slotted in the 3 to 6 
months bucket. In terms of behavioural maturity methodology, the NLF 
prescribes a set of benchmark treatments. If banks chose to differ from 
these benchmark treatments, banks have to satisfy BNM on the robustness 
of their methods in producing the behavioural maturity.
Banks  are  required  to  manage  and  ensure  that  the  short-term 
liquidity obligations, i.e. up to 1 week and 1 week to 1 month maturity 
buckets, are adequately satisfied under normal course of business (level 1) 
as well as under withdrawal shock scenarios (level 2). How this work is, 126
under the normal course of business, the on- and off-balance-sheet assets 
maturing in the two shortest maturity buckets are compared with on- and 
off-balance-sheet liabilities of the same maturity tenures. The shortfall or 
surplus from these two maturity buckets is then added with withdrawal 
shocks of 3% and 5% of total deposits respectively. The new shortfall or 
surplus is then compared with the liquefiable assets and available credit 
lines to see the overall result. If the bank faces a shortfall, they have to 
rectify  the  situation  soonest  possible  to  ensure  the  overall  results  are 
always surplus to comply with the framework.
To ensure that the determination of liquefiable assets is on a more 
consistent and objective manner, a set of “qualifying characteristics” for 
the recognition of liquefiable assets has been identified under the NLF. 
The qualifying characteristics for liquefiable assets are as follows:
Assets easily convertible in large sums into cash at short  i. 
notice;
Low counter-party credit risks; ii. 
Free from any encumbrances that restricts its sale or repo  iii. 
capability; and
Have sufficiently deep secondary market or repo market  iv. 
which continue to exist during tight liquidity situations, 
or which the Central Bank of Malaysia is prepared to 
purchase, lend or allowed for repo in the course of its 
money market or liquidity support operation
In  order  to  factor  in  market  movements  in  the  framework, 
liquefiable assets used to meet the shortfall after withdrawal shocks are 
valued using yield slippages. The more risky the assets the higher the yield 
slippage,  i.e. government-issued bonds are given 2% yield slippage, while 
PDS are given 10%.  
Apart  from  monitoring  the  overall  mismatches  in  the  1st  and 
2nd maturity buckets, the framework also requires banks to calculate and 
monitor a series of broad ratios which indicate the bank’s dependency on 
a certain funding source. The ratios cover dependency on large customer 
deposits, interbank markets and offshore market. Any banks found to be 
over-reliant on a certain funding source would be asked to submit plans to 
diversify their funding source.127
In terms of SRR, banks are required to maintain 1% of eligible 
liabilities (EL), as at June 2009. The SRR has two levels both of which 
are required to be complied by banks. The first level deals with how banks 
are to calculate the balances in their Statutory Reserve Account. Banks are 
required to observe the average daily amount of EL over two fortnightly 
periods. EL Period A is average daily EL between 1st and 15th (inclusive) 
while period B is average daily EL between 16th and last day of the month 
(inclusive). In coming up with EL of each period, banks are prohibited 
from offsetting negative daily EL with positive ones. All negative daily EL 
should be zerorised. Banks have to maintain average reserve balance for 1st 
and 15th day of any month equivalent to 1% of EL Period A of the preceding 
month while the rest of the days in the month would be 1% of EL Period 
B of the preceding month. Under the second level, banks are required to 
maintain in the balances in the Statutory Reserve Account within 20% 
daily variation band around the prevailing policy rate. What this means is, 
as current prevailing rate is 1%, Malaysian banks have to maintain daily 
balances in the band of between 0.8% and 1.2%. Balances below the band 
are not permitted while balances in excess of the band’s ceiling will not be 
recognised in meeting the average fortnightly requirement as EL.
As  of  1st  September  2007,  the  EL  base  consists  of  ringgit-
denominated deposits and non-deposits liabilities, net of interbank assets 
and placements with BNM. However, a revised guideline issued in March 
2009, have allowed banks to make additional adjustments to their EL base. 
Banks are also allowed to deduct ringgit marketable securities held in their 
trading book provided banks’ Trading Book Policy Statement (TBPS) 
have been approved by BNM. Principal Dealers meanwhile are allowed 
to deduct specified securities in their trading and banking books as well 
as ringgit marketable securities which are not specified in their trading 
book. 
2.4   Collateral Criteria for Borrowing from Central Bank
Under the Standing Facilities prescribed by BNM in the “New 
Interest Rate Framework,” banks are allowed to borrow from BNM using 
the Lending facility to obtain overnight liquidity. This could be done in two 
forms which are repurchase agreements (REPO) and Collateralised Loans 
against eligible collaterals.  The eligible collaterals include MGS,Treasury 
bills,  GII,  BNM  Bills,  BNM  Negotiable  Notes,  quasi-  government 
securities4 and other securities that maybe specified by BNM. The net 
4.  Quasi-government securities: Securities issued by four  recognised government-linked 
institutions, namely, Cagamas, Khazanah, Danaharta and Danamodal. 128
price of the eligible collaterals is based on appropriate margin specified by 
BNM. For government-, government-guaranteed- and BNM-securities the 
margin ranges between 0.5% and 6.5%, while other securities are between 
0.8% and 10.0%. BNM reserves the right to change the margin applied 
in order to reflect current market conditions. With regard to the legal 
ownership of the asset under the lending facility, for overnight repurchase 
agreements, the ownership of the asset is transferred to BNM. For overnight 
collateralised loans, an enforceable security interest is provided over the 
asset while ownership of the asset retains with the bank. Interest rate is 
charged as fixed interest rate, based on ceiling limit and calculated using 
simple interest rate with day-count convention of “actual/365”. Upon the 
announcement of new OPR (Overnight Policy Rate as set by BNM), a new 
ceiling rate will be effective accordingly. 
Dynamics  and  Determinants  of  Liquidity  in  Malaysian  3. 
Financial System
3.1   Liquidity Profile in the Financial System  
Liquidity in Malaysian financial institutions, in particular in the 
banking sector, remains ample in 2009. This is based on a significant 
liquidity  surplus,  healthy  loan-to-deposit  (LD)  ratio,  large  depositors’ 
base, and minimal reliance on known volatile sources of funding.
 As at end of June, the liquidity surplus of Malaysian banks in 
the first two maturity buckets5 stood at RM225b. This amount represents 
1.55 times deposits maturing within 1 month and 24.84% of banks’ total 
deposits. The surplus is also enough to meet the off-balance sheet (OBS) 
obligations maturing in 1 month as the surplus is 1.53 times the OBS and 
almost enough to cover the on-balance sheet liabilities maturing in 1 month 
as it is 91% of the liabilities.    
Loan-to-deposit (LD) ratio and number of depositors are also at 
healthy levels. LD ratio as at end of June 09 stood at 81.43%. This ratio 
shows that banks do not have to rely on interbank borrowing to fund their 
loans as they have sufficient deposit base. Banks are also not concentrated 
on large depositors and have a broad base of depositors. 
In  terms  of  concentration in  volatile sources  of  funding,  such 
as offshore borrowings, interbank borrowings and short-term interbank 
5.  As defined by NLF: Maturing assets in 1 month minus maturing obligations in 1 
month minus 8% total deposit withdrawal shock plus liquefiable assets.129
borrowings, Malaysian banks have also managed to minimise such reliance. 
Offshore borrowings against total domestic funding were kept at 5.5%, 
while short-term interbank borrowings against total short-term funding 
were  kept  at  15%.  Moreover,  Malaysian  banks  are  also  net  interbank 
lenders and, as such, they are not relying on interbank borrowings.
If we categorise banks into Domestic Commercial Banks (DCB), 
Locally- incorporated Foreign Banks (LIFB), Investment Banks (InvB) and 
Islamic Banks (IB), we see similar conclusions. The liquidity indicators as 
at 30 June 2009 for each category are summarised in the Figure 6.
Figure 6
Liquidity Indicators of Banks
Indicators DCB LIFB InvB IB
Liquidity Surplus up to 1 month RM86.6b RM71.8b RM22.4b RM44.7b
LD ratios 86.91% 71.58% 12.47% 81.25%
Average number of depositors 
with deposits > 1% of total 
deposits
7 12 34 13
Offshore borrowings / Total 
domestic funding
1.33% 12.4% 6.55% 1.87%
Short-term interbank borrowings 
/ Total short-term funding
5.33% 32.31% 20.85% 3.28%
LIFB registered the highest short-term interbank borrowings/total 
short-term funding - the reason being that LIFB normally serve as MYR 
settlement banks for their member branches in the region. If member banks 
do not utilise MYR excess fund, the fund would normally be placed with 
their LIFB. These LIFB will then place the money out with BNM or other 
banks.
In terms of Foreign Currency (FCY), Malaysian banks have limited 
exposure as total FCY assets constitute less than 10% of total assets. 
In  terms  of  liquidity  profile  for  Malaysian  financial  market, 
government-issued  bonds  revealed  heightened  market  liquidity  risk  in 
2009. One indicator, liquidity premium for the 3-, 5- and 10-year tenors 
were highest between November 2008 till June 2009, as compared with 
any other periods in the last 5 years, as Malaysia started to feel the impact 
of the sub-prime crisis as well as the collapse of Lehmann Brothers (refer 
to Figures 13a to 13c in pages 23-24 for details). Turnover ratio was also 
the smallest in 2009. Prior to 2009 the average turnover ratio registered 
above 1.4 times as compared with 2009 average ratio of 1.3 times.130
3.2   Development of Liquidity Indicators (Compared with Trend)
3.2.1 Funding Liquidity (Quarterly Data from 2005-2009)  
Funding liquidity risk for Malaysian banks seems to be at its highest 
during the 2006 to 2007 period, while for InvB deposits, withdrawals grew 
higher  after  the  collapse  of  Lehman  Brothers.  Nevertheless,  although 
highest  negative  mismatches  were  seen  during  this  period,  Malaysian 
banks were still registering liquidity surplus in the range of 16.3% to 
27.4% of total deposits. 
Between  2006  to  2007,  Malaysian  banks  experienced  highest 
negative mismatch on the shortest maturity bucket, i.e. up to 3 days for 
investment banks and up to 1 week for the rest, indicating significant level 
of funding liquidity risk. The highest negative mismatch stood at RM36b. 
This was mainly coming from DCB as can be seen in Figure 7.
Figure 7
Trends of RM Account Maturity Gap for 
Shortest Maturity Bucket (RM’b)
 
  The negative mismatch came mainly from core banking business 
where repayments of loans in the shortest bucket were not enough to 
cover both on-balance sheet in the form of deposits maturing, and off-
balance sheet in the form of undrawn loans, commitments and guarantees. 
Furthermore, banks during this period did not place significant amount 
of money sourced by their treasury department in the shortest maturity 131
bucket. The trend of negative mismatch started to decline since June 2007 
as banks started to place short-term deposits sourced by their treasury with 
BNM. This placement with BNM allows banks to uplift early if they have 
liquidity needs.
  Although the negative mismatches during 2006 to 2007 were the 
highest, they were adequately met by the holding of liquefiable assets such 
that the banking industry was still registering liquidity surplus within the 
range of RM50b to RM93.4b. The surplus was in the range of 16.3% to 
27.4% of total deposits. The percentage of liquefiable assets against short-
term liabilities was also among the highest during this period as can be 
seen in Figure 8.
Figure 8
Trends of Liquefiable Assets/Short-term Liabilities
 
  The trends of loan-to-deposit (LD) ratio also showed that they 
peaked during the period of 2006 to 2007, where the industry ratio stood 
at a maximum of 90%. The LD ratios during this period were mainly 
contributed by DCB, LIFB and IB where the highest recorded ratios were 
94%, 91% and 93%, respectively (see Figure 9).132
Figure 9
LD Ratio Trends
  The quarter-on-quarter growth in retail deposit outflow meanwhile 
showed only InvB were facing dramatic growth during the 2009 quarters 
(see Figure 10 below). The likely cause for this is the efforts by the banking 
groups  to  consolidate  and  rationalise  their  business.  Deposits  held  by 
corporate clients in these InvB were being transferred to their commercial/
Islamic banking operations within the same group. Moreover, the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers may have also unsettled these depositors.
Figure 10
Retail Depositors Outflow Quarter-on-Quarter Growth (QoQ)133
In terms of concentrations under the shortest maturity bucket, interbank 
placements and deposits have the highest composition on average of 37% 
and 32%, respectively. The trends of interbank placements and deposits in 
the shortest term buckets are shown in the Figures 11 and 12.
Figure 11
Percentage of Interbank Placements in Shortest Maturity Bucket
Figure 12
Percentage of Deposits in the Shortest Maturity Bucket
  The  above  indicate  that  although  banks  in  Malaysia  may  be 
exposed to short-term deposit outflow, there are enough assets to meet 
these outflows.134
3.2.2 Market Liquidity (Monthly Data from 2005-2009)        
Market liquidity indicators in Malaysia are still at an early stage 
of development where historical bid- and ask-quotes for MGS are still 
very limited. However, the Bond Pricing Agency of Malaysia has started 
collecting this information in 2009. Nonetheless, as the historical data 
prior to 2009 are unavailable, trend analysis would not be possible.
In terms of liquidity premium, the differences between MGS and 
PDS issued by corporates rated AAA to BBB were on an increasing trend 
since August 2006, with highest premium recorded between November 
2008 to February 2009, as reflected in the Figures 13a, 13b and 13c.
Figure 13a
3-year Corporate-issued Securities Liquidity Premium135
Figure 13b
5-year Corporate-issued Securities Liquidity Premium
Figure 13c
10-year Corporate-issued Securities Liquidity Premium
  The main reasons for the increase in liquidity premium were the 
upward revision of interest rates and investors’ incorporation of inflation 
risk into PDS pricing.  
The  turnover  ratio  of  government  bonds,  however,  showed  a 
declining trend with an average of 1.315 times in 2009, as compared with 
above 1.4 times prior to 2009, signaling heightened market liquidity risk in 
2009. Spikes could be seen during the volatile periods, such as September 
2006 to June 2007 (monetary policies were reviewed upward three times), 
and October to December 2008 (the collapse of Lehman Brothers). See the 
Figure 14 below for the trend of the turnover ratio of government bonds.136
Figure 14
Government Bond Turnover Ratio
In terms of market depth, MGS has the highest depth when it is 
traded at yields of between 3.5% and 4.5%. Furthermore, highest depth 
could also be seen in the shorter- to medium-term tenors, i.e. tenors of 
3 years or less. The summary of MGS highest depth against traded yield 
from 2005 to June 2009 is highlighted in Figure 15 below.
Figure 15








Less than 1 3.55-3.8 48,164
1 to 3 3.55-3.8 62,587
3 to 5 3.55-3.8 27,742
5 to 10 4.05-4.30 37,740
Above 10 4.05-4.30 9,616
3.2.3   Qualitative Data (Yearly Data and Information from 
  2005-2009)
  In terms of earnings, 2 out of 9 domestic commercial banks (DCB) 
registered losses during 2005 to 2009 period, while 1 DCB had a decreasing 
trend. For LIFB, no banks registered losses, while 7 out of 13 LIFB had 
decreasing trend of profit in 2007. 5 out of 16 InvB had registered losses 
between 2005 to 2009, while another 7 reported lower profits in 2008. IB, 
on the other hand, had 6 out of 17 banks registering losses, while a further 137
4 had decreasing profit trends. Non-Performing Loans (NPL) analysis 
revealed 2 banks from DCB, 5 LIFB, 6 InvB and 7 IB faced higher NPL in 
2009.
  Credit ratings between 2006 and 2009 saw 2 DCBs being upgraded 
by one notch while the rest had maintained their ratings since 2006.  LIFB 
saw no movement in their credit ratings, while InvB and IB each had 1 
bank-credit rating upgraded by 1 notch,    
3.3   Factors Affecting Liquidity Risk in Malaysia
  
  There are three main factors affecting liquidity in Malaysia. The 
first factor is a sudden rise in uncertainty caused by financial crisis. The 
Asian financial crisis during the period of 1997 to 1998 had caused 1 finance 
company to be placed under BNM receivership. The finance company was 
one of the top financial institutions in Malaysia. However, the company 
encountered about 20% NPL as a result of the crisis, causing many of its 
depositors to lose confidence in and withdraw from the company. BNM 
intervened and assumed control when the condition worsened. 
  The second factor that would affect liquidity in Malaysia is the 
change of monetary policy. Between 2005 and 2006 BNM had revised 
upwards its Overnight Policy Rate (OPR) three times to its highest level 
of 3.5%. This had caused the value of liquefiable assets to drop down and 
thus decrease liquidity surplus in banks. Between 2008 and 2009 the OPR 
was revised downward a number of times. This had caused the value of 
liquefiable assets to shoot up and increase liquidity surplus.
  The third factor in Malaysia is the establishment of a deposit 
insurance scheme known as Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(MDIC)  in  September  2005.  Since  its  formation  MDIC  had  further 
contributed to financial stability, especially among depositors guaranteed 
by them.
4.    Current Practices in Liquidity Risk Management in Banking    
  There are a few tools banks in Malaysia use in managing liquidity 
during normal time. These tools are based on established organisational 
and  industry  practices  published  in  the  written  papers.  These  papers 
identify weaknesses in industry practices and recommend improvements, 
while also identifying existing industry best practices. The following are 
some of the liquidity risk management practices observed in Malaysian 
banks. Practices may vary between different banking institutions.138
  All  banks  in  Malaysia  are  subjected  to  the  New  Liquidity 
Framework  (NLF)  and  in  this  guideline  banks  are  required  to  have 
sufficient liquefiable assets to meet mismatch under normal business as 
usual plus total deposits withdrawal shock. As such a primary liquidity 
management tool in Malaysia is the strengthening of liquefiable assets and 
available credit lines held by banks. 
  On top of liquefiable assets and available credit lines, commercial 
banks in Malaysia would also ensure they are not exposed to unnecessary 
liquidity risk by employing Risk Diversification Plan. This plan covers 
minimally the following 3 areas:
Diversification of Funding Sources and Instruments i.  : 
Diversification of sources means taking money from as 
many different types of customers (individuals, SMEs, 
large corporations, etc.) in as many different industries 
as  possible  (insurance  industry,  petroleum  industry  or 
interbank market, etc.).
Diversity  of  instruments  (CDs,  Repos,  BAs,  CPs, 
securitised assets, etc.) is more attractive to investors and 
it enables the issuer to obtain additional funding and have 
more liquidity.
Market Share of Sources and Instruments ii. 
Banks  would  ensure  that  they  spread  out  the  market 
shares of their funding sources and instruments so that 
they  would  not  be  caught  in  a  liquidity  squeeze  from 
depending on 1 or 2 sources or instruments with 100% 
market shares.
Diversification by Maturities iii. 
Banks are also managing proactively their funding source 
maturities  to  avoid  concentration  of  maturities  on  a 
particular tenor.
  In time of crisis banks are still expected to source their funding 
from the interbank market before resorting to the central bank as the lender 
of last resort. 139
  There  are  not  many  differences  between  domestic  banks  and 
foreign commercial banks with regard to their liquidity management tools. 
An additional tool available to foreign commercial banks would be their 
ability to depend on their holding banks or their group for funding sources. 
However, domestic banks with large branches overseas would also be able 
to depend on this tool for liquidity management.
  The contingency funding plan during crisis is predicated on these 
factors:
Bank-specific factors: Most banks depend on their ability  i. 
to liquidate liquefiable assets as well as depend on the 
interbank market in order to obtain the needed funding 
arising from bank-specific factors.
Systemic  (economy-wide)  factors:  Most  banks  would  ii. 
depend  on  similar  tools,  i.e.  liquefiable  assets  and 
interbank market. However, as the factors are economy-
wide, higher yield slippage are assumed for liquefiable 
assets and dependency on interbank market would also be 
only with those they have good relationship with. On top 
of these two tools, banks would also include the central 
bank as lender of last resort as a part of their funding 
source.
  In term of internal governance, it is a combination of the NLF with 
Basel principles. Under Basel principles, the Board of Directors (BOD) is 
responsible in establishing banks’ liquidity risk tolerance. The BOD is also 
responsible for articulating the risk tolerance such that each entity in the 
bank is aware of the risk tolerance.
  The Basel principles also specified that senior management is 
responsible in setting up strategies in order to ensure compliance towards 
banks’ risk tolerance. Senior management is also responsible in ensuring 
that banks are able to measure and manage liquidity risk during business 
as usual as well as crisis situations. The following items should also be 
included in banks’ liquidity risk management and measurement based on 
the Basel principles:
Establish a process for the identification, measurement,  i. 
monitoring and control of liquidity risk;140
Consider limitations to transferability of liquidity across  ii. 
entities and currencies;
Diversify funding sources & tenors & manage market  iii. 
access; 
Actively  manage  collateral  &  intraday  liquidity  iv. 
positions;
Conduct stress tests & utilise results to manage risk; v. 
Maintain a cushion of unencumbered, highly liquid assets  vi. 
as insurance against stress scenarios; and
Establish contingency funding plans. vii. 
5.   Lessons Learned in Malaysia    
5.1   Trends in Liquidity Risk Management Practices Before and 
After the Recent Global Financial Crisis
Malaysian banks had been subjected to stringent regulations 
of liquidity risk since the Asian Financial crisis 1997-98. The NLF had 
outlined the requirements for banks to be able to project and meet present 
and future cash-flow requirements, withstand crisis, like deposit withdrawal 
shocks, and to have adequate liquefiable assets to buffer liquidity needs. 
However, the two areas which had seen significant improvements following 
the global financial crisis are: stress testing and contingency funding plans 
(CFP).
Arising from the crisis as well as from the BIS paper on liquidity 
management issued in September 2008, Malaysian banks have further 
improved on their stress-test process. Both market-wide and institution-
specific  scenarios  are  being  developed  in  order  to  see  whether  banks 
are able to withstand such scenarios. Banks are also required to submit 
semi-annually the result of their stress testing to BNM. The central bank 
would review and comment on the suitability of the scenarios created as 
well as the severity of crisis as compared with banks size and complexity. 
Furthermore, banks are expected to produce policies and procedures in 
order to manage these stress scenarios should the events materialised.141
Contingency funding plans are also being developed by banks 
in managing liquidity stress scenarios. Banks are using the BIS paper 
as a guide for preparing their CFP.  Malaysian banks in their CFP are 
expected to prepare for funding sources for each stress event that they 
have developed as well as outlining step-by-step processes and plans in 
facing liquidity stress and officers responsible to execute them. There are 
also banks in Malaysia which have started to test the applicability of their 
CFP. 
5.2   Role of Liquidity Risk in Triggering Past Financial Crisis, 
including Case Studies  
In Malaysia, it is the global and regional financial crisis which 
had triggered liquidity risk, and not the other way around. One of the most 
outstanding cases which occurred in Malaysia was the takeover of MBf 
Finance Bhd (MBf) by BNM.
Until it ran into financial difficulties, MBf was an example of 
an  ethnic-Chinese  corporate  dynasty.  The  company  had  a  network  of 
120 branches with deposits totaling US$4.49b. In his autobiography, the 
founder of the company declared that he was preparing to transform MBf 
into an international conglomerate which could take on the Fortune 500 
companies that dominate world trade.
The Asian Financial crisis, however, punished MBf for investing 
in all the wrong industries. These included hotels, stock broking, property 
development and assembly of imported cars. Furthermore, MBf had also 
focused on loans to stock market investors and real estate buyers. More 
than 20% of MBf loans had turned bad. The situation was aggravated by 
the news about the poor health of the founder. These two situations led 
to withdrawal runs in many of MBf’s 120 branches. Before the situation 
worsened, BNM stepped in and took over the management of MBf as a 
pre-emptive measure.
5.3   Development of Liquidity Situation (in Banking Sector) 
  Before and After the Recent Financial Crisis    
Liquidity in the Malaysian banking sector remained ample before 
and after the recent global financial crisis. This could be attributed to the 
predominantly deposit-based funding structure of the banks, including 
investment banks, significant portion of liquefiable assets to meet liquidity 142
needs, government blanket guarantee of deposits as well as continuous 
liquidity management by the Malaysian banks.
In terms of liquefiable assets, as at 30 June 2009, the proportion 
of liquefiable assets to short-term liabilities stood at 19.71%, while the 
proportion of Class 1 (mainly made up of Government- and BNM-issued 
papers) against Class 2 (which are made up of NIDs, BAs, PDS and 
Credit lines)  was 76% to 24%. Apart from the healthy ratios the level of 
liquefiable assets also indicates the demand of Government- and BNM 
-issued papers would be sustainable, thus providing market liquidity to 
these papers.
  Finally,  liquidity  management  is  a  primary  concern  of  all 
Malaysian banks. Accordingly, committees such as the Assets-Liabilities 
Committee or ALCO of the Malaysian banks would frequently monitor, 
discuss and manage the liquidity situations of their banks to ensure that the 
banks remain solvent and would be able to meet their obligations when they 
are due. Furthermore, with the constant development and improvement of 
stress testing and CFP processes, Malaysian banks are becoming better 
equipped to manage liquidity risk in the Malaysian banking system.  
5.4   Future Prospects
The NLF issued by BNM deals mainly with the monitoring and 
managing of the funding liquidity risk. The only resemblance of market 
liquidity risk in the NLF is the use of yield slippage in valuing the liquefiable 
assets. The fix yield slippage does not leave any room for possibilities of 
higher decrease in value that banks may face under certain stress events 
where they have to force sell. As such BNM may want to issue a more 
dynamic minimum standard on monitoring, reporting and management of 
market liquidity risk. Such requirement would enhance banks’ liquidity 
risk management.
Furthermore, as recommended in the consultative document on 
the International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards 
and Monitoring, issued by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) on 17 December 2009, BNM may also want to consider:
Developing regulatory standards which promote both short- 1. 
term and long-term resiliency towards liquidity risk. Currently, 
NLF deals mainly with short- term resiliency towards liquidity 
risk of banks.143
Adopting the two ratios in the paper, i.e. Liquidity Coverage  2. 
Ratio (LCR) which monitors short-term resiliency and Net 
Stable  Funding  Ratio  (NSF)  which  monitors  long-term 
resiliency.  LCR  identifies  the  amount  of  liquid  assets  an 
institution holds that can be used to offset the net cash outflows 
it would encounter under short-term scenarios specified by 
BNM. While NSF measures the amount of longer term, stable 
sources of funding employed by an institution relative to the 
liquidity profiles of the assets funded and potential contingent 
calls  on  funding  liquidity  arising  from  off-balance  sheet 
commitments and obligations.
Adopting the set of common metrics recommended by BCBS  3. 
in monitoring liquidity risk profiles of specified entity. This 
is to ensure consistency in the monitoring and supervising of 
banks with international presence.
6.   Conclusion and Policy Recommendations  
The liquidity of Malaysian banks remained ample before and after 
the global financial crisis. The significant holding of liquefiable assets, 
establishment  of    MDIC,  government  blanket  guarantee  on  deposits, 
continuous liquidity management by the banks, constant supervision by 
BNM, evolution of liquidity risk measurement and management tools, as 
well as strong macroeconomic and trade fundamentals have all contributed 
to the state of liquidity in the country.
 
The above reflects the sophisticated and well supervised state of 
Malaysian banks in terms of the monitoring and managing of the funding 
liquidity  risk.  Malaysian  banks  have  also  shown  great  discipline  and 
commitment in liquidity management by complementing the minimum 
requirements set out by the NLF with their own tools such Maximum 
Cash Outflow (MCO) as well as early warning system, just to name but 
a few. The level of understanding of liquidity risk by Supervisors from 
BNM and employees of the banks in Malaysia is generally good and 
continuous improvements could also be seen in the areas of stress testing 
and contingency funding plans. 
In terms of policy recommendations, BNM may want to explore 
the possibility of improving its regulations and policies on market liquidity 
risk. This area still requires further enhancements in the Malaysian context 
as the current monitoring and management of market liquidity risk is in 144
the use of static yield slippages. A more dynamic measurement of market 
liquidity risk standards which caters for different stress scenarios or events 
should be developed as this would enhance liquidity risk management by 
allowing banks to monitor and project the impact on marketability of their 
liquefiable assets during stressed scenarios. Furthermore, BNM may also 
consider adopting the recommendation made by the BCBS in its paper 
issued on 17 December 2009. The paper proposes regulatory standards 
which promote resiliency towards liquidity risk on both short- and long-
term basis. This monitored vide monitoring the Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSF). The paper also propagates 
the use of common metrics in monitoring liquidity risk to better supervise 
banks with international presence.145
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CHAPTER 5
LIQUIDITY MEASUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
IN MYANMAR
by May Toe Win1
1.   Introduction 
Risk measurement and management is regarded as a key element 
of  governance  at  the  Central  Bank  with  the  underlying  objectives  of 
safeguarding the Bank’s reputation and ensuring the safety and soundness 
of the Bank’s operation. As a principle, the risk management framework 
is periodically reviewed to ensure that it remains effective in surfacing 
key  risks  of  the  bank  and  that  appropriate  processes  and  systems  are 
implemented to manage these risks. 
Since  the  current  global  financial  crisis  triggered  by  sub-
prime  mortgage  loans  has  also  made  clear  the  importance  of  good 
risk-management  practices  and  the  potential  challenges  to  sustainable 
growth and the resilience of financial institutions, risk measurement and 
management plays a vital role in maintaining the safety and soundness of 
banks. 
 
Therefore, this paper aims to help people who are involved in 
striving for soundness of the financial sector understand the importance of 
risk measurement and management, not only for individual banks, but also 
for safeguarding stability of the financial system.
1.1  Overview of Financial System and Commercial Banking    
  Industry in Myanmar
Following a change of government in 1988 and adoption of a 
market-oriented  policy,  the  structure  of  the  financial  institutions  was 
transformed by new bank laws passed in 1990, namely, the Central Bank 
of Myanmar Law, the Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law, and the 
Myanma Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Law. The Central 
Bank of Myanmar Law defines the responsibilities and the authority of the 
Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM); the Financial Institutions of Myanmar 
Law defines the activities of banking institutions and is the legal basis 
for the establishment of private banks; and the Myanma Agricultural and 
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Rural Development Bank Law defines the activities of the state-owned 
Myanma Agricultural Development Bank (MADB). The structure of the 
Myanmar Financial System in the early 1990s comprised the banking and 
non-banking financial institutions. 
1.2  Share of Banking Sector vs. Capital Market
 
As mentioned above, the financial system in Myanmar is strongly 
dominated by banks while the insurance sector and the securities market 
are  relatively  small.  As  of  March  2008,  total  assets  of  the  banking 
system stood at K1,956 billion (Figure 1). The banking sector consists 
of  31  institutions,  of  which  19  are  local  banks  and  12  representative 
offices of foreign banks. The remaining players in the formal financial 
sector are the Myanma Small Loans Enterprise, the Myanma Insurance, 
and the Myanmar Securities Exchange Centre (MSEC). The MSEC was 
launched in April 1996, a joint venture between the Ministry of Finance 
and Revenue and the Japanese Daiwa Institute of Research. Generally, the 
MSEC’s trading activities are low and investors hold the shares as another 
savings instrument. The securities sector is still in its infancy and currently 
there are only two companies listed at the MSEC: the Forest Products 
Joint Venture Corp (FPJV) engaging in timber extraction, saw-milling and 
wood-based production; and the Myanmar Citizens Bank Ltd (MCBL). 
Figure 1
Size of Financial Sector (in Terms of Total Assets), March 2008
1.3  Characteristics of Banking Sector
At  present,  the  banking  sector  comprises  the  Central Bank  of 
Myanmar, 4 state-owned banks, 15 domestic private banks and 12 foreign 
bank representative offices. All state-owned banks and domestic banks are 149
commercial banks and foreign bank representative offices are allowed to 
deal in liaison business only.
The  non-bank  financial  institutions  include  a  state-owned 
insurance enterprise, a state-owned small-loans enterprise (the government 
pawn shop prior to 1992), a private-owned leasing company and one 
securities company. As the non-bank financial sector is relatively small, 
the development of banking sector has become significantly important 
for the mobilisation and allocation of financial resources and, thus, for 
economic development.
1.4  Nature of Bank’s Business 
The state banks serve to the specialised needs of the economy 
as indicated by their names—Myanma Economic Bank (MEB), Myanma 
Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB), Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank 
(MICB), and Myanma Agricultural Development Bank (MADB). They 
are complex financial institutions, which combine banking with directed 
lending and other quasi-fiscal operations and, in some cases, certain central 
banking and treasury operations. 
Figure 2
Nature of State Banks’ Business     
Since  1990,  privately-owned  domestic  banks  were  granted 
licences to operate banking business under the Financial Institutions of 
Myanmar Law 1990. Currently, 15 domestic private banks are conducting 
domestic commercial banking services, which include accepting demand 
and  saving  deposits  and  extending  loans.  Private  banks  are  neither 
permitted to open foreign currency accounts nor enter into correspondent 
banking relationships with foreign banks. The state banks totally dominate 
the branch network in the country. The Myanma Economic Bank alone 
has  325  branches  while  all  private  banks  operate  about  219  branches 
throughout the country as of end- December 2009.150
1.4.1  The  Major  Uses  and  Sources  of  Funds  of  Domestic 
Private Banks and State- owned Banks
As of June 30, 2009, the major uses and sources of funds of 
domestic banks are shown as follows:  
Figure 3
The Major Uses and Sources of Funds of Domestic Private Banks
as of June 30, 2009
Figure 4
The Major Uses and Sources of Funds of State-owned Commercial 
Banks as of March 31, 2009151
Figure 5
Share of Deposit-taking Activities to Non-deposit-taking Activities, 
June 2008
1.5  Characteristics of Government Bond Markets  
The primary bond market  first  developed  in  1993,  as  the   
CBM  issued,  3- years  and  5-  years  treasury  bonds currently yielding 
11-11.5%.  Both private individuals as well as domestic investors can 
purchase the bonds, at anytime, directly from the Central Bank or through 
the MSEC. The issuance of treasury bonds increased gradually till to 2002. 
During the fiscal years of 2002-2003 and 2003-2004, the  sales  of  treasury   
bonds  slowed  down  due  to  the  capability of the private  banks  who 
are  the  major  investors. After the fiscal year of 2003-2004, almost all 
the commercial banks have returned to stable condition and are operating 
banking business in full swing, the sale of Government Treasury Bonds 
have drastically increased again.
Like in the other transitional economies, the government of the 
Union of Myanmar plays a leading role in building economic infrastructure. 
In pursuit of infrastructure development, the government spending has been 
huge and on the increase in recent years. While the tax policy is based on 
easing measures in encouraging the private sector, the government has to 
rely partly on the issuance of treasury bonds to finance its budget deficit.
Myanmar  Securities  Exchange  Center  (MSEC)  has    also   
maintained  a  trading  market  for  seasoned  bonds  on  the  OTC  market. 152
At the moment, in the primary market, the methods of underwriting by a 
syndicate and public offering via auctions cannot be applied in the issuance 
of Treasury bonds. Individual  bond  holders  have ready  access  to  the   
MSEC’s  OTC  market.
1.5.1  Share of Government Bond in Total Bond Outstanding 
  The  government  treasury  bond  is  the  only  investment  vehicle   
in the Myanmar  bond  market, there are no other investment instruments 
in Myanmar Bond Market. Which is why, the total bond outstanding is 
equal to total government bond outstanding at K349,857.55 million as of 
June 30, 2009. The three largest bond purchasers are private banks and 
their shares in total bond outstanding as of June 30, 2009, are shown in 
Figure 6 below. 
Figure 6
The Largest Bond Purchasers and their Shares in Total Bond 
Outstanding as at June 30, 2009
1.5.2  Use  of  Primary  Dealers  and  Its  Effects  on  Liquidity 
Distribution in Government Bond Market
Private banks are the major investors. Since the Central Bank 
allowed the private banks to  maintain  treasury  bonds  as  part  of their 
reserve requirements,  the  private  banks  buy  a  lot  of  Treasury Bonds   
to  maintain  strong  liquidity  position.  In the Myanmar financial market,   
most  of  the  financial  institutions  are  commercial  banks,  and  the   
number  of  long-term institutional  investors  are limited.  153
1.6  Regulations and Restrictions Regarding Bank’s Business    
  Activities
The Central Bank of Myanmar attaches considerable importance 
to prudential regulations. The elements of the prudential and supervisory 
regulation are:
A reserve requirement  •	 of 10% of total deposits is required to be 
maintained by each bank;
A liquidity ratio •	  of 20% is required;
A 10%  •	 risk-weighted capital-adequacy ratio;
A  •	 general provision of 2% of outstanding loans, and loan loss 
provisions of 50% and 100%  of the stock of doubtful and bad 
loans, respectively; 
A lending limit •	  to a single client of 20% of bank’s capital and 
reserve; and
Non-performing loans are classified as either  •	 “substandard” , 
“doubtful”, or “bad” when principal or interest are overdue 6 to 
12 months, 12 to 24 months, or above 24 months, respectively.
On-site inspections by the CBM are conducted annually to assess 
the banks’ internal control systems, evaluate their financial soundness and 
check  their  compliance  with  relevant  regulations.  Off-site  supervision 
involves the review of statistical returns submitted by the banks and dialogue 
with the banks’ management. A comprehensive system of reporting is in 
place for verifying banks’ compliance with reserve, minimum liquidity, 
capital adequacy and loan provisioning requirement.
2.  The Role of the Central Bank of Myanmar
2.1  Acting as Liquidity Provider and Financial Regulator
  The Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM) was established in February 
1948 under the Union Bank of Burma (Myanmar) Act of 1947. The Bank 
is now governed by the CBM Law that was enacted in 1990 and which 
confers  upon  the  Central  Bank  broad  powers  to  operate  with  relative 154
independence and to exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over a 
wide range of financial institutions, both state and privately owned.
  The CBM is responsible for acting as adviser to the government 
on economic matters; issuance of currency and securities; acting as a 
banker to the government as well as to financial institutions; formulating 
and implementing monetary policy; managing the international reserves 
of the State; controlling foreign exchange transactions; and licensing, 
inspecting, supervising and regulating financial institutions.
  In accordance with the Central Bank of Myanmar Law (Section 
57) and the Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law (Section 48), the 
Central Bank is authorised to inspect, supervise and regulate banks and 
financial institutions. The Central Bank’s two departments, namely, the 
Bank  Supervision  Department  and  the  Bank  Regulation  Department 
conduct  supervisory  and  regulatory  functions  according  to  the  core 
principles  of  the  Basel  Accord.  The  Bank  Supervision  Department 
conducts regular off-site inspection and on-site supervision. The Bank 
Regulation Department issues prudential instructions for the systematic 
and  smooth  operations  of  the  financial  institutions  in  line  with  the 
internationally accepted norms and best practices. 
  Generally, the Myanmar banking sector has remained stable and 
most of the banks were profitable over the past years. However, in early 
2003, a few large banks experienced panic runs in part due to the effects 
of a loss in depositors’ confidence sparked by the spill-over effects of 
the failure of general services companies outside the banking sector. The 
incidents have now been overcome after the Central Bank intervened as 
lender of last resort and supported adequate liquidity assistance to the 
banks.  Owning to these efforts, almost all the commercial banks have 
returned to stable condition and are operating banking business in full 
swing. 
2.2  Liquidity Provision Facility by CBM
2.2.1  During Normal Times and Crisis Times  
 
  The Ministry of Finance and Revenue issues T-bills with a maturity 
of 3 months to finance short-term budget shortfalls. T-bills can be—and 
frequently are—rolled over. The present interest rate on the T-bills is 4% 
p.a. In view of this exceptionally low rate of return, to date, no market 155
demand exists to invest in T-bills. As a result, the CBM is major investor of 
this asset and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank also purchases 
the T-bills from CBM at a discount rate.
  Treasuries in all countries encounter shortfalls requiring short-
term financing during the financial year with respect to actual revenue 
and expenditure performance. An alternative to the current system practice 
in Myanmar is operation of an overdraft facility with the CBM for this 
purpose. Such an arrangement would make it possible to use T-bills, in the 
future, as market-based instruments for monetary policy. With a market-
oriented return, T-bills should be transformed into a liquid security and a 
powerful instrument will exist providing short-term liquidity, which would 
benefit the development of a money market in Myanmar. 
 
  To provide more investment opportunities to the public and stimulate 
the emergence of a capital market in Myanmar as well as to introduce 
an indirect instrument of monetary policy, the Central Bank of Myanmar, 
on behalf of the government, has issued 3-year and 5-year government 
treasury bonds since 1993. It recently issued new denomination of 2-year 
government bond bearing interest rate of 10.5% p.a. Effective from 1st 
January 2010, 2-year, 3-year and 5-year government treasury bonds bear 
interest rates of 10.5, 11.0 and 11.5%, respectively. The treasury bonds 
deposited by the financial institutions in the Central Bank of Myanmar are 
treated as cash balance in calculating the reserve requirement. 
 
  To meet their liquidity shortage, banks can put up 3-year and 
5-year government treasury bonds as collateral to obtain short-term loans 
(92 days) through the discount window facility provided by the CBM 
pursuant to its Instructions No.262 dated 14 November 1995. The interest 
rate on these short-term loans is the same as the Central Bank rate. 156
Figure 7
Purchasing, Depositing as Reserve Requirement and Making 
collateral for Short-term Loan of Government Treasury Bonds by 
Private Banks, As at June 30, 2009*
(Kyat in million)
*Remaining two private banks have no T/bond.   
 
  Previously,  the  state  banks  are  not  permitted  to  invest  in 
government treasury bonds and are confined to 3-month treasury bills 
yielding 4% per annum. Starting July 2009, the state banks can invest 
in government treasury bonds. MEB is the major investor and its total 
outstanding investment to date is K450 billion.   
  There is always a danger of the possibility of a bank-run, i.e. a 
simultaneous withdrawal of deposits by a large number of depositors. 
In order to prevent such a thing from occurring, the central banks in all 
countries with a modern banking system act as the lender of last resort. 
In a developing economy, it is the most important function of a central 
bank, acting as the lender of last resort. That is, it will lend to other banks 
in times of crisis, in the form of its own bank notes, since it alone has the 
power to issue bank notes (or legal tenders).  
  Reflecting  the  above-mentioned  central  bank’s  function,  the 
Central Bank of Myanmar acts as the sole issuer of domestic currency 157
either notes or coins, and also as the lender of last resort. The latter is 
performed only at the crisis times and Figure 8 provides the liquidity 
provision facility during crisis time which was occurred in early 2003, due 
to a loss in depositors’ confidence sparked by the spill-over effects of the 
failure of general services companies outside the banking sector. 
   
Figure 8
Liquidity Provision Facility During Last Crisis Time, 
Within Year 2003
                                                                                     (Kyat in million)
*     Revoked license in August, 2005
**  3 co-operative banks were merged in May 2004 and reestablished as Co-operative 
Bank Ltd. 
***    Revoked license in April, 2005 
2.3  Central  Bank’s  Requirement  and/or  Recommendations 
Regarding Bank’s Liquidity Measurement and Management 
  The  banks  and  other  organisations  of  the  financial  sector  are 







determined by law and conservative liquidity requirements are in place. 
Lending is restricted to short-term collateralised loans. Private banks are 
subject to a loan-to-deposit requirement which limits lending. According 
this ratio, banks shall lend out not more than 80% of their deposits.
  At present, Myanmar relies on heavy regulation and a policy of 
risk minimisation. However, if the authorities were to allow the financial 
sector, especially the organised part of it, to play a more significant role 
in economic development, a more modern style of supervision would 
be  needed.  That  should  include  making  the  supervisory  regime  more 
accountable so as to contribute to stable economic development that can 
provide a safe haven for the savings of the personal sector.
  Reflecting  the  heavily  regulated  environment,  the  on-site 
supervisory  regime  is  more  compliance-oriented  than  risk-assessment-
oriented. The on-site teams are conducting inspections more along the 
lines  of  a  conventional  audit  rather  than  performing  a  review  of  risk 
management  procedures  and  processes  that  is  associated  with  a  more 
modern on-site regime. 
  Off-site  analysis  needs  to  be  less  compliance-based  and 
more  devoted  to  ensuring  effective  corporate  governance  and  good 
risk  management.  More  effort  should  be  devoted  to  encouraging  the 
development  of  effective  risk  management  and  improving  corporate 
governance. While some of the work can be performed on-site, off-site 
analysts can leave verification of the implementation of such policies to 
the on-site examiners and focus on the process of obtaining, evaluating 
and assessing the policies for effective risk management.159
3.   Dynamics and Determinants of Liquidity in Myanmar
3.1   Development of Liquidity Indicators
3.1.1   Funding Liquidity 
Figure 9
Ratio of liquid Assets in Relation to Short-term Liabilities
Liquid Assets can be defined by its component.160
Figure 9
Ratio of Liquid Assets in Relation to Short-term Liabilities
*Liquidity Asset can be defined by its component
Figure 10
Loans-to-Deposit Ratio (15 Private Banks)161
Figure 11
Concentration in Assets or Liabilities (15 Private Banks)
Figure 12
Capital-to-Deposit Ratio and Capital-to-Assets Ratio 
(15 Private Banks)162
3.1.2  Maturity of Future Cash Flows of Assets and Liabilities 
or Maturity Gap between Assets and Liabilities  
  Banks are subject to a reserve requirement of 10% of deposits 
and further liquid asset requirements of 20% of deposits, which must be 
satisfied in cash, balances with the CBM or treasury securities eligible 
as collateral for borrowing from the CBM2. There is, therefore, a buffer 
of liquid assets, which in an emergency, can be drawn down to fund 
unexpected withdrawals of deposits. 
  The maturity gap can be clearly identified. This is because although 
most loans3 are short term, or at least renewable annually, deposits are 
predominately on current account, can be withdrawn on demand, or in 
savings accounts which also withdraw on demand, albeit subject to some 
restrictions on the rate and frequency of withdrawal. Time deposits and 
fixed-term deposits are negligible very small. 
 
  Experience in 2003 has shown that the private banks were indeed 
subject to very severe liquidity pressures and had to reduce balance sheets 
by as much as a half or even more in order to meet withdrawals. As 
memories of that experience fade, banks may become less conscious of the 
need to maintain liquidity, which is costly, especially given the low yields 
available on treasury securities. Here, the state banks are not permitted 
to invest in 3- or 5-year treasury bonds with a yield of 11.0 and 11.5% 
previously and now they can invest in it. 
3.1.3  Other Liquidity Ratios Used       
  In Myanmar, the banks and other parts of the financial sector are 
heavy regulated. Law determines bank interest rates, both borrowing and 
lending, and strict liquidity requirements are in place. Lending is restricted 
to short-term collateralised loans. 
  On the liabilities side, the private banks are subject to a deposit-
to-capital requirement which limits deposit-taking from the general public 
to 10 times the paid-up capital. In this regards, this ratio limits banks’ 
ability to raise liabilities and therefore limit their ability to lend. Banks, in 
2.  Government treasury bond is the only and single collateral criteria for borrowing from 
the Central Bank. 
3.  Bank lending is limited to one year, which does restrict the extent of possible matu-
rity transformation. But loans may be renewed for a further two years. It is normal 
practice for a borrower to repay loans from other sources before a new agreement is 
concluded.163
turn, become very selective in advancing loans, and therefore lending is 
restricted to very creditworthy borrowers able to provide good collateral.4 
As a consequence, coupled with the bank’s legal inability to lend long, 
there have allegedly been few non-performing new loans in recent years, 
with some private banks reporting having zero NPL. The ratio of NPL to 
total loans of 15 private banks is shown in Figure 13.
Figure 13
Ratio of NPL to Total Loans of 15 Private Banks and SOB
Figure 14
Borrowing from the Central Bank’s Lending Facility
                                                                                        (Kyat in million) 
4.  In any case, banks are now required to lend only on the basis of cash or real-estate 
collateral.164
3.1.4  Qualitative Measures
Figure 15
Overall Financial Position of 15 Private Banks
Figure 16
Ratio of Excess Liquidity to Required Reserve (in Percent)
 
In accordance with the captioned indicators post-crisis, the private 
banks have adjusted in some remarkable ways, with many of them being 
able to add significantly to their paid-in capital. With strong emphasis on 
liquidity, the bank’s liquidity ratios have also strengthened. As a result, 
the data on liquidity and capital ratios are very high (see Figure 15). From 
the financial year 2005-2006, public confidence in the banking sector has 
strengthened with growth in deposits. At the same time, based on the data, 
the level of non-performing loans for the private banks stands at not more 
than 3%, while that of the state banks is round 25% because of their credit 
operation  is  directed-lending  based  on  non-commercial  criteria. When 
over time, such loans to state-owned enterprises became non-performing 
loans.   
 
  More  to  the  point,  at  issue  here  is  one  concerning  the  safety 
and soundness of the banking system, which is essential for the healthy 
development of economies. Capital-deposit ratio and capital-assets ratio 
(Figure 12) are the simplest and oldest measures employed to ascertain 
capital adequacy, meaning whether the bank has enough capital to absorb 
losses stemming from making loans and investments. In this respect, the 
regulatory authorities in most countries have in place minimum capital 165
requirements for banks as measured by capital adequacy ratio (CAR)5. 
The minimum capital adequacy ratio or capital requirement for private 
bank as prescribed by CBM is 10 % of risk-weighted assets. Furthermore, 
in calculating the said ratio, bank capital is defined to include issued and 
paid-up capital, paid-up share premium, reserves, and retained profits. 
This is standard international practice (BIS)6. The definition of capital 
in the banking industry is somewhat different from that in other lines of 
business, and with good reasons since reserves, retained profits, etc., are 
not only owned by the bank, they but could also be used to absorb losses.
  Capital,  Liquidity  and  Reserve  Requirement  are  the  main 
indicators analysed in this chapter and they reflect the liquidity situation in 
Myanmar.
  
4.  Liquidity Risk Management in Banking
4.1  Past Development      
 
  Chapter VIII of the Central Bank of Myanmar Law (CBML)7 
empowers the CBM to require banks and financial institutions to maintain 
required reserves and specified liquid assets against such deposits and 
similar liabilities and all privately-owned commercial banks shall comply 
in the following manner at normal time:  
Reserve  requirement  ratio •	 :  Required  reserves  shall 
be maintained by way of cash holdings, or by way of 
deposits with the CBM, or by both, in such proportion 
as the Central Bank may from time to time determine. In 
June 2009, the level of required reserves was (7.26%) of 
total liabilities of a bank.
That required reserves for a bank shall not exceed 35% of  •	
the total liabilities of the bank. However, if the CBM Board 
of Directors considers that there are serious inflationary 
pressures,  it  may  increase  required  reserves  above  the 
5.  The Basel Committee specified a minimum ratio of total capital to weighted risk assets 
of 8% (The Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices).
6.  Bank for International Settlements.
7.  Central Bank of Myanmar Law (CBML), enacted in 1990.166
maximum 35% limit. In such a case, the CBM is obliged 
to pay interest on the required reserves exceeding the 35% 
limit provided that such rate of interest will not exceed the 
minimum discount rate prevailing in the Central Bank.   
Liquidity requirement ratio: •	  Liquid assets shall consist 
of freely transferable assets, free from any charge or lien, 
and of the kind and amount specified by the CBM. In June 
2009, the level of liquidity ratio was (64.07%) of deposits 
at banks.
General  Provision: •	   Banks  shall  maintain  a  general 
provision  account  amounting  to  at  least  2%  of  total 
outstanding  loans/advances  at  the  financial  year  since 
loans convey the highest returns for banks.
General  Reserve  Account:  •	 Under  the  provisions  of 
Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law (FIML)8, banks 
shall set aside (25 %) of its net profits in a general reserve 
account until this account reaches (100 %) of its paid-up 
capital.
Lending  Limit: •	   Banks  shall  not  lend  more  than  20% 
of their capital plus reserves to a single individual, an 
enterprise or an economic group.
 
  Banks shall put up 3-year and 5-year government treasury bonds 
as collateral to obtain short-term loans (92 days) to fulfill their liquidity 
shortfall, through the discount window facility provided by CBM under 
the  CBM’s  Instructions  No.262  dated  14  November  1995.  Moreover, 
banks can resell their holding of treasury bonds at the discount rate when 
they are faced with a serious liquidity problem. The interest rate/discount 
rate on these short-term loans is same as the Central Bank rate. This is the 
liquidity management of banks in crisis time.
4.2  Current Practices 
 
  Public confidence in the banking system has gradually recovered 
from  the  banking  crisis.  Some  administrative  measures  taken  by  the 
CBM include the application of its supervisory requirements to both state 
and private banks, relaxation of the restriction for opening of new bank 
8.  Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law (FIML), enacted in 1990.167
branches and review of risk management guidelines issued, but the overall 
regulatory environment as described in Section 4.1 remains unchanged.   
  Banks  shall  raise  their  paid-up  capital  under  the  following 
conditions: when they intend to source for deposits exceeding ten times 
their paid-up capital; when they have a shortfall in their CAR; and when 
they do not meet the requirement of free capital at 50%.
5.  Lessons Learned in Myanmar
5.1  Trends in Liquidity Risk Management Practices Before and 
After the Recent Global Financial Crisis
Since  the  banking  crisis  in  2003–04,  the  financial  system  in 
Myanmar has not encountered any serious instability. This includes recent 
periods when major parts of the world have endured extreme financial 
volatility. As mentioned in the previous sections, the banking system in 
Myanmar is currently has minimal risk. 
5.2  Role of Liquidity Risk in Triggering Past Financial Crises
 
  The  banking  crisis  that  started  in  2003  seriously  affected  the 
performance of the banking sector for a couple of years. The key points in 
the crisis are summarised as follows:
February 2003: Acute problems arose among the illegal  (i) 
financial firms involved in pyramid schemes. A decline 
in public confidence generated massive depositor runs on 
private banks.
In  March:  the  private  banks  had  lost  40  %  of  their  (ii) 
deposits.
By September: their deposits were depleted by two-thirds,  (iii) 
much of this withdrawals migrated to the state banks, 
which the public perceived as safer, or less likely to be 
closed. A severe liquidity problem was thus created in the 
private banks.
 The authorities’ response was to restrain bank withdrawals,  (iv) 
which further undermined public confidence, and to order 
private banks to strengthen their cash position by calling 168
in loans. These banks tended to shorten the term of new 
lending. The authorities required private banks to adhere 
to a deposit-to-capital ratio capped at 7 times, thereby 
constraining their ability to collect new deposits.
All  these  measures  aggravated  the  liquidity  problems,  (v) 
which spread to the real sector through a sharp drop in 
the volume of financial intermediation. At its peak, six 
problem  banks  were  prohibited  from  accepting  new 
deposits  or  extending  any  new  credits.  Later,  three  of 
the  banks  were  allowed  to  resume  normal  operations, 
while two were closed, and one remained under a special 
supervisory regime.
Early  2004:  Deposits  started  returning  to  the  private  (vi) 
banks, but at a low level.
In June, three private banks merged.  (vii) 
5.3  Development of Liquidity Situation (in Banking Sector) Before 
and After Recent Global Financial Crisis
Although the banks have well recovered from the 2003–04 crisis 
and Myanmar was largely unaffected from the direct impact of the global 
crisis by the absence of any significant linkages to major crisis-affected 
countries,  the  existing  conservative  liquidity  requirements  are  still  in 
place and the fundamental structural problems and other weaknesses in 
the financial system remain. 
5.4  Future Prospects 
The financial crisis triggered by lack of liquidity risk management 
notwithstanding,  immediate  steps  can  be  taken  to  support  economic 
growth  with  less  restrictive  liquidity  requirements  and  credit  policies 
while maintaining banking system stability. The deposit-to-capital ratio 
and the stringent collateral requirements effectively limit bank lending and 
should be relaxed. Further, the pre-2003 list of acceptable collateral for 
bank lending could be reintroduced and the 100% collateral-to-loan ratio 
reduced. The banking sector stability can be better addressed using the 
existing framework of liquid assets and reserve requirement ratios.169
6.  Conclusion  
The event of 2003 has shown the importance of liquidity risk. 
Banks are required to maintain a stock of liquid assets as well as holding 
reserves at the Central Bank. Looking forward, banks that develop policies 
and processes for identifying such risks are better placed to control them 
and can react quicker if conditions of stress re-emerge. 
Furthermore, the supervisory arrangements should seek to ensure 
that risks taken are understood and managed, that the risks are appropriately 
priced and that adequate capital is held against unexpected losses.
As  noted  above,  the  financial  system  in  Myanmar  is  strongly 
dominated by banks while the insurance sector and the securities market 
are relatively small. Though the banks and other parts of the financial sector 
are heavily regulated, the regulations are highly risk-averse. There is very 
limited opportunity for market liquidity risk. Most banks in the world have 
some FX risk which also can trigger a liquidity crunch, but even foreign 
banking is only permitted for state-owned banks in Myanmar. 
Moreover, Myanmar has no traded debt securities as well as no 
equity market. Its T-bonds are not marketable security and they are held 
to maturity. In this context, Myanmar is making its best effort to develop 
a bond market. Several actions are needed to widen and deepen an active 
market for T-bonds, including: provision of more competitive rates of 
return, increase in the number of T-bond maturities, and broadening the 
investor categories to enhance the market influence. The positive steps 
taken in developing the government bond market are: the issuance of 
2-year T-bond to tap a wider investor base with effect from January 1, 
2010, implementation of the roadmap of the Capital Market Development 
Committee within the planned time frame, and appointment of the MSEC 
and MEB to underwrite the Government T-bonds.  
Another highlighted issue, which can foster the liquidity problem 
of banks, is maturity mismatch. Generally speaking, traditional banks lose 
from interest rate increases because assets have longer maturities than 
liabilities. Since the absence of derivative products in Myanmar, hedging 
interest rate risk is probably not practiced in Myanmar. 170
Basel I apply a capital charge to risk in the trading book but not in 
the banking book. In many countries there is no trading book, so the risk 
is not covered by capital. Supervisors in Myanmar use higher minimum 
capital ratio.
  The conservative liquidity requirements are in place. Lending is 
restricted to short-term collateralised loans. Private banks are subject to a 
loan-to-deposit requirement which limits lending. That, in turn, enables 
the banks to be very selective in advancing loans, and therefore lending 
is restricted to very creditworthy borrowers who are able to provide good 
collateral.
The supervisory framework is required to be more risk-focused 
and  forward-looking.  The  capital  adequacy  arrangements  should  be 
broadened, the risk-weightings should be more in line with international 
best practices and applied in a more risk-sensitive way. Banks will need 
to be more proactive in managing liquidity and supervisors challenging of 
that management. 
There is no doubt that risk management has become increasingly 
complex,  not  only  in  relation  to  financial  trading  activities,  but  also 
in  relation  to  the  risk  found  on  traditional  bank  balance  sheets.  Risk 
management is therefore becoming a much more skilled activity than in 
the past. 
The latest global financial crisis showed that risk management 
must be made to work in practice as well as in theory. The ongoing task for 
banks’ management and bank supervisors is to ensure that those involved 
in risk-management activities are alert to potential operational deficiencies 
and act quickly to rectify any deficiency that exist.171
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CHAPTER 6
LIQUIDITY MEASUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
IN THE PHILIPPINES
by Neil Angelo C. Halcon1
1.   Introduction
  
	 The	 onset	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 had	 driven	 monetary	
authorities	around	the	globe	to	re-consider	and	re-visit	operations	and	









2.   Overview of Financial System and Commercial Banking    
  Industry
	 The	 Philippine	 financial	 system	 comprises	 a	 set	 of	 financial	
institutions	 intricately	 organised	 and	 structured	 to	 facilitate	 financial	














	 Notwithstanding	 these	 gains,	 financial	 integration	 has	 also	
heightened	the	country’s	vulnerability	to	external	shocks	and	exposure	


















































2.2.1 Steady Increase in Resources. 
	 In	the	last	13	years,	the	financial	sector	has	benefited	from	a	










2.2.2 Healthy Indicators of Banking Growth. 











	 Results	 of	 the	 latest	 BSP	 Senior	 Bank	 Loan	 Officers’	 Survey	


























at  P80.3	 billion,	 with	 the	 rest	 issued	 in	 bonds,	 corporate	 notes,	 and	
commercial	paperlines.2






































3.   The Role of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas


















v.	Management of Foreign Currency Reserves.	The	BSP	seeks	to	
maintain	sufficient	international	reserves	to	meet	any	foreseeable	
net	 demands	 for	 foreign	 currencies	 in	 order	 to	 preserve	 the	
international	stability	and	convertibility	of	the	Philippine	peso.







subdivisions	 and	 instrumentalities	 and	 government-owned	 and	
–controlled	corporations.	179

































i.		 Enhanced	 the	 existing	 peso	 repurchase	 agreement	 (repo)	
facilities	 through	 relaxed	 valuation	 and	 a	 broader	 list	 of	
acceptable	collaterals;
















































	 The	 increase	 in	 the	 budget	 for	 the	 rediscounting	 facility	 was	











3.3   Key Regulations on Business Activities by the Banks   








i.   Supported  a  private  sector-led  initiative,  began  in  2001, 
to  establish  a  fixed  income  exchange  (FIE)  to	 help	













iii.  Issued guidelines in 2004 to pave the way for the creation 




iv.  Upgraded the existing payment system into a real time gross 
settlement system (RTGS).	This	is	intended	to	enhance	the	
operational	 efficiency,	 reliability,	 speed,	 and	 timeliness	 of	
payment	 transactions	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 rapidly	 increasing	
volume	and	large	value	of	payment	transactions.
v.		 Enhance the domestic rating capacity	and	meet	the	growing	
need	for	credit	rating	services	by	both	the	financial	industry	
and	 regulators,	 the	 BSP	 established	 minimum	 eligibility	








































4.   Dynamics and Determinants of Liquidity 
4.1  The Financial System’s Liquidity Profile
4.1.1 Improvement in Asset Quality                  

















































4.2   Development of Liquidity Indicators 
4.2.1 Funding Liquidity 
	 Year-on-year	 (YoY)	 figures	 showed	 a	 banking	 system7  that  is 
resilient	to	the	global	financial	crisis.	Total	loan	portfolio8	for	March	2009	
remarkably	grew	by	21%.	In	particular,	loans	to	the	agriculture	sector,	


















































































4.2.3 Qualitative Measures 
 




















The	five	banks’	“stressed”	CARs	are	8%,	6.7	%,	7.8%,	9.6%,	and	-13.7%16.   
The	five	banks	combined	contribute	more	than	half	of	the	banking	system’s	
assets,	loans,	and	deposits.
4.3   Factors Affecting Liquidity Risk









4.3.2 Microeconomic Factors 







5.   Liquidity Risk Management in Banking
















	 In	 July	 2001,	 the	 Philippines	 formally	 adopted	 the	 risk-based	











5.1.1 Poor Asset Quality
   The	banking	system	is	hobbled	by	the	heavy	baggage	of	NPAs	
from	the	1997	crisis.	The	overhang	in	the	non-performing	assets	(NPAs)	
which	the	banking	system	carries	is	a	lingering	concern	to	the	BSP.	It	





5.1.2 Slowdown in Bank Lending
   Reflecting	both	the	deterioration	in	asset	quality	as	well	as	the	




5.1.3 Rising Risk Exposures
  Deregulation,	 technological	 progress,	 financial	 innovation,	
changing	tastes	and	demographics	and	increasing	market	competition	have	191
all	combined	to	dramatically	transform	the	financial	services	industry.	 	
This	 is	 a	 continuing	 and	 dynamic	 process.	 	As	 a	 result,	 the	 banking	
industry	has	no	choice	but	to	reinvent	its	products	and	services	and	how	




5.1.4 Underdeveloped Capital Market
  Another	 major	 concern	 of	 the	 BSP	 is	 the	 continued	
underdevelopment	 of	 the	 domestic	 capital	 market.	The	 country’s	 debt	











5.2   Current Practices
The	BSP	continued	to	strengthen	its	regulatory	and	prudential	
standards	in	line	with	international	norms.	These	initiatives	are	aimed	at	









































	 The	 BSP	 likewise	 amended	 the	 guidelines	 for	 identifying	 and	
monitoring	problem	loans	and	other	risk	assets	and	for	setting	up	allowance	




6.   Issues and Lessons Learned
6.1   Liquidity Management before the Global Financial Crisis
	 Philippine	banks	recorded	a	solid	performance	in	terms	of	asset	








while	 its	 capital	 adequacy	 ratio	 remained	 above	 local	 regulatory	 and	






























	 Regulatory	 guidelines	 pertaining	 to	 investments	 in	 structured	


































6.2   Liquidity Situation after the Global Financial Crisis












7.   Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

































































































	 It	 may	 be	 noted	 that	 market	 liquidity	 is	 also	 contingent	





















LIQUIDITY MEASUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
IN SRI LANKA
by P. D. R. Dayananda1
  Overview of Financial System and Commercial Banking     1. 
  Industry in Sri  Lanka
  Introduction 1.1 
	 The	financial	system	in	Sri	Lanka	comprises	the	money	market	
and	capital	market.	The	major	players	of	the	money	market	are	banks,	


















































































Nature of Commercial Banking Business in Sri Lanka 1.3 
Figure 4
Uses of Funds of Licensed Commercial Banks Sri Lanka
as of End-2008













Sources of Funds of Licensed Commercial Banks
in Sri Lanka as at 31.12.2008
 
Source	:	Bank	Supervision	Department,	Central	Bank	of	Sri	Lanka















































  Role of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka 2. 











Supervision and Regulation of Financial System in Sri Lanka  2.2 
The	regulatory	framework	of	the	financial	system	of	Sri	Lanka	
brings	 into	 play	 a	 multiple	 regulatory	 system	 which	 consists	 of	 three	
major	supervisory	agencies	covering	banks,	finance	companies,	leasing	
companies,	 government	 security	 dealers,	 stock	 market	 and	 its	 allied	
businesses	and	the	insurance	companies.	As	the	apex	institution,	the	CBSL	
is	responsible	for	the	stability	of	the	financial	system.	The	CBSL	directly	
















margin	 providers,	 credit	 rating	 agencies,	 investment	 managers	 and	208
securities	clearing	houses.	The	IBSL	regulates	and	supervises	the	insurance	
industry,	i.e.	insurance	companies	and	their	agents	and	insurance	brokers.	
Regulatory Requirements on Commercial Bank Liquidity,     2.3 
  Risk Measurement and Management   

























Statutory Reserve Requirement (SRR)  2.3.1 
The	commercial	banks	operating	in	Sri	Lanka	are	required	to	
maintain	reserves	with	the	Central	Bank	at	rates	determined	by	the	Bank.	
























The Role of CBSL as a Liquidity Provider 2.4 
The	role	of	the	CBSL	as	a	liquidity	provider	to	the	commercial	














Liquidity Provisions by the CBSL – Normal Time 2.4.1 
The	CBSL	facilitates	the	commercial	banks	to	meet	their	liquidity	
requirements	 through	 the	 active	 OMO	 system	 with	 the	 following	 key	
elements:	
2.4.1.1  Daily Auction 






























Dynamics and Determinants of Market Liquidity in  3. 
Sri Lanka
Market Liquidity Measurement in Sri Lanka   3.1 
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monetary	 management	 strategy	 of	 the	 CBSL.	Accordingly,	 the	 CBSL	
employs	monetary	management	strategy	and	tools	(SRR	and	OMO)	in	the	
management	of	market	liquidity	in	Sri	Lanka.






If Market Liquidity is in Balance 3.2.1 







 If a Market Liquidity Deficit Emerges  3.2.2 




If a Money Liquidity Surplus Emerges  3.2.3 







































   
























Daily Market Liquidity Volume in Sri Lanka 
      
       Rs.	billion	
Source:	Annual	Reports	of	Central	Bank	of	Sri	Lanka










The	 CBSL	 discouraged	 the	 regular	 use	 of	 Reverse	 Repo	 •	
facility	by	the	commercial	banks.










3.3.1.3 Market Liquidity in 2008
The	money	market	had	excess	liquidity	during	most	of	the	 •	
first	eight	months	of	2008,	mainly	due	to:	






3.3.1.4 Market Liquidity after September 2008 
















subsequently	 removed	 the	 restrictions	 on	 number	 of	
times	with	effect	from	21	May	2009.








3.3.2  Other Quantitative Indicators to Measure the Market    
    Liquidity    



























Liquidity Stocks in Commercial Banks in Sri Lanka 







sector.	The	 movements	 of	 these	 three	 indices	 have	 shown	 a	 common	




Stock Market Indices in Sri Lanka
Source:	Annual	Report,	Central	Bank	of	Sri	Lanka
3.3.3  Other Qualitative Indicators to Measure Market    
    Liquidity   













Standing Facilities Enjoyed by Commercial Banks












which	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 market	 liquidity,	 namely,	 the	 Financial	 and	221
Business	 Services	 (FBS)	 and	 Credit	 Cards	 (CC).	 During	 Q4:	2006	 to	
Q1:2008,	these	two	sectoral	NPL	ratios	were	below	the	commercial	banks’	
industry	NPL	ratio.	
3.4  Funding Liquidity in Commercial Banks of Sri Lanka     
Funding	liquidity	is	a	level	of	liquidity	in	a	commercial	bank	
whereby	the	bank	is	able	to	meet	its	current	and	future	cash	flow	and	
collateral	 needs,	 both	 expected	 and	 unexpected,	 without	 materially	






Loan-to-deposit Ratio and Liquid Asset-to-deposit Ratio
Source:	Department	of	Bank	Supervision,	Central	Bank	of	Sri	Lanka
3.4.1  Loan- to-deposit Ratio and Liquid Asset-to-deposit    








Sources of Funds in Commercial Banks of Sri Lanka
Source:	Department	of	Bank	Supervision,	Central	Bank	of	Sri	Lanka
















3.5  Market Liquidity vs. Funding Liquidity at Call Money    
  Market     
The	 interbank	 call	 money	 market	 is	 an	 overnight	 market	 and	
mainly	 serves	 commercial	 banks	 in	 meeting	 their	 immediate	 liquidity	












3.6  Factors Affecting Liquidity Risk in Sri Lanka





























Statutory Liquid Asset Ratio in Commercial Banks






Liquidity  Risk  Management  in  Commercial  Banks  in  Sri  4. 
Lanka     




















4.1.1  Tools Used in Individual Commercial Bank Liquidity    










such	 as	 maturity	 ladder	 (based	 on	 contractual	 maturity	 of	 assets	 and	
















potential	 liquidity	 crisis	 situation.	Accordingly,	 the	 commercial	 banks	
commonly	used	aggressive	deposit	mobilisation	and	retention	strategies,	
such	as	special	interest-rate	offers	(bonus	interest	or	interest	rate	higher	




4.1.2  Liquidity Management in Domestic vs. Foreign 
  Commercial Banks
There	is	no	significant	difference	in	the	governance	structure	of	
liquidity	 risk	 management	 between	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 commercial	
banks	in	Sri	Lanka.	However,	there	were	some	differences	in	the	use	of	























4.2.1  Tools Used in Individual Commercial Bank Liquidity    
    Management    
The	 commercial	 banks	 consider	 liquidity	 risk	 management	 as	
one	of	the	core	functions	of	commercial	banks.	Therefore,	they	have	paid	

























































However,	 the	 CBSL,	 as	 commercial	 bank	 regulator,	 has	





and	 carrying	 out	 effective	 stress-testing	 mechanism.	 The	 CBSL	 plans	










5.2  Bank Crisis in Sri Lanka - Case Study                         
The	 CBSL	 strongly	 warned	 the	 general	 public	 through	 its	
notice	 of	 21st	 January	 2008	 about	 the	 investment	 instruments	 offered	













































banking	 sector.	 Therefore,	 a	 sound	 banking	 system	 is	 mandatory	 for	
economic	stability.			
We	 learn	 from	 the	 recent	 global	 financial	 crisis,	 liquidity	 risk	
management	 has	 a	 direct	 influence	 on	 the	 soundness	 of	 the	 banking	
system	of	any	economy	whether	developed	or	less	developed.	Therefore,	
it	 is	 necessary	 for	 an	 economy	 to	 make	 it	 a	 priority	 to	 establish	 a	
comprehensive	liquidity	risk	management	framework	which	can	address	
market	 liquidity	 and	 funding	 liquidity.	 Market	 liquidity	 is	 referred	 to	
as	 economy-wide	 liquidity	 management,	 whereas	 funding	 liquidity	 is	
referred	to	as	the	bank-level	liquidity	management.	This	study	showed	231
that	 market	 liquidity	 management	 and	 funding	 liquidity	 management	
are	 economically	 significant	 because	 both	 of	 them	 are	 inter-related.	
Any	 liquidity	 risk	 management	 should	 basically	 address	 the	 liquidity	
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LIQUIDITY MEASUREMENT AND PRACTICES IN TAIWAN
by Michael M.K. Lin1
Overview  of  Financial  System  and  Commercial  Bank  1. 
Industry
Taiwan  has  a  diverse  financial  system  which  comprises  many 
types of financial markets and institutions. The principal financial markets 
in Taiwan include the banking and insurance markets, the money market, 
the capital market, and the foreign exchange market. 
  The principal financial institutions include domestic banks, local 
branches of foreign banks, credit cooperative associations (CCA), credit 
departments  of  farmers’  associations  (CDFA),  credit  departments  of 
fishermen’s associations (CDFI), Post Corporation, insurance companies, 
bills  finance  companies,  securities  firms,  futures  firms,  and  securities 
finance companies.   
1.1   Share of Banking Sector vs. Capital Market
    
       Financial services output as share of GDP was 10.64% in the 
second quarter of 2009. The banking sector accounted for 6.88% of the 
segment, insurance sector accounted for 2.69%, and securities and futures 
sector accounted for 1.06%.
       As of end-June 2009, Taiwan had 38 domestic banks, 32 foreign 
banks,  27  credit  cooperative  associations,  264  credit  departments  of 
farmers’ associations, 25 credit departments of fishermen’s associations, 10 
bills finance companies, 1 Postal Savings System, 52 insurance companies, 
94 securities firms, 4 securities finance companies, and 25 futures firms.
In terms of assets, domestic banks accounted for 87.4% of the 
outstanding value of assets held by the banking sector. Local branches of 
foreign banks accounted for 7.3% as of end-June 2009 (Figure 1).    
1.  Section Chief, Information & Analysis Section, Department of Financial Inspection, 
Central Bank of Republic of China (Taiwan).236
Figure 1
Outstanding Amounts of Asset by Banking Sector
                                                         Unit: NTD billion 
Institutions 2006 2007 2008 June 2009
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %
Domestic banks 31,977 88.8 32,559 87.3 34,136 86.4 34,903 87.4
Local branches of 
foreign banks
2,316 6.3 2,656 7.1 3,275 8.3 2,916 7.3
CCA 641 1.8 581 1.6 581 1.5 582 1.5
CDFA  1,454 4.0 1,445 3.9 1,455 3.7 1,479 3.7
CDFI 3.9 0.1 39 0.1 41 0.1 42 0.1
Total 36,427 100 37,280 100 39,488 100 39,922 100
Note1: End- of-period figures.
Note 2: Domestic banks include post corp. 
The  capital  market  includes  stock  and  bond  markets.  The 
instruments  of  the  bond  market  include  government  bonds,  corporate 
bonds, and bank debentures. In terms of market value, the stock market 
accounted for around 80% of capital market in 2006 and 2007. After the 
global financial crisis in 2007, the stock price has plunged. The total value 
accounted for 67% of the capital market as of end-2008. However, the 
stock market gradually rebounded from the beginning of 2009. The total 
value accounted for 73.7% of capital market as of end-June 2009 (Figure 
2). 
Figure 2
Outstanding Amounts of Capital Markets
                                                       Unit: NTD billion
2006 2007 2008 June 2009
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %





































Total (C＝A＋B) 24,085 100.0 27,069 100.0 17,476 100.0 21,993 100.0
Note1: End-of- period figures.
Note 2: The figures of stocks are total market value.
Note 3: The figures of bonds are outstanding.
1.2   Characteristics of Banking Sector 
As of end-June 2009, among 38 domestic banks, there were 1 
export-import bank, 2 industrial banks, 1 agricultural bank, 1 real estate 237
bank, 1 medium business bank, and 32 commercial banks. However, real 
estate bank, medium business bank, and agricultural bank can still conduct 
most businesses of commercial banks, such as deposit taking and loan 
extending on retail market for general public.
1.3   Nature of Banks’ Business
   According to the Banking Act, in general, businesses which may 
be conducted by a bank are as follows:
a.  Acceptance of various kinds of deposits;
b.  Management of Trust Funds under mandate;
c.  Issuance of Bank Debentures;
d.  Extension of loans;
e.  Discounting of bills and notes;
f.  Investment in securities;
g.  Investment in productive enterprises;
h.  Handling of domestic and foreign remittances;
i.  Acceptance of commercial drafts;
j.  Guaranteeing domestic and foreign transactions; 
k.  Acting as collecting and paying agent;
l.  Underwriting and trading in securities for its own account or 
for customers;
m.  Managing  the  issuance  of  bonds  and  debentures  and 
providing advisory services with respect thereto;
n.  Acting  as  attestor  for  the  issuance  of  stocks,  bonds,  and 
debentures;   
o.  Conducting  businesses  related  to  investment  and  trusts 
regarding securities;
p.   Buying and selling of gold bars/coins and/or silver bars/
coins and foreign currencies; and
q.  Conducting other relevant businesses as may be authorised 
by the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC).
  Pursuant to the Article 22 of the Banking Act, a bank shall not 
conduct any business other than as approved by the FSC.
  As of end-June 2009, the major uses of funds of domestic banks 
were loans. It accounted for more than 60% of total uses of funds. The 
major sources of funds were deposits. It accounted for more than 77% of 
sources of funds. The major uses and sources of funds are shown in Figure 
3.238
Figure 3
Major Uses and Sources of Funds of Domestic Banks
                                                                                                                                Unit: %
Uses of funds 2008
June 
2009
Sources of funds 2008
June 
2009
Cash and due from banks 15.9 18.1 Due to banks 7.1 7.5
Securities purchased 13.8 14.5 Deposits  77.0 78.4
Securities purchased under R/S 0.2 0.2 Securities sold under R/P 1.5 1.2
Loans 63.0 60.2 Borrowing funds 2.9 2.4
Property and equipment 2.0 2.0 Equities  6.1 6.1
Other uses of funds 5.1 5.0 Other sources of funds 5.4 4.4
Total 100.0 100 Total 100.0 100
Note 1: End-of-period figures.
Note 2: This table excludes post corp.
   Regarding the market share of deposits and loans, domestic banks 
are the major players. In relation to deposits, the market share of domestic 
banks was around 90% of total deposits (Figure 4). For loans, the market 
share of domestic banks was around 85% of total loans (Figure 5). 
Figure 4
Deposits of Financial Institutions in Taiwan
                                                       Unit: NTD billion
    Institutions
December 31, 2007
December 31, 2008
  June 30, 2009
Balance % Balance  % Balance  %
Domestic banks 25,288 89.0 27,211 89.4 28,139 89.2
Local branches of foreign 
banks
1,241 4.4 1,328 4.3 1,475 4.7
CCA 535 1.9 537 1.8 539 1.7
CDFA  1,321 4.6 1,329 4.4 1,352 4.3
CDFI 36 0.1 37 0.1 38 0.1
Total 28,421 100 30,442 100.0 31,543 100.0
Note 1:  Domestic banks include Postal Savings System.
Note 2:  Credit cooperatives associations (CCA), Credit departments of farmers’ 
associations (CDFA), 
  Credit departments of fishermen’s associations (CDFI) 
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Figure 5
Loans of Financial Institutions in Taiwan
                                                       Unit: NTD billion
     Institutions December 31, 2007
December 31, 2008
 June 30, 2009
Balance % Balance  % Balance  %
Domestic banks 17,925 85.7 18,604 85.4 18,155 85.8
Local branches of foreign 
banks
651 3.1 796 3.6 704 3.3
CCA 344 1.6 342 1.6 342 1.6
CDFA  703 3.4 717 3.3 704 3.3
CDFI 19 0.1 20 0.1 20 0.1
SFC 101 0.5 35 0.2 58 0.3
Insurance companies 1,172 5.6 1,265 5.8 1,174 5.6
Total 20,915 100 21,779 100.0 21,157 100.0
Note 1: Domestic banks include Postal Savings System.
Note 2: Securities finance companies (SFC)
1.4   Characteristics of Government Bond Market
         Regarding government bonds, the primary dealers are chosen from 
the government bond dealers by the Central Bank of Republic of China 
(Taiwan). They are appointed to play the role of market makers which are 
obligated to provide liquidity and quotation of benchmarks. To date, there 
are 66 dealers, including 21 domestic banks, 3 local branches of foreign 
banks, 10 bill finance corporations, 4 local insurance companies, and 28 
securities houses. For the primary dealers, there are 4 domestic banks, 1 
local branch of foreign banks, 3 bill finance corporations, and 7 securities 
houses.
  Only government bond dealers are allowed to submit bids at the 
government  bond  auctions.  However,  investors  can  participate  in  the 
auction by submitting their bids through any one of the government bond 
dealers by filling in application forms that are available from them. The 
bids will be submitted under the name of the government bond dealers.
  The Central Bank of Republic of China (Taiwan) issues government 
bonds on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. Taiwan’s government bonds 
are sold at auctions, using the single-rate method. Minimum bid is NTD50 
million and the incremental amount is NTD10 million. All bids are placed 
in terms of percentage yield.240
1.5   Regulations and Restrictions Regarding Bank’ Business    
  Activities
  Pursuant to Article 4 of the Banking Act, the scope of business of 
each bank shall be determined individually by a competent central authority, 
namely, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) in accordance with 
the classification of the bank and the permitted business specified in the 
Act. However, transactions relating to foreign exchange must be approved 
by the Central Bank.
2.   The Role of Central Bank
2.1    As Liquidity Providers
  Pursuant to the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) 
Act, the CBC’s primary objectives are as follows:
a.  To promote financial stability;
b.  To guide sound banking operations;
c.  To  maintain  the  stability  of  the  internal  and  external  value  of  the 
currency; and
d.  To  foster  economic  development  within  the  scope  of  the  above 
objectives. 
      Based on CBC’s objectives on the maintenance of financial stability, the 
CBC has legal authority to provide the liquidity to the financial institutions 
in the event that financial institutions have a liquidity problem. 
2.2   As Financial Regulators
  There are many financial regulators including CBC, FSC, Council 
of Agriculture (COA) and the municipal or county (city) government, and 
Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) in Taiwan. Pursuant to 
the CBC Act, the CBC is conferred supervisory authority in accordance 
with the powers and functions authorised in the Act. The CBC could also 
undertake the examination of the operations of all financial institutions in 
Taiwan.
       Since  July  2004,  the  FSC  has  been  an  integrated  regulator 
responsible for the development, monitoring, regulation, and examination 
of financial markets and financial enterprises except agricultural financial 
institutions in Taiwan. After the establishment of the FSC, the CBC only 241
conducts  target  examination  with  focus  on  monetary  policy,  foreign 
exchange  policy,  credit  policy,  and  payment  and  settlement  issues. 
However, based on the legal objectives, the CBC still conducts off-site 
monitoring through information system to screen warning signals from 
various financial institutions. 
  
   Regarding  agricultural  financial  institutions,  the  Council  of 
Agriculture (COA) and the municipal or county (city) government are the 
competent authorities responsible for oversight of the agricultural financial 
institutions based on the Agricultural Finance Law.
       In addition, the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) is 
empowered under the Deposit Insurance Act to undertake deposit insurance 
business,  extend  assistance  to  an  insured  institution  whose  business 
operations are unsound, and to take conservatorship or receivership over 
problematic institutions subject to related laws, etc.
       There is a liaison committee comprising the CBC, FSC, CDIC, 
and COA. This committee provides a forum for the discussion of financial 
supervisory  issues  including  liquidity  problem  among  its  members. 
Generally, the meeting of the committee is held on a quarterly basis.
2.3   Liquidity Providers
      Pursuant to the CBC Act, the CBC may provide accommodations to 
banks. In the light of financial conditions, the CBC may purchase and sell 
in the open market the bonds issued or guaranteed by the government, 
financial bonds issued by banks and bills accepted or guaranteed by banks. 
For the purpose of regulating monetary conditions, the CBC may issue 
certificates of deposits, savings bonds and short-term bonds, and may 
purchase and sell them in the open market. By the above measures, the 
CBC may provide liquidity to individual institutions during normal time 
or crisis time. 
2.4   Central Bank’s Requirement Regarding Banks’ Liquidity    
  Measurement and  Management    
        There  are  three  major  requirements  regarding  financial 
institutions’ liquidity measurement and management prescribed by the 
CBC. Specifically, they are the required reserve ratio, liquid reserve ratio, 
and limits on maturity mismatch. 
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  2.4.1   Required Reserve Ratio
   According to the “Regulations Governing the Audit and Adjustment 
of Deposit and Other Liability Reserves of Financial Institutions” prescribed 
by the Central Bank, the types and required reserve ratios of deposits for 
which  financial  institutions,  including  domestic  banks,  local  branches 
of foreign banks, credit cooperative associations, credit departments of 
farmers’ associations, and credit departments of fishermen’s associations, 
shall set aside reserves are as follows:
a.   Checking deposits (10.75%)
b.   Demand deposits (9.775%) 
c.   Savings  deposits,  including  passbook  savings  deposits 
(5.50%), and time savings deposits (4.00%) 
d.   Time  deposits  (5.00%  including  time  deposits,  negotiable 
certificates  of  deposits,  and  time  deposits  of  postal  fixed 
savings)
  The various liabilities other than NTD deposits for which financial 
institutions shall set aside reserves are as follows:
a.   Foreign currency deposits
b.   Interbank overdrafts
c.   Interbank call loans
d.   Bank debentures
e.   Interbank financing
f.   Interbranch transactions  
g.   Borrowings  for  time  payments  or  repurchase  agreements 
(bills)
h.   Other liabilities specified by the CBC
     The current required reserve ratio of foreign currency deposits is 
0.125%. The required reserve ratios of the other liabilities are 0%.
       Actual reserves set aside by financial institutions for items which 
require reserves, shall be limited to the following assets:
a.   Cash in vaults;
b.   Deposits in reserve accounts with the Department of Banking 
of the CBC or Trustee Institution; and243
c.   Deposits that have been approved by the CBC for placement 
in “Interbank Funds Transfer Guarantee Special Accounts” 
with the Department of Banking of the CBC or to special 
accounts of similar properties with Trustee Institutions.
     The calculation period used as the basis for calculating the amount 
of legally required reserves to be set aside by financial institutions shall be 
from the first day of each month through the month’s end. The maintenance 
period for the setting aside of actual reserves by financial institutions shall 
be from the fourth day of each month to the third day of the following 
month.
     In the event that the actual daily average reserve balance for a 
financial institution during a given reserve maintenance period fails to 
meet the Legally Required Reserve Balance, the financial institution may 
apply to offset the shortfall by the excess reserve of prior period within 
the limit of 1% of required reserve for the prior period. For shortfalls in 
excess of one percent, or the balances which are not replenished, those 
financial institutions will be charged penalty interest at 1.5 times the Bank’s 
unsecured short-term accommodation interest rate without collateral, and 
in serious circumstances they will be disciplined pursuant to the provisions 
of the Banking Act.
 2.4.2 Liquid Reserve Ratio   
  In order to manage the liquidity of banks, Article 25 of the CBC 
Act requires the CBC to prescribe for banks a minimum ratio of their 
liquid assets to various liabilities. The minimum liquid reserve ratio is 7% 
currently.
     According to the “Directions for Auditing Liquidity of Financial 
Institutions”  prescribed  by  the  CBC,  all  items  of  NTD-denominated 
liabilities of financial institutions shall be subject to a minimum liquid 
reserve ratio requirement. 
  The items of NTD-denominated liabilities are as follows:
a.   Checking deposits (including checking deposits and certified 
checks);
b.   Demand deposits;244
c.   Savings deposits (including passbook savings deposits, lump–
deposit/ lump-payment savings deposits, installment-deposit/
lump–payment  savings  deposits,  lump-deposit/installment-
payment  savings  deposits,  interest-withdrawal  savings 
deposits,  and  bank  employees’  savings  accounts,  provided 
those portions already pledged are deducted); 
d.   Time deposits (including time savings deposits and negotiable 
certificate of deposit, provided those portions already pledged 
are deducted); 
f.   Government Treasury deposits (the net balance after deducting 
the re-deposits at the CBC’s Treasury Department);
g.   Net dues to banks in call loan market;   
h.   Bills/bonds sold under repurchase agreements; and
i.   Other liabilities as designated by the CBC.
  
        Qualified liquid reserve assets for financial institutions shall be 
limited to the following new Taiwan dollar-denominated assets:
a.   Excess reserves;
b.   Net dues from banks in call loan market;
c.   Re-deposits at designated banks with term to maturity of no 
more than one year (either bank re-deposits with the CBC or 
grassroots financial institution (including CCA, CDFA, CDFI) 
re-deposits with banks mandated by the CBC);
d.   Certificates of deposit issued by the CBC;
e.   Government bonds;
f.   Treasury bills;
g.   NTD-denominated bonds issued in Taiwan by international 
financial organisations approved both by the CBC and the 
FSC;  and  NTD-denominated  corporate  bonds  issued  in 
Taiwan by foreign issuers in accordance with the “Regulations 
Governing  the Offering and Issuance of Securities by Foreign 
Securities Issuers”;
h.   Negotiable certificates of deposit (net balance of each bank’s 
holdings after deducting negotiable certificates of deposit it 
has issued);
i.   Bank debentures (including subordinate bank debentures, the 
amount of which being limited to the net-debit position of its 
bank debentures issued by other banks after subtracting those 
issued by itself);245
j.   Banker’s acceptances (net balance of each bank’s holdings 
after deducting drafts it has accepted) are limited to those 
purchased from money market;
k.   Trade acceptances are limited to those purchased from money 
market; 
l.   Commercial papers (net balance of each bank’s holdings after 
deducting face value of commercial papers it has guaranteed) 
are limited to those purchased from money market;
m.  Corporate bonds (net balance of each bank’s holdings after 
deducting face value of corporate bonds it has guaranteed); 
and
n.   Other liquid assets as approved by the CBC.
   
      The amounts of qualified liquid reserve assets listed in Items (d) 
through (n) shall be calculated according to the following rules:
A.   For  assets  classified  as  “financial  assets  held  for  trading”  and 
“financial assets designated as at fair value through profit or loss” 
recorded  under  “financial  assets  at  fair  value  through  profit  or 
loss”,  the  amount  shall  be  that  after  adding/deducting  valuation 
adjustment.
B.   For  assets  classified  as  “available-for-sale  financial  assets”,  the 
amount shall be that after deducting accumulated impairment loss 
and adding/deducting valuation  adjustment.
C.   For  assets  classified  as  “held-to-maturity  financial  assets”  or 
“non-active market debt instruments”, the following rules shall be 
applied:
i.   For assets listed in Items (d) through (f), the amount is 
that after deducting accumulated impairment loss.
ii.   For assets listed in Items (g) through (n) shall not serve as 
liquid reserve assets.
  Financial institutions shall put up the liquid reserves on a monthly 
basis. According to the regulation, financial institutions shall compile the 
“Liquid Reserves Adjustment Report” on a monthly basis and submit it 
together with related detailed schedules before the 15th of the following 
month to CBC or appointed banks for examination.246
  2.4.3 Limits on Maturity Mismatch
     In order to monitor the mismatch of major sources of funds and major 
uses of funds, banks are required to report “Term to Maturity Analysis of 
NTD Assets/Liabilities” to FSC on a monthly basis. The CBC downloads 
all the data from FSC for review. Banks shall also report to the CBC the 
historical experience and other parameters used in preparing the “Terms 
to  Maturity Analysis  of  NTD Assets/Liabilities”.  Where  the  negative 
funding gap from the flow-of-funds in the next one to thirty days exceeds 
the specific value set by the CBC, the bank shall immediately report to the 
CBC providing explanations and proposing measures for improvement. 
The CBC will forward the results of offsite monitoring to the FSC or the 
COA for administrative management.
      According to the regulation, the negative funding gap over total NTD 
assets within one month is not allowed to exceed the specific values. The 
specific values are –5% of total NTD assets for commercial banks, -10% 
of total NTD assets for industrial banks, and –15% of total NTD assets for 
the export-import bank.
3.   Dynamics and Determinants of Liquidity Risk 
3.1   Liquidity Profile in Taiwan’s Financial System
       Due to the global financial crisis, liquidity has been injected to 
stimulate the economic growth as the Central Bank lowered the rediscount 
rate and rates on accommodations 9 times from March 2008 to February 
2009. 
       Considering  the  instability  of  both  domestic  and  international 
financial  markets  and  for  the  sake  of  maintaining  public  confidence 
and providing full protection to depositors, the government in Taiwan 
announced a temporary guarantee for all deposits their full amount. The 
temporary measure takes effect from October 7, 2008 until December 31, 
2010.
       After the adjustments, every domestic bank met the regulatory 
liquidity ratio requirement of 7% in June 2009. The average liquidity ratio 
was 28.31% for domestic banks as a whole, increasing by 5.61 percentage 
points, up from 22.70% at the end of 2008. Liquidity in the domestic 
banking sector has been increasing.247
3.2   Development of Liquidity Risk Indicators
3.2.1 Funding Liquidity
Due to the government maintaining an accommodative monetary 
policy stance, most banks have excess regulatory reserve in June 2009. 
The excess regulatory reserve reached NTD4,046 billion as of end-June 
2009. Deposit growth rate still kept rising. The deposit growth rate was 
11.5% as of end-June 2009, 3.8 percentage points up from 7.7% as of end-
2008. Primarily led by banks’ conservative attitude toward lending, loan-
to-deposit ratios have recorded a decreasing trend over the last two years. 
The loan- to-deposit ratio was 76.8% as of end-June 2009, 8.0 percentage 
points down from 84.8% as of end-2007. The funding liquidity indicators 
are shown in as Figure 6.  
Figure 6
Funding Liquidity Indicators (at end of year)
Indicators 2006 2007 2008 June 2009
Excess regulatory reserve** 2,876 2,495 3,017 4,287
Ratio of excess liquidity to required 
reserves
227.8 193.7 224.3 304.4
Ratio of liquid asset in relation to 
short-term liabilities*** 22.95 20.56 22.70 28.31
Loan- to-deposit ratio 83.8 84.8 81.7 76.8
Deposit growth (YoY) 4.4 3.0 7.7 11.5
Note 1: The figures in this figure only include domestic banks.  
Note 2: The figures of excess regulatory reserve are in billions of NTD.
**   Excess regulatory reserve is liquid asset minus regulatory reserve requirement
***  The short-term liabilities include deposits, net dues to banks in call loan    
  market, Bills/bonds sold under repurchase agreements, etc.
  3.2.2 Market Liquidity
3.2.2.1 Stock Price Movement  
  Motivated by the developments of cross-strait economic and trade 
issues after the presidential election in March 2008, the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange Weighted Index (TAIEX) of the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) 
market trended upward and reached a high of 9,295 in mid-May 2008. 
Afterward, two gigantic US mortgage lenders (Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac),  Lehman  Brothers,  and AIG  faced  difficult  financial  conditions, 
and  the  consequent  blow  to  market  confidence  prompted  major  stock 248
markets around the world to slump, setting new record one-day percentage 
declines. Due to the global stock market crash and foreign investors’ net 
selling, the TAIEX then fell back to 5,719 at the end of September 2008, 
down 38.47% compared to its highest closing level in 2008. The TAIEX 
index stopped falling and fluctuated in 2009. The main reasons behind this 
rebound were the net buying of foreign investors, inflows of residents’ 
portfolio  investments  from  abroad  and  the  emerging  effects  of  easing 
restrictions on cross-strait securities investment.
Meanwhile, Taiwan’s GTSM Index (the over-the-counter or OTC 
index) basically tracked the movements of the TAIEX, falling sharply 
after hitting a peak of 163 in May 2008, and then declining to 83 at the end 
of September, a decrease of 49.08% from its highest closing level in 2008 
(Figure 7). Following measures taken by the government to stimulate the 
economy, both TAIEX and GTSM Index rebounded from March 2009. 
Figure 7
Taiwan Stock Market Indices
TAIEX volatility began to come down after hitting a peak of 33.67% 
in mid-March 2008, dropping below 20% in mid-June 2008, but it climbed 
again in July owing to the global stock market crash. With the volatility 
on the TWSE market and the OTC market in September 2008 reaching 
a record five-year high of 38.85% and 43.35% (Figure 8), respectively, 
the risks in stock investments have risen significantly. Market volatility 
subsided from its peak and stood at 30.74% and 30.52% for TWSE and 249
OTC markets, respectively, at the end of April 2009. Although market 
volatility moderated somewhat, the risk in equity investments remained.
Figure 8
Stock Price Volatility
Note: Volatility refers to the annualised standard deviation of 60-day daily index returns.
Sources: TWSE, GTSM, and CBC.
3.2.2.2 Volume of Stock Transactions   
      As the global stock market turned bearish, the TWSE market cooled 
down during the first three quarters of 2008, with a dramatic decrease 
in  trading  value.  However,  as  the  result  of  market  value  tracking  the 
movements of trading value, turnover ratio in terms of trading value on the 
TWSE still posted 152.25%, down slightly from 153.28% in 2007. After 
reaching a peak of 382.81% in 2007, the turnover ratio in the OTC market 
plummeted to 247.53%, with a dramatic decrease in trading value during 
the first three quarters of 2008 (Figure 9). In order to mitigate the impact of 
the extreme volatility in international stock markets from late September 
2008, the FSC temporarily suspended all short selling and narrowed the 
daily percentage fall limit from the existing 7% to 3.5%. Consequently, 
the  trading  value  of  all  -  and  OTC-listed  stocks  contracted  markedly, 
leading to a lower turnover ratio and weakened market liquidity. Trading 
value started to increase slowly after the FSC resumed the 7% down-limit, 
effective from 27 October 2008. In early 2009, the trading value in the 
TWSE market continued to shrink.250
Figure 9
Annual Turnover Ratio in Taiwan’s Stock Markets
Note: 2008 Q1 are annualised results of the accumulated monthly turnover ratios.                       
Sources: TWSE and GTSM  
Nevertheless, it began to expand from March 2009. The monthly 
average turnover ratio of the TWSE market moved in an upward direction 
and maintained a level of 146.2% in Q1of 2009. The monthly average 
turnover ratio of the OTC also increased modestly to 252.28% in Q1of 
2009. 
3.2.2.3 Volume and Bid-ask Spread of Bond Transactions 
In the bond market, both trading value and monthly turnover rate 
expanded in Q1 of 2008 due to sizable capital inflows. However, trading 
activities cooled from Q2 of 2008 onwards as financial institutions sought 
to reduce their spare funds through purchases of bonds, causing bond 
yields to decrease, which in turn discouraged bond trading. The monthly 
turnover rate fell noticeably to a trough of 25.75% in July, a five-year low. 
In August, both bond trading value and monthly turnover rate rebounded 
slightly as investors redirected funds from the lackluster equity markets 
into the bond market, but they still remained in low gear (Figure 10). 251
Figure 10
Bond Market Size and Turnover
Notes:   1.  Monthly turnover ratio = trading value in the month / average bonds    
       issued outstanding.
  2.     Average bonds issued outstanding = (bonds issued outstanding at the end of
                     this month + bonds issued outstanding at the end of the previous month) / 2 
Sources: CBC and FSC.
 If we focus on government bond and state-enterprise bonds, the 
annual turnover ratios fell significantly from 29.0 in 2006 to 8.1 in 2008. 
The major factor is that most traders would like to keep bonds on hand 
due to a loose monetary policy in recent years. In Taiwan, The volume 
of government bond transactions concentrated on 10-year government 
bonds. The bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds did not display 
too much fluctuation. In 2009, from Q1 to Q3 the turnover ratio of outright 
transactions and the trading volume of repo transactions in the bond market 
remained at a low level.
 In 2008, due to the international financial crisis, the liquidity 
premium between 5-year twAAA2 corporate bonds and 5-year government 
bonds reached 109.48 basis points. However, in 2009, the premium began 
to drop. The market liquidity indicators are presented in Figure 11.
2.   The credit rating “tw” is applied in Taiwan.  252
Figure 11 
Market Liquidity Indicators (at end of year)
Indicators 2006 2007 2008 June 2009
Bid-ask spread of 5-year 
government bonds
0.004018 0.005801 0.00542 0.011899
Bid-ask spread of 10-year 
government bonds
0.000846 0.000384 0.00073 0.002269
Liquidity premium
14.83 bp 17.94 bp 109.48 bp 73.88 bp
Turnover ratio of 
government bond
29.0 13.5 8.1 2.8
Turnover ratio of 
government, central bank, 
and state-enterprise bonds
24.0 12.5 7.5 2.6
Note 1:  Average yearly bid-ask spread of government bonds S= (PA-PB)/ ((PA+PB)/2) 
where S is spread, PA is the closing ask price, and PB is the closing bid price
Note 2:  Liquidity premium is year-end yield spread between 5-year twAAA corporate 
bonds and 5-year government bonds 
Note 3:  Turnover ratio is the volume traded during the year/outstanding volume at year-
end
3.2.2.4 Volume of Interbank Market
The average monthly trading volume of interbank call loans was off 
15.84% year- on-year from January through September of 2008, but both 
the trading volume and outstanding amount of interbank call loans trended 
upwards from August 2008 onwards (Figure 12), indicating that allocation 
of funding resources was somewhat uneven along with a rise in demand 
for interbank call loans. The average monthly trading volume of interbank 
call loans from January through September of 2008 consisted mainly of 
overnight call loans, accounting for 54.19% of average interbank call-loan 
transactions over the same period, a slight increase compared to the same 
period last year, followed by one-week call loans, with a declining share 
of 26.80%. Since October of 2008, the average monthly trading volume of 
interbank call loans has begun decreasing resulting in excess liquidity in 
banking sector. In May 2009, the trading volume rebounded sharply then 
began to drop. 253
Figure 12
Interbank Call-loan Market
Note: Amount outstanding indicates average daily trading volume of the month
Source: CBC.
3.2.2.5 Volume of Bill Market
The transactions in the bill market include treasury bills, negotiable 
certificates  of  deposits,  banker’s  acceptances,  trade  acceptances,  and 
commercial papers. The outstanding amount of bill issuance increased in 
early 2008 but declined in June 2008. In September of 2008, the figure 
declined by 9.14% compared to the previous year-end, primarily because 
of a marked reduction in the outstanding issuance of treasury bills, while 
that of commercial paper rose by 6.40%. Affected by a rise in the issuance 
of commercial paper, the secondary market saw an expansion in trading 
volume in the first half of 2008. The average monthly trading volume rose 
by 9.27% year-on-year from January through September of 2008 (Figure 
13). The primary market also saw an expansion in the outstanding issuance 
in the early of 2009 then dropped steeply in Q3 of 2009. 254
Figure 13
Primary and Secondary Bill Markets
Note: Excluding ABCP.
Source: CBC.
3.2.2.6 The Short-term and Long-term Interest Rate    
In 2008, the average overnight interbank call-loan rate increased 
steadily in response to rate hikes by the CBC, peaking at 2.166% in July, 
and then fell back to 2.092% in September as the CBC shrank the issuance 
of certificates of deposit to maintain market liquidity at an appropriate level 
against the backdrop of unfavorable financial conditions domestically and 
overseas. Interest rates on bills first rose and then fell, with the average 
rate on 1-30 day commercial paper in the secondary market falling to 
2.01% in September after rising slightly to 2.03% in July 2008. As for 
long-term interest rates, the yield on 10-year government bonds began a 
gradual rise in Q2 of 2008, peaking at 2.82% in mid-June on the back of a 
rebound in equity prices, rate hikes by the CBC, and heightened inflation 
expectations. The bond yield dipped appreciably afterwards and registered 
2.15% in September 2008. This was led by increasing inflows of funds 
into the bond market supported by the CBC’s rate cuts and expanded Repo 
facility operations (Figure 14). 255
Figure 14
Yield Spreads
Note: Yield spread refers to yield on 10-year government bonds minus yield on 90-day 
commercial papers.
Source: Bloomberg.
The spread between the yields of 10-year government bonds and 
90-day commercial papers began to widen in Q2 of 2008 as bond yields 
trended upwards. Bond yields dropped noticeably afterward, resulting in 
a convergence of yield spreads between 10-year government bonds and 
90-day commercial papers. The yield spreads even became negative in 
mid-September and troughed at -20 basis points (Figure 14). Declining 
bond yields are unfavorable to financial institutions, which use short-
term financing to fund long-term bond positions, despite the fact that 
they generate capital gains for financial institutions holding long bond 
positions. Due to a loose monetary policy, the yield on 90-day commercial 
papers went down enormously from the end of 2008. The spread between 
the yields of 10-year government bonds and 90-day commercial papers 
began to widen in 2009.
3.2.2.7 Factors Affecting Liquidity in Taiwan
There are many factors affecting liquidity of banks in Taiwan. 
These are loss of confidence, contagion effect, inadequate liquidity risk 
management,  asset-liability  mismatch,  global  financial  crisis,  growing 256
concentration  in  assets  or  liabilities,  and  trading  losses.  Sometimes, 
it is difficulty to figure out which one is the most important factor. In 
general, while an individual institution suffers from huge loss, it will 
lose the confidence from customers and transaction counterparties. Then 
contagion effect will happen after depositors withdraw their money from 
the institution and the line of credit is suspended by its counterparties. 
Some institutions may find out that they could not deal with their liquidity 
problem resulting from the contagion effect. 
3.2.2.8 Public Disclosure on Liquidity Risk
      All banks in Taiwan must disclose their liquidity situation on their own 
websites every quarter including mismatch gaps, balance sheet and income 
statement, capital adequacy ratio, asset quality, earning, and market risk, 
etc. The CBC also discloses major financial ratios including mismatch 
gaps over net worth of domestic banks on website. If one bank has any 
incidental event, it is necessary to make announcement on the market 
observation post system. The disclosures would broaden the impact of 
liquidity risk. In order to alleviate stress from liquidity problem, banks 
are required to incorporate a standard operating procedure to handle the 
situation in their contingency plan.        
   
3.2.2.9 Identification of Channels of Vulnerabilities
      
In Taiwan, there are two ways to identify the vulnerabilities of 
liquidity risk, specifically, on-site examination and off-site monitoring by 
regulators. 
In on-site examination, the examiners perform an assessment of a 
bank’s overall liquidity risk management framework and the adequacy of 
their liquidity. Based on a checklist, the risk tolerance of a bank and the 
effectiveness of a bank’s process to measure and monitor liquidity risk are 
the major targets to assess.
In off-site monitoring, monitoring call reports received, such as 
required reserve ratio, liquid reserve ratio, and term to maturity analysis 
of assets and liability, from banks to regulators are the major methods 
to assess liquidity risk. Sometimes regular communication with a bank 
senior management and the board of directors are part of the regulators’ 
channel.257
3.2.2.10 Linkages between Funding and Market Liquidity Risks
The  CBC  conducts  daily  supervision  on  individual  financial 
institutions through off-site monitoring which focuses on funding liquidity 
risk. Every quarter, the CBC produces a warning list to the monitoring 
team  of  problem  institutions  established  under  the  CBC  to  assess  the 
potential risk on funding liquidity. The CBC also organises an analysis 
team to watch market liquidity risk for macro-prudential purpose. Some of 
the financial soundness indicators regarding market liquidity are installed, 
including  the  turnover  ratio  of  trading  value  in  stock  market  and  the 
monthly average turnover ratio in bond market. Every six months the CBC 
integrates funding liquidity data and market liquidity data and completes 
a detail financial stability report for internal reference. After numerous 
discussions with FSC, CDIC and some experts from universities, the CBC 
publishes a formal financial stability report for the general public every 
year.    
   
4.   Liquidity Risk Management in Banking  
4.1   Past Developments
      The CBC prescribes three major requirements for financial institutions 
with  regard  to  liquidity  measurement  and  management,  namely,  the 
required  reserve  ratio,  liquid  reserve  ratio,  and  limits  on  maturity 
mismatch.  All  the  deposit  taking  institutions  (including  banks,  credit 
cooperation  associations,  credit  departments  of  farmers’  associations, 
and credit departments of fishermen’s associations) are required to file 
monthly reports regarding the required reserve ratio and liquid reserve 
ratio to CBC. Banks are also required to file “Terms to Maturity Analysis 
of NTD Assets/Liabilities” to FSC. The CBC then retrieves the data from 
the FSC for monitoring purpose. If any financial institutions violate the 
requirements, the CBC will forward the deficiencies to FSC or COA for 
supervisory purpose.
4.2   Current Practices: An Application of Historical Experience 
In order to monitor the mismatch of major sources of funds and 
major uses of funds, banks are required to report to the CBC the historical 
experience and other parameters used in preparing the “Terms to Maturity 
Analysis of NTD Assets/Liabilities” (Figure 15). The CBC requires that the 
negative funding gap over total NTD assets within one month should not 258
exceed the specific values. The specific values are –5% of total NTD assets 
for commercial banks, -10% of total NTD assets for industrial banks, and 
–15% of total NTD assets for the export-import bank. In practice, banks 
file different parameters based on their historical experience for approval. 
The items include demand deposits, undrawn commitments, credit card 
loan, etc. The following methods are adopted to calculate the parameters 
by banks. 259
Figure 15












1. Inflow of funds






















1. Method A (fluctuation under a gentle trend) 
2. Method B (fluctuation under a larger scale)
Method A (fluctuation under a gentle trend)
Step 1: Downloading Historical Data
At first, banks should download historical data at least 24 months. Banks 
may pick out the highest and lowest outstanding of demand deposits from 
each month. Then the average outstanding of demand deposits from each 
month will be calculated. 260
Step 2: Calculating the ratio of fluctuation
Banks should calculate the ratio of fluctuation from each month. The 
formula is as follows:
DN = (AN – BN) ÷ C N. 
AN: the highest outstanding of demand deposits in nth month.
BN: the lowest outstanding of demand deposits in nth month.
CN: the average outstanding of demand deposits in nth month.
DN: the ratio of fluctuation in nth month.
   
Step 3: Calculating the Average Ratio of Fluctuation
The formula is as follows:
R1= (DN-1+DN+2…. + DN-24)/ 24 
(On the assumption that banks have 24 months’ observation data) 
R1: the average ratio of fluctuation within one month.
    
Step 4: Calculating Expected Outflow within One Month
The formula is as follows:
  G1 = F × R1
F: the outstanding of demand deposits on calculating date. G1: expected 
outflow within one month.
Step 5: Calculating Expected Outflow from Different Maturity 
Buckets 
Option 1 (The simple approach)
31-90 days (G2):     G1 × 2 
91-180 days (G3):    G1 × 3 
181- 1 year (G4):     G1 × 6
More than 1 year (G5): F-(G1+G2+G3+G4)
A maturity distribution in different maturity buckets is tabulated as 
follows:









More than 1 
year
Total
Demand deposits G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 F261
Option 2 (The advanced approach)
Banks should calculate the average ratio of fluctuation within 3 months, 6 
months, and 1 year based on the approaches used from Step 1 to Step 4. A 
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More than 1 
year
Total
  Ratios R1 Q2 H2 Y2
Demand deposits F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F
R1: the average ratio of fluctuation within one month.
Q1: the average ratio of fluctuation within one quarter.
H1: the average ratio of fluctuation within a half year.
Y1: the average ratio of fluctuation within a year.
Q2=Q1-R1 (the average ratio of fluctuation between 31-90 days)
H2=H1-Q1 (the average ratio of fluctuation between 91-180 days)
Y2=Y1-H1 (the average ratio of fluctuation between 181 days -1 year)
F1=F×R1 (expected outflow within one month)
F2=F×Q2 (expected outflow between 31-90 days)
F3=F×H2 (expected outflow between 91-180 days)
F4=F×Y2 (expected outflow between 181 days -1 year)
F5=F-F1-F2-F3-F4 (expected outflow more than 1 year)
Method B (fluctuation under a larger scale)
Step 1: Downloading Historical Data
At first, banks should download historical data for at least 24 months. 
Secondly,  banks  may  pick  out  the  highest  and  lowest  outstanding  of 
demand deposits from each month. If the average ratio of fluctuation 
within one month is over 8.33%, banks may pick out the lowest figure (L) 
from the observation data. 
Step 2: Calculating the Ratio of Fluctuation
Banks should calculate the average ratio of fluctuation within 1 month, 3 
months, 6 months, and 1 year based on the approaches used on Method A 
from Step 2 to Step 3.
Step 3: Calculating Expected Outflow within One Month
The formula is as follows:
  G1 = F × R1262
F: the outstanding of demand deposits on calculating date. G1: expected 
outflow from demand deposits within one month.
Step  4:  Calculating  Expected  Outflow  from  Different  Maturity 
Buckets
The lowest figure (L) from the observation data may be regarded as long-
term deposit and be classified into more than 1 year interval. 
31-90 days (G2): G1 × 2 
91-180 days (G3): G1 × 3 
181- 1 year (G4): F-L- (G1+G2+G3)











More than 1 
year
Total
Demand deposits G1 G2 G3 G4 L F
G3 and G4 may be zero if the fluctuation of deposits is bigger than 8.33%.
B. Undrawn Commitments
Step 1: Calculating Drawn Amounts of Commitments
At first, banks should download historical data at least 12 months. Secondly, 
banks may calculate drawn amounts of commitments from each month. 
Step 2: Calculating the Ratios of Drawn Amounts 
The formula of the ratio of drawn amounts is as follows:
Rn=An÷Un-1
Rn: the ratio of drawn amounts in nth month
An: the drawn amounts of commitments in nth month
Un-1: the outstanding of undrawn commitments at the end of n - 1 month.  
Step 3: Calculating the Average Ratio of Drawn Amounts
The formula is as follows:
RA= (R1+R2+R3…+Rn) ÷n
(On the assumption that banks have n months’ observation data)
RA: the average ratio of drawn amounts263
Step  4:  Calculating  Expected  Outflow  of  Undrawn  Commitments 
from Different Maturity Buckets
C=RA×U
U: the outstanding of undrawn commitments on calculating date.
C: expected outflow from undrawn commitments within one month.
A maturity distribution in different maturity buckets is tabulated as 
follows:







More than 1 
year
Total
Undrawn commitments C C×2 C×3 C×6 U-C×12 U
C. Credit Cards
Step 1: Calculating Full Repayment of the Outstanding Balance from 
Each Month
At first, banks should download historical data at least 12 months. 
Secondly, banks may calculate full repayment of the outstanding balance 
from each month.  
Step 2: Calculating Partial Repayment of the Outstanding Balance 
from Each Month
Banks may calculate partial repayment of the outstanding balance from 
each month.
Step 3: Calculating the Average Ratio of Full Repayment and Partial 
Repayment of the Outstanding Balance from Each Month
Banks may calculate the average ratio of full repayment of the 
outstanding balance from each month (RT). Then banks may calculate 
average ratio of partial repayment of the outstanding balance from each 
month (RP). 
Step 4: Calculating the Average NPL Ratio of Credit Card Loans from 
Each Month
Banks may calculate the average non-performing loans (NPL) ratio of 
credit card loans from each month (RN).
Step  5:  Calculating  Expected  Inflow  of  Credit  Card  Loans  from 
Different Maturity Buckets 
C: the outstanding of credit card loans on calculating date.264
L1=C× (RT+RP) ( the expected inflow of credit card loans within 1 month)
LP=C×RP (expected inflow of partial repayment of the outstanding 
balance within 1 month)
L2=LP×2 (expected inflow of credit card loans from 31 days to 90 days)
L3=LP×3 (expected inflow of credit card loans from 91 days to 180 days)
L4=C-L1-L2-L3-RN×C (expected inflow of credit card loans from 181 days 
to 1 year)
A maturity distribution in different maturity buckets is tabulated as 
follows:









More than 1 
year
Total
Credit cards  L1 L2 L3 L4 C×RN C
5.   Lessons Learned in Taiwan  
       Resulting from the global financial crisis in 2008, a few banks 
suffered losses from their foreign investments. After the disclosure of their 
financial status, these banks addressed their deposit drain in a systematic 
way. 
      In order to meet the requirements of the CBC, these banks set three 
phases to improve their liquidity as follows:
Phase I
(1)  Banks applied for short-term accommodation to the CBC with 
securities sold under repurchase agreements. The security was 
certificates of deposit issued by the CBC.  
(2)  Banks  applied  for  short-term  accommodation  by  drawing 
promissory  notes  payable  to  the  CBC.  The  promissory  note 
should be secured by certificates of deposit issued by the CBC, 
government bonds, and treasury bills.
(3)  Banks suspended some large amount of loans.
(4)  Banks  pushed  a  series  of  projects  for  deposits  taking  under 
preferential interest rates. 
Phase II
Banks applied for short-term accommodation to the CBC. Banks should 
provide eligible bills or securities consented by the CBC as collaterals.265
Phase III
Banks disposed liquid assets with a small impact on price.
  Due  to  the  Taiwanese  government  implementing  a  blanket 
protection for deposits on October 7, 2008, these problem banks only 
implemented Phase I to recover their liquidity status to stable within a 
short period of time. However, in order to improve the potential liquidity 
problem, these banks took some corrective measures. The followings are 
the major measures for banks to take:
a.   To reduce the percentage of deposits from investment trust funds 
and corporate firms and some wholesale counterparties.
b.   To raise the percentage of deposits from core deposits.
c.   To set a long-term (one-year) maturity mismatch limit in 
accordance with the risk tolerance 
d.   To maintain strong relationships with fund providers.
e.   To conduct stress tests on an annual basis for a variety of short-
term and market-wide stress scenarios. 
Another issue is that some foreign banks received deposits and injected 
most of funds into their foreign affiliated units. As some of the international 
banks faced financial difficulty, the CBC and FSC found it necessary to 
establish a mechanism to protect depositors in Taiwan.  
   
6.   Conclusions and Future Direction 
6.1   Conclusions
Liquidity risk is a common problem faced by banks. Policies which 
are soundly formulated for holding liquid assets or ready access to markets 
for borrowed funds are normally adequate to meet deposit withdrawals. 
However, large withdrawals can cause asset liquidity problems which can 
be compounded by incentives for liability claimholders to engage in runs 
at the first sign of a liquidity problem.
After the global financial crisis, a few Taiwanese banks faced net 
deposit drains. Although they did not face the need to liquidate their assets 
at low fire-sale prices, they came under tremendous pressure to meet their 266
financial claims. For financial stability and for the sake of maintaining 
public confidence, it was necessary for the government to provide full 
protection  to  depositors.  However,  this  temporary  measure  must  have 
a  deadline  to  avoid  moral  hazard.  The  development  of  liquidity  risk 
indicators is essential for regulators. In order to monitor liquidity risk, the 
government implemented some measurements such as required reserve 
ratio, liquid reserve ratio, and limits on maturity mismatch. Following 
numerous  discussions  with  banks,  the  CBC  developed  a  historical 
experience framework for the mismatch of major sources of funds and 
major uses of funds. A few Taiwanese banks also learned some lessons 
from  experiencing  liquidity  problem  and  developed  a  more  effective 
contingency plan.
6.2     Future Direction
 The central bank’s activities inevitably have an impact on market 
and funding liquidity. The FSC also has authority to impose regulatory 
measures for compliance by financial institutions. From the above analysis, 
the following suggestions are provided for policy consideration:
a.   Local branches of foreign banks be required to lend a minimum 
of 50% of their local deposits to local businesses, 40% of 
which would have to be in the form of NTD-denominated 
assets (a grace period of one year will be granted).
b.   To develop a more sophisticated methodology to estimate the 
expected outflow and inflow. 
c.   To develop a more effective contingency plan based on some 
stress tests.
d.   To establish transparency of trading information to enhance 
market liquidity.
e.   To diversify major source of funds to meet banks’ liquidity.
f.   To determine what kind of information should be submitted 
to supervisors?267
CHAPTER 9
LIQUIDITY MEASUREMENT AND MANAGEMENT IN 
THAILAND 
by Sirinit Rattanapintha1
  Overview of Thai Financial System  1. 
Thailand’s financial sector is relatively large, with assets close 
to  222%  of  Gross  Domestic  Product  at  the  end  of  June  2009.  The 
Thai  financial  system  is  a  crucial  mechanism  facilitating  the  overall 
functioning of the economy, in terms of allocating  resources amongst 
the  economic  sectors,  including  national  production  market,  labor 
market, service market, and money market, by playing a key role as an 
intermediary in distributing funds from surplus sources to deficit sources. 
The  Thai  financial  system  is  bank-based,  although  the  role 
of  capital  markets  and  non-bank  financial  institutions  is  increasingly 
important. After the 1997 crisis, the Thai government expended great 
effort  in  developing  other  markets,  apart  from  the  banking  system, 
including  the  Capital  Market  and  fixed-income  securities  market,  to 
reduce the dependency on the banking sector and enhance overall market 
efficiency by deepening the funding sources and investment alternatives 
for Thai investors. Consequently, this would help provide greater balance 
and sustainability for the economy as a whole. The financial system in 
Thailand has been gradually improving since the 1997 crisis. The key 
players in the system can be classified into the following four categories:
1.  Author is Senior Examiner of the Supervision Group of Bank of Thailand.268
Figure 1
The Thai Financial System
Deposit-taking Financial Institutions 1.1   
Players in this category can take deposit from customers. There are 
several types of players in this group, including domestic banks, restricted 
banks, subsidiary, foreign bank branches, finance companies, and credit 
foncier companies. Domestic banks seem to outperform the market. 
The  deposit-taking  financial  institutions  underwent  a  major 
restructuring over the past decade. This includes: 
Closure and mergers of a number of finance companies; 1. 
Implementation of the Financial Sector Master Plan, resulting  2. 
in new entrants, mergers, and the formation of new banking 
conglomerates; and
Ownership  changes  from  private  bank  recapitalisation,  3. 
government intervention in banks, and the sale of two banks 
to foreign investors. 
Foreign-owned banks play an important but limited role in the 
Thai financial system. Foreign banks accounted for about 13% of the 
total banking assets as of end-June 2009. In accordance with the Bank of 
Thailand (BOT) rules, they are allowed to establish only a single branch 
in Thailand. Therefore, in light of this branch restriction, the size and the 
scope of their retail banking activities are assuming to be limited. The 
majority of the foreign-owned banks strongly emphasise on wholesale 
banking businesses, like treasury trading, FX trading, and trade finance. 269
In accordance with the Financial Master Plan and One Presence 
Policy,   the BOT tried to encourage finance companies, and credit foncier 
companies to upgrade themselves to have a license of a commercial bank 
or restricted bank.
For over a past decade, the deposit-taking financial institutions went 
through a major restructuring, which includes the closures, mergers and 
acquisition among finance companies, together with the implementation 
of the government’s Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP). This Master 
Plan is aimed at reforming the landscape of the Thai financial sector with 
the aim of creating stability and efficiency in the banking system. The 
FSMP brought about new entrants, mergers, and the formation of new 
banking conglomerates. 
1.2   Non-deposit-taking Financial Institutions
This type of institution consists of leasing, asset management, 
insurance, and securities companies. Insurance companies are supervised 
by the Department of Insurance under the Ministry of Commerce. The 
majority of them are subsidiaries of local banking conglomerates. 
1.3   Stock and Bond Markets     
The Thai bond market is sizable and is dominated by public debt 
instruments. The issuance of corporate debt instruments remains limited. 
For the primary market, the new domestic bonds and bills of exchange 
issued in 2009 reached a total of US$330 billion, a decrease of 3.19% over 
the previous year. While the outstanding  registered bonds  in the ThaiBMA 
(Thai Bond Market Association) totalled US$178 billion as of 30 December 
2009, government bonds  take up the biggest portion with an amount of 
US$65 billion, or an increase of 17.83% over the previous year, followed 
by the BOT bonds of US$55 billion,  with an increase of 24.17% over the 
previous year. Corporate bonds recorded a total of US$32 billion. For the 
secondary market, the trading volume is approximately US$441 billion.
1.4   Specialised Institutions for Financial Sector Resolution
Institutions in this category were created by special purpose as to 
manage and resolve the non-performing loans. 270
2.   Banking Sector in Thailand
Banks  are  the  prominent  players  in  the  financial  system  in 
Thailand. There are many types of banks operating in Thailand nowadays. 
The Thai registered banks can be classified into 14 full licensed banks, 
2 restricted banks, and 1 subsidiary. In addition to the local banks, there 
are 14 foreign bank branches operating in Thailand at present. Restricted 
bank was established pursuant to the Financial Master Plan, to serve and 
operate in the retail and SME banking niche only. This type of bank is not 
permitted to perform FX trading and derivative activities as it might not 
match with its initial objective. This type of license was created with the 
purpose to serve the needs of small-sized firms and retail businesses. 
Clearly, the Thai banking system is currently dominated by the 
domestic banks with total assets making up approximately 87% of the 
assets of the banking system, while the foreign-owned bank accounted 
for merely 13%.  The foreign-owned banks, by law, are only allowed to 
operate a single branch in the country. 
Figure 2
The Thai Banking Sector
The  fundamentals  of  the  Thai  banking  system  continue  to 
strengthen,  with  most  banks  reporting  high  capital  levels  and  solid 
operating profitability. Thai Banks’ return on assets (ROA) fell to 0.88% 
in mid-2009 compared to 1.17% for June 2008. The ROA of the foreign 
bank branches declined as well from 1.45% as of June 2008 to 0.68% in 
June 2009.271
Figure 3
Capitalisation of Banks in Thailand 
As of June 2009, the banking sector continued to strengthen, with 
most banks reporting high capital levels and solid operating profitability. The 
capital position of the Thai commercial banking system remained strong, 
as reflected by the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of approximately 15.83% 
as of June 2009, well above the regulatory minimum requirement of 8.5%. 
Additionally, the ratio of regulatory Tier-1 capital to total assets at 
the end of June 2009 stood at 11.59%, well above the minimum requirement 
of 4.25%.
2.1   Credit Quality  
Credit  quality  in  Thailand  has  improved,  compared  to  the 
previous year, due largely to the recovery of the Thai economy, together 
with tightened lending standards at financial institutions and continued 
acceleration in debt restructuring. The NPL ratios of both the corporate and 
household sectors had levelled off. The delinquency ratio of the corporate 
sector showed signs of stabilisation while that of the household sector 
came down slightly after increasing in the previous year. The overall NPL 
ratio of the banking system has declined to 5.40% as of end-June 2009, 
compared to 6.45% the same period last year. 272
2.2   Profitability
 
Following the crisis in 1997, the banks sought to diversify their 
income base so as not to rely unduly on interest income, and looked 
toward  generating  fee-based  income,  simultaneously  expanding  their 
scope of service to retail markets and small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).  The  diversification  of  bank  lending  portfolio  and  revenue 
base would help improve the concentration risk and earning volatility. 
2.3  Major Uses and Sources of Funds of Thai Banking Sector 
The banks operating in Thailand are deposit-based. Deposits is the 
major funding source and accounts for nearly 70% of the funds, followed 
by equity and borrowing. Nowadays, banks are increasingly issuing bills of 
exchange to capture the excess money in the market since the government 
announced the removal of its full blanket guarantee in the near future.  
Figure 4
Sources of Funds of Thai Banking Sector
With regard to the uses of fund, the bulk of the bank assets which 
stems from lending activities accounts for approximately 62.4% of banks’ 
total  assets,  followed  by  investment  and  interbank  exposure. The  key 
sectors of bank lending are personal loans and manufacturing sector loans 
accounting for 22% each. 273
Figure 5
Uses of Funds of Thai Banking Sector 
2.4   Liquidity Condition in Thai Bank Market     
In 2009, acting out of concern and responding to the challenge 
of the global financial crisis, many banks in Thailand tried to maintain a 
liquidity cushion as a buffer for a stress condition. The liquidity situation 
in Thailand  gradually  continues  to  improve,  with  the  banking  system 
building up on liquid assets. At this time of economic slowdown, with 
cash flow becoming more essential than ever, strengthening liquidity and 
cash management capability are the key concerns of bank management. 
Accordingly, banks in Thailand piled up their own liquidity and deployed 
the  strategy  “Cash  is  King”,  including  an  investment  in  liquid  debt 
instruments  that  would  help  them  better  manage  their  own  liquidity 
position and simultaneously enhance yield. These instruments included 
Government bonds, the Bank of Thailand, and State-owned Enterprise 
bonds. The banks’ deposit base remains strong.  274
Figure 6
Trend of Liquid Asset and Deposit & Borrowing (2005 -2009 )
  Furthermore, the liquidity ratio gradually went up to 28.1% and 
50.6%  for  Thai  banks  and  foreign-owned  banks,  respectively.  These 
current figures far exceeded the minimum legal requirement of 6%.  This 
is another indicator that reflected the strong position of liquidity in the 
Thai banking system.
  Thai banks had learned many lessons from the past crisis in 1997. 
Therefore, they tried to prevent the problem and paid attention to their 
asset  and  liability  mismatch,  together  with  holding  ample  liquidity  to 
cover any unexpected shortfall in the future. 275
Figure 7
Trend of Liquidity Ratio of Thai Commercial Bank 
and Foreign-owned Bank
  For the liquidity management in the normal business time, banks 
typically establish an organisational function or unit which is responsible 
for the management, measurement and monitoring of liquidity position, 
liquidity forecast and liquidity risk for the bank as a whole and for its 
key subsidiaries. The Treasury Unit is normally responsible for liquidity 
management and asset-liability mismatch, while the Risk Management 
Department is in charge of monitoring and controlling the bank’s liquidity 
risk. The practice in Thai banks is to establish an Asset Liability Committee 
(ALCO) to manage the overall bank liquidity. The committee consists of 
the heads of the relevant departments, including Treasury Department, Risk 
Management, Deposit, Credit lending, and Finance. The ALCO usually 
meets once a month to monitor the bank cash flow movement and assess the 
cash flow projection, reviewing and adjusting the bank’s deposit strategy 
according  to  its  current  cash  flow  condition  and  market  competition. 
  For liquidity management in times of crisis, the banks set up an 
early warning system with indicators that will trigger off in an abnormal 
situation sending out a warning sign of a potential liquidity problem. If 
some of the early-warning indicators are triggered, a unit in charge, like 
Risk Management Unit will analyse the circumstance, report the analysis 
and figures and explain to the ALCO immediately. Normally, the banks 
will establish a separate committee to handle the abnormal situation and to 
structure a proper action plan, contingency funding plan, resolution plan, 
or communication strategy with the public and regulators in an attempt to 
resolve the problem as soon as possible. 276
In conclusion, the liquidity in the banking system remains high. 
In quantity terms, this is reflected in a large surplus of liquid assets and a 
lower loan-to-deposit ratio.
3.   Role of Central Bank in Banks’ Liquidity Management  
3.1   Role and Responsibility of Bank of Thailand  
   
According to the Bank of Thailand Act B.E.2485, as amended by 
B.E.2008, the roles and responsibilities of the Bank of Thailand can be 
summarised as follows: 
1. Prints and issues banknotes and other security documents. The 
BOT is empowered under the Currency Act and has sole rights to 
print and issue banknotes in the Kingdom. 
2. Promotes monetary stability and formulates monetary policies. 
The  BOT  implements  monetary  policy  as  specified  by  (under 
the  authority  of)  the  Monetary  Policy  Committee  performing 
the following: mobilising deposits, determining the interest rate 
for loans to financial institutions, trading foreign exchange and 
exchanging for future cash flow, borrowing foreign exchange in 
order to maintain monetary stability, borrowing money in order to 
implement the monetary policy, trading securities when necessary 
and exchanging for  future cash flow in order to control the money 
supply in the country’s financial system, and borrowing or lending 
the securities with or without returns.
3. Manages the BOT’s assets
  The  BOT  manages  its  assets  (excluding  the  assets  within  the 
currency reserve according to the Currency Act) and invests such 
assets for returns by realizing the security, liquidity, return on 
asset, and management risks.
4. Provides  banking  facilities  to  the  government  and  act  as  the 
registrar for government bonds.       
  The BOT provides banking facilities to the government in terms 
of depository and lending facilities for the Ministry of Finance, 
acts as the custodian for the government, acts as the representative 
of the government for investment in assets and FX, trades and 277
transfers bills of exchange, securities, and share certificates, and 
controls and oversees FX.  In addition, the BOT may provide 
banking facilities to state enterprises or other government agencies. 
Moreover, the BOT acts as the registrar for government bonds by 
acting as the government representative in purchasing and selling 
government bonds, paying principal and interest, and acts as the 
registrar of state enterprises, specialised financial institutions, or 
other government agencies.
5.  Provides banking facilities to the financial institutions.
  The BOT provide banking facilities to the financial institutions 
by acting as lender of last resort for the financial institutions, and 
acts as the custodian for the financial institutions, requiring the 
financial  institutions,  whenever  necessary,  to  report  or  explain 
about their assets, liabilities or contingent liabilities.
6.  Establishes or supports the establishment of payment systems.
  The BOT establishes or supports the establishment of payment 
systems, electronic clearing systems, and administers such systems 
for safety and efficiency.
7.  Supervises and examines the financial institutions.
  The BOT supervises, examines, and analyses the financial status, 
performance,  and  risk  management  system  of  the  financial 
institutions  in  order  to  promote  the  stability  of  the  financial 
institutions. 
8. Manages the country’s foreign exchange rates under the foreign 
exchange system and manage assets in the currency reserve in 
accordance with the Currency Act.
9. Controls the foreign exchange in accordance with the Exchange 
Control Act. 
3.2   Monetary Policy and Instruments   
Under the inflation targeting framework, the BOT implements 
its monetary policy by influencing short-term money market rates via 
the selected key policy rate, currently setting the 1-day repurchase rate. 278
The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) signals shifts in monetary policy 
stance through announced changes in the key policy rate. The BOT uses a 
variety of monetary policy instruments to implement MPC’s interest rate 
decisions.     
   The operational framework of the BOT’s monetary operations 
consists of a set of instruments which can be classified into three categories, 
namely, Reserve Requirements (RR), Open Market Operation (OMO), and 
Standing Facilities (SF).
3.2.1 Reserve Requirements   
Commercial banks are required to maintain the required reserves 
on average over a fortnightly period (starting on a Wednesday and ending 
on  a  second  Tuesday  thereafter)  with  carry-over  provisions  using  the 
previous period’s average level of commercial banks’ deposits/liabilities 
as the base.
The  amount  of  reserves  required  to  be  held  by  each  bank  is 
determined as a percentage of its reserve base. The reserve base comprises 
deposits, short-term foreign borrowings maturing within one year and other 
borrowings with index-linked returns or embedded financial derivatives. 
Currently, the reserve requirement ratio is 6% and the reserveable assets 
consist of: 
1)   A minimum 1% in non-remunerated current account deposits 
at the BOT, (of which not more than 0.2% in cash at the 
central cash centers of  commercial banks can be counted 
towards this component); 
2)   A maximum 2.5% in vault cash; and 
3)   The rest in eligible public securities. 
The averaging provision means that compliance with the reserve 
requirements is determined on the basis of the average of the end-of-
day balances of the banks’ reserveable assets over a maintenance period. 
Such averaging arrangement helps to facilitate the banks’ own liquidity 
management and reduce daily volatility in short-term interest rates. 279
3.2.2 Open Market Operation (OMO) 
In  conducting  open  market  operations,  the  BOT  undertakes 
transactions in financial markets in order to affect the aggregate level of 
reserve balances (financial institutions’ deposits at the BOT) available in 
the banking system, and therefore affect the short-term market interest 
rates. 
OMOs  are  the  most  actively  used  instrument  to  maintain  the 
policy rate, while at the same time ensuring that there is sufficient liquidity 
in the banking system to meet banks’ demand for reserves and settlement 
balances.
The BOT employs five main types of open market operations: 
3.2.2.1 Bilateral Repurchase Operation (Bilateral RP)
 
The  BOT  uses  bilateral  repurchase  and  reverse  repurchase 
transactions to temporarily add or drain reserves available to the banking 
system. The bilateral repurchase operation is conducted through “Primary 
Dealers  (PDs)”  appointed  for  bilateral  RP  transactions.  Normally,  the 
BOT conducts bilateral RP operations in the morning, by notifying the 
bilateral PDs before 9.30am, via Web Portal (a secured internet-based 
communication channel), of the bilateral RP operation the BOT plans to 
conduct that day (inject or absorb at which maturity).      
Figure 8
Bilateral Repurchase Operation
  The BOT has the option of conducting either fixed-rate or variable-
rate tenders. To enhance the signaling effect of the policy rate, a fixed-rate 
tender is conducted for the 1-day tenor while a variable-rate tender applies 
for all other tenors. In other words, when the BOT wishes to conduct a 
1-day bilateral repurchase transaction, it will do so at the policy rate. Thus, 
the PDs will indicate the amounts of money they wish to transact with 
the BOT at the policy rate. In a variable rate tender, PDs will indicate 
the amounts and the interest rates at which they want to transact with the 
BOT.280
The  BOT  has  gradually  been  increasing  the  importance  of 
bilateral repurchase operation in its market operations, as this also fosters 
the development of the Thai money market. In doing so, the BOT has 
increased both the frequency and the amount of its bilateral repurchase 
operations. Currently, the BOT undertakes bilateral repurchase operations 
daily.
3.2.2.2 Outright Purchase/Sale of Government Securities 
To permanently add or drain liquidity available to the banking 
system, the BOT buys or sells government securities outright with Outright 
Primary  Dealers.  The  BOT  usually  adds  rather  than  drains  reserves 
through this channel to accommodate the permanent increase in currency 
in circulation as the economy grows. The scope for outright securities 
transactions by the BOT has greatly improved as the Thai bond market 
becomes more developed.
The procedure for outright operation involves the BOT notifying 
the Outright PDs before 10am, via Reuters Dealing system, the specific 
securities that the BOT would like to buy or sell. The PDs have half an 
hour to respond with their bids/offers indicating yields and amounts. The 
multiple-priced auction procedure is employed. The BOT will inform each 
PD before noon whether or not they have been allocated. Settlement takes 
place two days afterwards.
Although eligible securities include all types of secured public 
debt securities, the BOT has primarily used government bonds in outright 
operations as the market for government bonds is most liquid. 
Figure 9
Outright Purchase/Sale of Government Securities
3.2.2.3 Issuance of Bank of Thailand Bills/Bonds
The BOT started reissuing Bank of Thailand Bills/Bonds in early 
2003, with an aim of expanding the range of instruments used in the 
implementation of monetary policy. This would enhance the flexibility 281
and efficiency in managing money market liquidity and in conducting 
monetary operations.
The BOT determines the total issue size and maturity distribution 
in accordance with the prevailing money market conditions, taking into 
account the issuance schedule of public sector debts. The monthly auction 
calendar is announced in advance on the Bank of Thailand website.
Bills/Bonds  are  issued  through  competitive  multiple-priced 
auctions held mostly on Tuesdays. Settlement takes place two days later 
on Thursdays. Eligible bidders comprise the same institutions as those 
eligible for the bidding of Treasury bills and Government bonds which are 
commercial banks, specialised financial institutions, finance companies, 
finance  and  securities  companies,  securities  companies,  Government 
Pension Fund, provident funds, mutual funds, Social Security Office, life 
and non-life insurance companies, and other institutions which hold their 
current accounts at the Bank of Thailand.
3.2.2.4 Foreign Exchange Swap
The foreign exchange swap is another instrument the Bank of 
Thailand uses to influence liquidity conditions in the money market. It 
supplements other market operations in domestic debt securities quite well 
especially when domestic debt securities are scarce. The FX swap is similar 
to a repurchase agreement in domestic debt securities, the difference being 
that the Thai baht is exchanged for foreign currency, namely the US dollar, 
rather than domestic debt securities.
The BOT facilitates the electronic platform for the bidding of buy-
sell FX swap. Local banks wishing to obtain baht liquidity may do so by 
submitting their bids, via Web Portal, to the BOT before 1.30pm, indicating 
swap points, amount and maturity. The BOT, after taking into account the 
overall money market condition, will notify counterparties their results. 
Settlement usually takes place one or two days afterwards. The BOT will 
occasionally allow same-day settlement in exceptional circumstances. 282
Figure 10
Foreign Exchange Swap
The BOT also conducts liquidity withdrawal operations via sell-
buy FX swap transactions with both onshore and offshore commercial 
banks.  The  sell-buy  FX  swap  operation  is  generally  planned  to  help 
lessen the amount of withdrawal needed to be done through repurchase 
operations. The BOT will either call banks directly asking for quotes or 
access the market via brokers. The transactions are undertaken throughout 
the day, usually for one- or two-day settlement.
Standard  tenors  are  overnight  up  to  1  year,  but  the  FX  swap 
operations  are  more  typically  concentrated  on  the  short  ends  (up  to 
3-month). 
3.2.2.5 Electronic BOT Debt Security (e-PN) Window
The BOT launched the electronic BOT debt security window on 13 
February 2008, after the closure of the BOT-operated repurchase market. 
This is another channel in which the BOT used to withdraw liquidity from 
the banking system in order to maintain short-term money market rates.
The characteristic of the e-PN purchase operation is similar to 
the BOT accepting deposits and issuing e-PN in return. Member financial 
institutions can bid for BOT debt securities by specifying the amount and 
the rate of return of each maturity to the BOT during 4 pm – 4.30 pm. 
The minimum amount per transaction is 100 million baht, with increments 
in multiples of 10 million baht. The BOT will inform the results of their 
tenders by 4.45pm, and settlement takes place within 5 pm on the same 
day.283
Figure 11
Electronic BOT Debt Security (e-PN) Window
The  financial  institutions  wishing  to  access  this  window  are 
required  to  apply  for  membership.  Eligible  financial  institutions  are 
commercial  banks,  finance  companies,  credit  foncier  companies, 
specialised financial institutions, and other juristic persons approved by 
the BOT.
Available maturities of the BOT debt securities are overnight, 7 
days, 14 days, 1 month, 2 months, 3 months and 6 months. The BOT debt 
securities are neither transferable nor eligible to be used as collateral. 
3.2.3 Standing Facilities
The BOT provides collateralised standing overnight facility called 
the “End-of-day Liquidity Adjustment Window” through which the BOT 
offers both overnight lending and borrowing to financial institutions. This 
allows financial institutions with insufficient liquidity at the end of the day 
to pledge collateral to obtain liquidity from the BOT and those with excess 
reserves to lend overnight to the BOT and in return receive a BOT debt 
instrument (e-PN). 
The rate charged on the End-of-day Liquidity Adjustment Window 
is the policy rate plus or minus an adjustable margin depending upon 
whether the BOT is lending to or borrowing from financial institutions.   
Normally, the margin is set at +/- 50 basis points, except for the 3-month 
period following the closure of the BOT-operated repurchase market (13 
February – 12 May 2008) when the BOT temporarily set the margin at 
+/- 25 basis points. With the policy rate currently at 3.25%  per annum, the 
rates charged on the End-of-day Liquidity Adjustment Windows are at 3.0 
and 3.5% per annum. In determining the width of the interest rate corridor, 
considerations have been taken to ensure that the corridor is sufficiently 
wide to encourage market players to adjust liquidity among themselves 
while at the same time narrow enough to ensure that market interest rates 
will fluctuate within an acceptable range.284
Even  though  there  is  no  restriction  on  the  amount  that  each 
institution  can  borrow  through  the  End-of-day  Lending  Facility,  the 
borrowing amount is implicitly capped by the amount of each institution’s 
eligible collateral. The overnight lending facility is also provided as part 
of the BAHTNET RTGS (Real Time Gross Settlement) payment system 
to accommodate the “spill-over” into overnight liquidity of the free-of-
charge intra-day liquidity. In the event that the intra-day liquidity is not 
repaid by the end of the day, banks will be charged the same interest rate 
as that of the End-of-day Lending Facility, thereby effectively using the 
standing overnight credit facility. 
Eligible collateral is the same set as eligible securities used in the 
normal repurchase operations which consist of government bonds, treasury 
bills, FIDF bonds, government-guaranteed state enterprises bonds, and 
BOT bonds.
All transactions through the Liquidity Adjustment Window are 
overnight and are settled on the same day.  The facility is available to 
all financial institutions with deposits at the Bank of Thailand.  Eligible 
financial institutions are commercial banks, finance companies, finance and 
securities companies, and specialised financial institutions. The facility is 
available every working day from 16.30-17.30 except on days with some 
technical problems, the opening hour could be extended to accommodate 
the payment system.
  Apart from its role as liquidity provider, as shown above, the BOT 
also plays a crucial role as financial supervisor and regulator for banks and 
non-banks. 
3.3   Role as Financial Regulator      
The role, responsibilities and supervisory framework of the BOT 
are provided under three major enactments, namely, the Bank of Thailand 
Act, the Financial Institutions Businesses Act, and the Deposit Protection 
Agency Act. They have been amended and came into force in 2008. These 
laws are intended to enhance the BOT’s independence, strengthened risk-
based  supervision,  and  consumer  protection.  They  also  reflect  a  high 
degree of compliance with the international standards. These help ensure 
the safety and soundness of the banking system in Thailand. 
Following the 1997 crisis, the BOT supervisory framework has 
been gradually reformed and improved with the emphasis shifted to risk-285
based, focusing more on a forward-looking approach and high-risk area. 
Risk-based supervision was adopted. 
3.3.1 Key Developments in Bank Supervision in Thailand
Apart from the amendment of the key legislations as mentioned 
above, the following are some of the major enhancements on Thai bank 
supervision:
1)  Implementation of Basel II Framework 
  The Bank of Thailand scheduled to implement Pillar 1 within the 
end of 2008, Pillar III by mid-2009, and Pillar II within 2010. To 
date, the BOT is making progress according to plan. 
2) Implementation of Consolidated Supervision
  The BOT released the Consolidated Supervision Guidelines for 
banks in 2006. A full set of the Consolidated Supervision Policy 
was issued after the Financial Institutions Business Act became in 
effective since August 2008. Commercial banks have identified 
their financial group structure and submitted it to the BOT for 
approval.  
3) Implementation of International Accounting Standard No. 39 (IAS 39) 
  The BOT is in the process of preparing for the implementation 
of  IAS  39,  which  includes  studying  the  accounting  standards, 
drafting practical guidelines and regulations, and assessing the 
financial and operating impact on the financial institutions. 
  With regard to this, the BOT has already prescribed two prudential 
regulations related to IAS 39:
1. Regulation on loan loss provisioning enforced since the end of 2006. 
The regulation requires banks to gradually increase their provision 
to 100% for all loans classified as substandard and doubtful, compared to 
20% and 50% previously. The provisioning amount is calculated based 
on the difference between the loans outstanding and the present value of 
expected cash flow, either by means of repayment or liquidating collaterals. 
Consequently, all banks have fully complied with the ruling since 2007. 286
2.    Regulations  on  accounting,  measurement,  and  the  disclosure  of 
structured products, such as Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDOs) and 
other structured notes. 
4.   Liquidity Risk Management of Banks in Thailand
4.1   Key Drivers Affecting Liquidity  
Liquidity risk is the risk that bank is not able to meet their liability 
obligation when it comes to due. Liquidity risk, therefore, could stem from 
both the asset side and liability side. For the asset side, the risk occurs 
when banks are not able to liquidate the asset in due time, whereas on the 
liability side, the risk arises when banks are not able to seek the fund in 
due time or with high funding cost. 
  Banks liquidity is influenced by a variety of factors. The external 
factors could be attributed to an economic condition, market competition, 
market vulnerability, attitude or belief, or law and regulation.  Whereas, 
the internal factors affecting liquidity in banks are business strategy, source 
of fund structure, off-balance sheet like derivative trading, and market 
accessibility. 
 
In addition to the above factors, overall bank reputational risk, 
direct  interbank  exposures,  market  liquidity  in  capital  markets  and 
disruptions in payment systems also provide the channels for liquidity 
problems affecting an individual bank to spill over causing a market-wide 
disruption of liquidity, like the effects of a contagion. 
  To manage liquidity condition in banks, it is crucial for banks to 
keep in balance their sources of funding and their uses of funds. Banks 
have to match their assets and liabilities in terms of tenor, amount, and 
currency. Funding mismatch could give rise to liquidity problems.
  For liquidity on the asset side, the key asset in banks’ portfolio 
nowadays is bonds and securities. Banks normally hold Thai Government 
bonds and securities.  287
Figure 12
Bank’s Key Asset 
 
 
  On the liability side, deposit seemed to be the key source of liability 
in  the  bank’s  balance  sheet. After  the  adoption  of  Deposit  Protection 
Agency Act, banks have increasingly issued bill of exchange as another 
source of capturing funds from the public.
Figure 13
Bank’s Key Liability 
 
 
  Liquidity would be reflected from both the asset and liability side 
of a bank. If the bank’s assets exceed its liabilities, then the liquidity is in 
surplus. On the other hand, if the bank’s liabilities are larger than its assets, 
the bank may encounter a liquidity shortage. 
  Too much surplus liquidity might create an additional cost burden 
to the bank and reduce the profitability of the bank in the future.288
4.2   Liquidity Risk Management of Banks in Thailand   
To  foster  banks  in  managing  their  liquidity  risk,  the  Bank  of 
Thailand  issued  the  Guideline  on  Liquidity  Risk  Management.  The 
Guideline has been amended on January 2010, in order to follow the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) new Principles of Liquidity 
Risk Management in September 2008. The Guideline sets out the principles 
to strengthen the measurement and management of the liquidity risk in 
banks. Bank should specify the proper level of risk tolerance that matches 
with the bank’s complexity, risk profile, and business model. The level of 
risk tolerance should be approved and regularly reviewed by bank’s Board 
of Directors. The level of risk tolerance would be aligned with the level of 
liquidity cushion and survival period the bank specifies. In managing their 
liquidity position, it is prescribed in the Guideline that banks should maintain 
a cushion of unencumbered, high quality liquid assets as an insurance 
against a range of stress scenarios. On top of that, banks should establish 
a  sub-committee  to  be  responsible  for  the  liquidity  risk  management, 
including policies and strategies like Asset Liability Committee (ALCO). 
Banks should not only manage the liquidity in the bank, but extend the 
practice to cover significant institutions in their conglomerates as well, for 
instance, securities company or asset management company. 
Banks  basically  should  set  out  the  liquidity  risk  management 
system to identify, measure, monitor, and control the liquidity risk. The 
system should be  forward-looking deploying such tools as cash flow 
projection. In the projection, banks should perform a behavioral adjustment 
to their analysis for both the asset side and liability side. Assumptions and 
scenarios should be sound and reasonable. This would help the projections 
to be more accurate and reflect the actual cash inflow and outflow. Data 
for the analysis should cover significant on-balance sheet items and off-
balance sheet positions. Banks should monitor their sources of funds and 
uses of funds, along with the concentration and diversity of funds. It is 
crucial in the diversification of funds to take into account the counterparties, 
products, financial instruments, markets, and currencies. 
Among other things, banks should conduct regular stress tests for 
a variety of short-term and protracted institution-specific and market-wide 
stress scenarios and use the outcomes to develop robust and operational 
contingency  funding  plans.  In  addition,  banks  ought  to  ensure  the 
alignment of risk-taking incentives of individual business lines with the 
liquidity risk exposures the activities create. Another important issue is that 
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positions and risks to meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely 
basis under both normal and stressed conditions, thus contributing to the 
smooth functioning of the payment and settlement systems. 
On top of the above, banks should have a proper database and 
reporting system in place. Bank should have a system to report liquidity 
information and stress test results regularly to bank’s management, sub-
committee, and Board of Directors and on a timely basis. 
In the Guideline, banks are encouraged to conduct liquidity stress 
test regularly at least on a quarterly basis. Assumptions should be set in 
accordance with the current market environment, business strategies, and 
other relevant factors. The test should cover institution-specific crisis, 
market-wide crisis, and the combination of both. Assumptions should take 
into account the bank’s characteristics, weaknesses, interconnection of 
other risks to a liquidity risk, and the connection between market liquidity 
to the bank’s funding capability. Haircut on the value of assets, like fixed 
income securities or foreign currency, should be set reasonably for the 
stressed time. 
The Bank of Thailand also encourages banks to disclose sufficient 
information with regard to their liquidity position regularly utilising both 
qualitative and quantitative data. This would help enhance the efficiency, 
transparency, and discipline in the market.
The level of liquidity risk management would depend on the size, 
nature of business and complexity of a bank’s activities. The selection of 
tools and indicators would primarily depend on the bank’s business model, 
historical bank’s crisis, and nature of cash inflow and outflow.
In the practice of liquidity management, banks would have a well 
established  sub-committee  like ALCO  to  set  up  liquidity  policies  and 
strategies, establish funding strategy, and oversight of the overall liquidity 
management of a bank. The treasury function is normally responsible for 
short-term or intra-day liquidity management and cash flow projection, 
while the Asset Liability Management (ALM) would perform medium- 
to  long-term  liquidity  management.  Business  units  like  the  lending 
department or deposit department have a duty to report expected large 
cash outflows to treasury for their management and projection. The risk 
management function would normally monitor and control liquidity risk 
and limits, together with performing stress test modeling and behavioral 
adjustment. The risk management in several banks serves as an operational 
arm for ALCO. 290
  A common approach for measuring and managing liquidity risk is 
the use of cash flow projections by mapping expected future cash inflows 
and outflows to maturity buckets and doing a liquidity gap analysis, while 
accounting for expected counterbalancing capacity in the business to fill 
those gaps. Counterbalancing capacity refers to the liquidity that a firm is 
expecting to be able to access over a given time frame. The cumulative 
sum of all cash inflows comprises the liquidity available to cover liquidity 
outflows from both on-balance and off-balance sheet positions.  Liquidity 
risk should be managed in order to meet the net cumulative cash outflow 
within a certain time period, starting with one day and going out in time, 
after applying risk management techniques to reduce the net cumulative 
cash outflow, and using the liquidity generation from the counterbalancing 
capacity of assets, liabilities, funding sources and other measures.
  Furthermore, Liquidity Gap and Maturity Gap would be viewed 
as  the  standard  tools  of  liquidity  risk  measurement.  Negative  gap  or 
positive gap would highly depend on bank’s view on projected interest 
rate movement. Banks may have a positive gap if they forecast that the 
market interest rate is on the rise, whereas a negative gap may be hold if 
the view of interest rate is decreasing. 
Moreover, some banks deploy Early Warning System (EWS) tools 
as a preventive measure of liquidity risk management. Trigger point, alert, 
or limit may be prescribed as a warning sign for bank’s management to 
closely monitor and prevent a problem. The definition of an indicative 
signal can be derived from a qualitative approach or quantitative approach, 
for instance, downgrade on bank’s rating, decline of stock price, deposit 
outflow, deterioration of long-term borrowing ability, and so forth. Banks 
should establish clear responsibilities on EWS implementation, including 
monitoring, analysing, and reporting. 291
4.3   Quantitative Tools for Liquidity Risk Measurement
  With regard to the BOT Guideline and the current practices of 
Thai banks, some of the quantitative tools and indicators of liquidity risk 
measurement deployed are listed below.
Cumulative cash outflows (i) 
Concentration in assets and liabilities  (ii) 
Daily deposit outflow (iii) 
Loan-to-deposit ratio or loan-to-deposit, plus B/E ratio (iv) 
Borrowed funds to total assets (v) 
Commitment to lend to total assets (vi) 
Liquid Asset to illiquid asset (vii) 
Size of mismatch for short term perspective (viii) 
Ratio of liquid asset to short-term liability (liquidity reserve) (ix) 
Excess liquidity over the minimum requirement (x) 
Ratio of large depositor to total liabilities (xi) 
Major source & use of fund (xii) 
Limit System: Typically a limit system is used to manage liquidity  (xiii) 
within maturity buckets. Limit systems could vary in their form 
and application. It can vary from ratio approaches over different 
time horizons or maturity buckets, to explicit detailed limit-driven 
steering of funding and revenue generation. Limits can be set for all 
periods with no possibility of exceeding the threshold at any time 
as Hard Limit, or with the possibility of exceeding the threshold 
only for a number of days per period or with permission as Soft 
Limit, for driving front-office activities through the allocation of 
liquidity costs, etc.
 
Those  ratios  are  closely  monitored.  Banks  through  their  Risk 
Management Unit monitor and analyse the movement of these ratios, 
assessing at the same time whether they reach the trigger or not. Normally 
a report of these indicators is generated daily. The bank’s management and 
Board of Directors are notified on the status and movement of these ratios 
from time to time, for instance, on weekly, monthly, or quarterly basis. 
5.   Crisis Management and Bank Resolution     
The BOT has in place a sound crisis management framework 
to facilitate prompt and coordinated action in the event of a crisis. A 
contingency plan has been prepared to deal with a systemic banking crisis 
and a continuity plan for disaster events. A crisis management committee 292
(CMC) chaired by the BOT Governor is designated to act as the central 
command to coordinate and manage banking crisis resolution. The BOT 
has established transparent guidelines governing the use of emergency 
credit to lend to banks perceived as solvent but illiquid. A working group 
has also been set up to formulate scenarios for testing once every year and 
to provide feedback to make improvements in the contingency plans. 
  Regarding the Liquidity Management Guidelines issued by the 
Bank of Thailand, banks should prepare the contingency plan that specifies 
policies, strategies, and process in the time of crisis. The plan must be in 
a written form and be flexible enough for implementation. Banks should 
set a plan to be able to cover different levels of crisis severity. Banks 
should also establish a Contingency Funding Plan that suits their financial 
performance, strategies, complexity of transaction and bank’s risk profile.
  The  Liquidity  Contingency  plan  should  align  with  the  bank’s 
business  continuity  plan.  The  Liquidity  Contingency  plan  should  be 
reviewed at least yearly. In the plan, communication and public relations 
action plan and process should be clearly established to communicate both 
within the organisation and to others like bank’s depositors, creditors, 
press, shareholders, and the Bank of Thailand.
5.1   Lessons Learned  
For Thailand, learning the lessons of the 1997 financial crisis have 
helped the nation survive through the current global turmoil. The dangers 
of funding mismatches and highly leveraged balance sheets are among the 
key lessons learned by Thailand a decade ago. Emerging from the crisis, 
Thai banks have significantly improved their financial discipline and skills 
in managing financial risks inherited in the banking environment. With 
regard to the recent global financial crisis in 2008, it was inevitable for 
Thai banks to be impacted. They saw their profits come under pressure. 
Nevertheless, their balance sheet remained relatively strong. Thai banking 
sector today remains resilient, with ample liquidity and capital funds. 
The previous Asian financial crisis had led to many important 
policy reform initiatives, all of which were aimed at strengthening the 
robustness  and  risk  management  discipline  of  the  domestic  financial 
system. In the case of Thailand, following the restoration of financial 
stability in the early 2000s, financial reform became the top priority, with 
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Thai  banks  also  adopted  a  macro-prudential  approach  in  the 
early 2000s, in recognition of the systemic linkages between the financial 
system and the macroeconomic conditions.  From 2003 to 2006, a series 
of macro-prudential measures were introduced, aiming at controlling the 
rapid growth of credit, especially credit card loans and mortgage loans. 
The preventive measures that were introduced included placing limits on 
the loan-to-value ratio for luxury mortgage, raising minimum repayment 
requirements for credit cards and personal loans, and strengthening the 
NPL provisions by fair valuation standards of International Accounting 
Standard  39.  These  measures  have  been  useful  in  reducing  excessive 
leverage and household indebtedness, thus helping to maintain stability in 
the Thai domestic financial system. 
Risk-based supervision was a key driving force in strengthening 
the risk management practices of Thai financial institutions. The financial 
institutions and central banking laws have been overhauled to keep up 
with the increased complexity of the financial system. The new Financial 
Institutions Business Act, enacted in August 2009, empowers the Bank of 
Thailand to regulate banks and non-banks under a consolidated supervision 
regime. Furthermore, the risk management and governance practices of the 
financial institutions have also been strengthened. The Board of Directors 
is now held accountable by law for setting the strategic and policy goals 
of banks, while corporate governance guidance and notifications under the 
fit-and-proper rule for the appointment of bank management have been 
put in place. 
Thai banks have been positive in embracing these changes, as 
they contribute to a more open, more accountable, and more transparent 
financial  system.  Risk  management  and  supervision  method  for  Thai 
banks is progressively forward-looking and highlights the importance of 
stress testing as a risk management and supervisory tool. During the past 
four years, the Bank of Thailand has conducted stress testing, both top-
down and bottom-up by requiring local banks to do the same, for risk 
management and capital planning purposes. Currently, stress testing has 
become an integral part of the supervisory process. From the experience, 
stress testing is supposed to be an extremely useful process and dialogue 
for identifying potential weaknesses of banks in a forward-looking manner, 
as well as in alerting bank management as to the adoption of the necessary 
corrective actions. 
As  a  result  of  the  macro-prudential  framework  implemented 
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management of banks, Thai banks have remained resilient to the impact of 
the global financial turmoil. 
6.   Conclusion and Policy Recommendations  
Looking ahead, there are some challenges posed by the global 
economic and financial developments. Although the risk-based supervision 
remains a robust and valid concept, there are some weaknesses when 
it  comes  to  practice.  These  weaknesses  include  the  inability  to  deal 
with  complexity  arising  from  such  mechanisms  as  credit  derivatives, 
securitisation, OTC derivatives, as well as the problem of procyclicality 
and systemic risk associated with valuation and performance management 
issues. 
Consequentially, it is an essential to strengthen risk measurement, 
management,  and  supervision,  so  that  banks  can  truly  capture  risk  of 
individual institutions overtime, and risk arising from interconnectedness 
of key components of the system, to safeguard financial stability. It is 
crucial to strengthen both micro- and macro-prudential regulations.
From the crisis, macro-prudential policy has been increasingly 
accepted, as it takes into account the interconnectedness within the financial 
systems as well as between the financial system and the real economy. The 
issue of systemic risk and procyclicality is highlighted. The proposals by 
the G20, the BCBS, as well as international accounting standards are in 
line with the risk-based principle. While the range of policy is extensive, 
the key driving forces are the strengthening of risk-based micro-prudential 
regulation, and emergence of the explicit importance given to macro-
prudential supervision to tackle the problem of procyclicality and systemic 
risk.
The  key  macro-prudential  policy  framework  that  has  received 
wide support to deal with procyclicality problems includes the followings. 
Firstly, there is a proposal for the built-up of capital buffer in the good times 
to be run down in the bad times and to prevent excessive credit growth. 
Secondly, provisioning should be linked with expected loss rather than 
incurred loss. This leads to provision management to be more forward-
looking to potential problems in the future. 
Finally,  the  primarily  simple  and  transparent  “leverage  ratio” 
should  be  applied  as  a  complement  to  risk-based  capital  requirement 
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to significant work on calibration as well as qualitative issues, such as 
consistency with risk-sensitive capital framework, and international level-
playing field. Such problems magnify in the case of emerging markets, 
which face constraint on data and institutional capacity.
  However, the reform will need to pay proper attention to capacity 
building and collaboration of banks and regulators. 
Turning to the key micro-prudential policy framework currently 
being discussed at the international forums to ensure individual financial 
institution’s  stability,  the  BCBS  has  proposed  a  package  to  address 
previous shortcomings in risk-based supervision as follows. For Pillar I, 
the regulatory capital for securitisation exposure is enhanced. In addition, 
the quality and transparency of capital is strengthened especially Tier I 
capital,  which  would  consist  mainly  of  common  equity  and  retained 
earnings. 
For Pillar II, the supplemental guidelines are issued by requiring 
banks to manage firm-wide, concentration and reputational risks more 
effectively.  Valuation  and  stress-testing  practices  are  also  improved. 
Moreover, compensation and bonus schemes should be aligned with long-
term risk-taking behavior and performance. 
Regarding Pillar III, key focus is on disclosure requirements to 
reduce uncertainties associating with securitisation exposures. Additional 
requirements  include,  for  example,  sponsorship  of  off-balance  sheet 
vehicles, and re-securitisation exposures. 
On  top  of  these,  a  new  consultative  paper  on  liquidity  risk 
management  inclusive  of  new  liquidity  measurement  ratios  has  been 
introduced.  This  new  regulation  is  designed  to  ensure  that  banks, 
particularly internationally active banks, maintain ample liquidity at all 
times, both in the normal period and stress time, underpinned by longer-
term structural liquidity ratio. In this regard, liquidity stress scenarios 
would be determined by supervisors. 
Our  stance  on  the  implementation  of  any  new  regulatory  and 
supervisory  change  includes  the  following  points.  First,  regarding 
micro-prudential policy framework, the BOT already has the process to 
enhance understanding and adjustment of banks for the implementation 
of the related standards, for example, through hearings on new measures 
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policy framework is a more challenging area, particularly in terms of data 
limitations and policy calibration. 
Amongst  these,  Basel  II  implementation,  especially  adequacy 
of capital, ICAAP and stress testing practices is on top of the list. The 
principles stipulated in Pillar II are in line with the existing risk-based 
supervision used by the BOT, but places greater focus on the qualitative 
aspect  of  risk  management  and  assessment  of  capital  adequacy.  For 
example, the role of the Board of Directors and senior management in 
the assessment and formulation of strategy on capital management for the 
current and future periods has been stressed. 
In  this  regard,  banks  would  ensure  they  have  a  good  risk 
management  system,  with  an  ICAAP  that  covers  all  significant  risks, 
including those  stipulated under  Pillar I  as  well  as  other  risks. These 
other risks should at least include credit concentration risk, interest-rate 
risk in banking book, liquidity risk, strategic risk and reputational risk.   
Moreover, it is desirable that banks maintain capital above the minimum 
regulatory requirement to withstand future losses both in normal and stress 
situations. 
To achieve this, banks should conduct stress tests and formulate 
capital plan in accordance with the stress test results in a systematic and 
continuous manner. Thai banks are assuming to start using their ICAAP by 
the end of December 2010.
Moreover, in maintaining adequacy of capital over the business 
cycle, it is  very important to focus on countering procyclicality. Thai 
banks should have sufficient capital, liquidity, and provision buffer over 
the business cycle.
After the trend of universal banking, banks are inclined towards 
having their own financial groups to better accommodate market needs. 
Therefore, it is crucial to focus on consolidated supervision to ensure 
adequacy not only in capital, but also in risk management of the entire 
banking group, particularly with regard to liquidity risk. 
With  respect  to  foreign  banks,  cross-border  supervisory 
coordination should be strengthened, particularly on better information 
sharing between home and host supervisors. This has proven to be crucial 
as the current crisis shows that there is a need for home supervisors of 
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local operations may be systemically important for the host economies, 
particularly concerning the liquidity issue. The interconnection between 
markets and institutions is in view.  
In conclusion, the bank business model is likely to become more 
conservative,  placing  less  reliance  on  wholesale  financing  and  use  of 
leverage, while focusing more on risk management and higher liquidity 
buffer. Consumers themselves will be more risk averse preferring to stick 
with simple transactions and products. The regulatory framework will be 
strengthened, especially the use of macro-prudential oversight that focuses 
on  system-wide  stability. As  such,  closer  supervision  of  systemically 
important  financial  institutions,  including  non-banks,  will  be  crucial. 
Finally, the micro-prudential oversight will also be strengthened to rectify 
the previously identified problems, particularly the Basel II framework, 
corporate governance, and incentive misalignment. These will strengthen 
the resilience of the Thai banking sector, and a strong financial system will 
be the backbone of sustainable economic growth in the long term.298